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The telecentre movement is more than two decades old. What started as an
attempt to help farmers in rural Sweden1 learn more about their financial
accounts from spreadsheets has morphed into a worldwide movement. And
‘movement’ is the right word rather than institution, organization or system.
The source fuel for the people that start, manage and grow telecentres is
their service to the community and the skills they learn and grow. Telecentres
have mushroomed into worldwide phenomena because of the unbridled
advocacy for their usefulness that those who have had the telecentre experi-
ence possess. This experiential learning and professional passion is difficult to
share without the actual experience of helping a telecentre and the movement
succeed.
What is the role of research and the researcher in this type of movement?
Does the researcher stand outside the movement and offer detached empiricist
observation disconnected from the actual development experience? This
volume illustrates the intellectual movement of its author from that of
abstracted positivist to applied telecentre partisan. Her research isn’t aimed at
a disinterested academy where the goal is only professional promotion. It is
focused as much on helping telecentre practitioners understand from one
another’s experiences and, equally, building a bridge to those who don’t yet
understand, and should.
Because the telecentre movement is without the normative patterns of more
traditional institutions, it is sometimes difficult for academics to understand
what they are observing. As they sit outside the tacit knowledge, informal
learning, unstratified relations and networked knowledge dissemination, the
culture of the telecentre and its movement can seem disorganized and in need
of ‘professional’ guidance. It is only by entering the gestalt of the digital
development experience the telecentre represents that understanding of its
assets and its needs for further development can really be achieved.
As a young professional researcher, the author has managed this in a
1 The first rural telecentre, or telecottage as it was then called, was established in
Velmdalen, Sweden in 1985 by Henning Albrechtson.
remarkable way. Her volume speaks to the commitment of the telecentre
activists she has worked with and observed. It also speaks to the fact that this
she, and this volume, have now become a part of the telecentre movement.
Rich Fuchs
Director
Information and Communications Technologies for Development
International Development Research Centre
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Executive Summary
Introduction
This study examines the role that shared access centres play in government
strategies to provide universal access to information and communication
technologies (ICTs). It also aims to shed light on the external factors that affect
the performance of these centres. The analysis draws on the experiences of
South Africa and Uganda in 2003, at the policy and community levels. Both
countries have policies regarding universal access and have taken steps to
achieve their policy goals.
In this study, shared access centres are understood to exist in the context of a
broader universal access policy, which is itself embedded in a national develop-
ment policy framework. They are affected, and sometimes directly created,
by policy and implementation processes, and involve a variety of actors at the
local, national and international levels. Key actors include licensed telecom-
munication operators, regulators, donor agencies and local professionals.
This research examined the situation in selected urban and rural com-
munities in Uganda and South Africa. The more than 50 centres that were
reviewed in the course of the study are classified into seven types:
• phone shops;
• Internet cafés;
• communication centres (including computer training centres);
• services within an existing business (eg, a hair salon, traditional healer or
stationery shop);
• services within an existing not-for-profit organization;
• telecentres;
• centres that are part of an integrated development strategy.
Four factors are posited as important to the success of shared access centres in
achieving universal access and maximizing development potential: scalability,
sustainability, reach and use. They cumulatively contribute to the develop-
ment impact of such centres. The apparent impact of access centres is analysed
in two ways. Firstly, the situation in communities is compared with the goals
motivating universal access policy in each country. Secondly, characteristic
usage of different access centres is analysed in the context of the livelihood
strategies commonly used by different people within the case communities.
Key findings and recommendations
The key findings from this report are presented below as 11 lessons, each
presented briefly with some evidence and explanation, and specific recom-
mendations where appropriate.
Lesson 1. Access centres are generally not adequate by themselves to build
local demand.
Evidence/rationale
Usage patterns at telecentres in both South Africa and Uganda show that cer-
tain services, especially those related to computers and information services,
tend to be poorly utilized, whilst some others, including telephone and photo-
copying, may enjoy moderate to high levels of demand. Similarly, private
enterprises have greater success when offering the latter services rather than
the former. This is especially true in more rural communities, and demand
within these underused services does not show any tendency to increase
over time. Rather, these services tend to be difficult to maintain over time,
especially where telecommunication and electricity services are expensive
and/or erratic. People using computer-related services tend to have higher
levels of education (secondary or above) and often have had some prior
exposure to computers through school, work, or are introduced through a
friend or family member. Unless people have other venues for building their
awareness of and confidence in using ICTs, telecentres have not proven a
robust method of overcoming the multiple barriers to access that many people
face.
Recommendations
Policy makers should focus on creating an enabling environment for access
centres, especially by focusing on liberalization of the national telecommuni-
cation market. They should also recognize that, with the use of computers and
the Internet, people need time and space in which to learn basic skills, and
that fee-based access is not a viable way to achieve this. Computers in schools
may be one option, although this solution has its own set of challenges. Those
with the task of setting up centres need to first assess the local situation, not
just needs but also feasibility and potential risks.
Lesson 2. Because access to ICTs is difficult to achieve in rural areas through
market means, and may not by itself be a primary development goal, it




Stand-alone access centres are difficult to maintain in rural areas and tend to
have limited market demand, with the exception of phone services. This also
means that, even when externally supported, they tend to have limited use
and impact. Integrating ICTs into larger rural development projects means
that these technologies can contribute to overall development goals while the
projects themselves make ICT service provision more feasible, although still
dependent on overall national market structures. This approach can support
ICT services by providing an anchor market, stimulating demand and helping
people to locate and apply useful information. South Africa and Uganda have
large national programmes that may demonstrate this lesson, but they are still
in too early a phase to permit comment on their practical success. RANET
(Radio and Internet) Uganda, a programme to deliver climatic information to
farmers, has demonstrated success through building on the existing infra-
structure of World Vision’s area development offices.
Recommendations
Stand-alone access centres should be pursued as an option only where local
markets have demonstrated capacity to support them. Otherwise, ICT access
should be integrated into other development activities. How this is done will
depend very much on national development priorities and programmes. This
approach should be viewed as social investment; it may take time and will
require careful planning. It may also benefit from cross-sectoral collaboration
within government and partnerships between government and external
stakeholders, including NGOs and private sector service providers.
Lesson 3. Any attempt to implement ICT access centres will be strongly
constrained (or enabled) by the national telecommunication market.
Evidence/rationale
For example, in South Africa the attempts of the Universal Service Agency to
institute self-sustaining community telecentres have been severely under-
mined by the high cost and poor service provided by the incumbent tele-
communication operator. Had greater technological choice and market
competition been available, some common problems would have been
avoided and the telecentres would have had a much greater chance of
long-term survival. Thus, it was a strategic error, at the national level, to put
resources and effort into implementing access centres when they depended
on a single provider whose services they could not afford.
Recommendations
This lesson reinforces the need for national telecommunication market liberal-
ization and regulation. It also suggests that government should not consider
direct implementation of access centres without addressing these issues. Like-
wise, third parties may be more effective as consumer advocates and lobbyists
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where vested interests are preventing reforms that would be in the public
interest, rather than creating expensive stand-alone centres that are neither
sustainable nor replicable.
Lesson 4. Universal access for telephone requires strategies different from
those needed for other ICTs (especially computer-related), since the former
usually enjoys immediate demand while the latter does not.
Evidence/rationale
In both South Africa and Uganda, telephone services were generally well used
and appreciated where they were available, whereas other ICT services were
generally underutilized and did not have ready local demand. This meant that,
in many cases, stand-alone telephone access could be sustained through user
fees, whereas other types of ICT services were much more difficult to sustain.
Awareness of computers and the Internet was generally lower than that of
telephone service, thus presenting obvious extra barriers to the use of these
technologies. Another explanation is that communication is widely valued
and appreciated more than information-related services, an observation fur-
ther reinforced by the fact that the Internet, where accessed, is used primarily
for e-mail.
Recommendations
Telephone access and use are issues best considered separately from Internet
access and use, especially since Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM) cellular networks have contributed broadly to the spread of the former.
Nevertheless, policy makers should maintain a holistic view that considers the
possible relationship between the two: trends of technological convergence,
especially voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), may again reduce the distance
between these two in terms of access, if not usage, if telephone demand
becomes a driver for Internet infrastructure.
Lesson 5. ICT access centres are an important but politically weak part of the
access chain. They often get short-shrifted in terms of service quality and cost.
This undermines their chances of long-term survival and acts as a disincentive
to the creation of such centres in the first place.
Evidence/rationale
Sustainability is often a struggle for both public and private access centres in
both countries, especially in South Africa. Public access providers must buy
their services from a limited number of licensed telecommunication operators.
Prices are already high and they cannot mark them up for consumers. This
means their profit margins are often dangerously low even where local
demand is present. A fairer approach is Vodacom’s community service pro-
gramme, whereby it gives preferential rates to entrepreneurs running its phone
shop franchises. These entrepreneurs make good profits while offering public
services at local market rates, adding significantly to the sustainability, rapid
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spread and community development value of these enterprises. This is a model
that should be more widely encouraged by public policy.
Recommendations
Regulators should consider encouraging or supporting preferential tele-
communication service rates (and possibly electricity rates) to agencies,
whether public or private, which provide public access.
Lesson 6. Affordability is still a major barrier to accessibility in both countries.
Evidence/rationale
In both South Africa and Uganda, unaffordable prices are cited by users, non-
users and access providers as a major reason for the limited use of ICTs. The
affordability problem is in turn attributed largely to lack of competition in the
national market. For example, where cellular markets have proven much more
lucrative than expected, there has not been a large drop in the consumer price
of services (Tusubira et al., 2004). In South Africa, the high cost of landline
telephones has increased at a rate that, according to analysts, exceeded any
reasonable explanation other than the self-interested profit motive of the
major operator and the government’s failure to regulate in the public interest
(Emdon, 2003). This in turn has led to very low rates of Internet use, even in
Khayelitsha, one of the largest townships in the country.
Recommendations
Since much of the affordability problem relates to lack of competition, the
highest priority is to liberalize the market, and especially to allow different
technologies, such as VoIP. Independent regulation is obviously crucial. This
may be aided in turn by the presence of organizations that can represent and
advocate for the interests of consumer and small business organizations. The
regulator, too, must be able to act in the public interest and consider where
this prevails above the usual logic of the market – for example, through
provision of free emergency calls to police or medical authorities.
Lesson 7. The popular view of ICTs casts computers as a tool for the educated
only. This limits spontaneous appropriation of ICTs even where physical
access is provided.
Evidence/rationale
This perceived link between computers and education was recorded in both
South Africa and Uganda and came across strongly in all community house-
hold surveys, especially when people were explaining why they did not use
computers. If one does not have an education and is not intending to get a
formal job, there is little motivation to use computers. This conflicts with
some policy assumptions that computers, and especially the Internet accessed
through computers, can be tools to support broader democracy and bring the
government closer to the people.
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Recommendations
Avoid assumptions about how people will choose to use ICTs; any policy that
depends on people’s interaction with ICTs should be based on evidence.
Otherwise, any development goal that counts on people using ICTs a certain
way may also need to include the requisite social structures to encourage such
use. South Africa’s Multipurpose Community Centres (MPCCs), for example,
are, according to the government agency in charge of co-ordinating them,
explicitly intended to help people find information based on and relevant to
their most general queries and concerns. Public information terminals, earlier
implemented by the South African Department of Communications, were
intended to help people obtain government information, but were not used
much.
Lesson 8. Where ICTs are available and used, not all uses yield financial
returns for their users or their communities. Thus, certain ICT uses, whilst
benefiting large, often foreign telecommunication and equipment providers,
may impede local economic development. For this reason, the presence of
ICTs within communities cannot be presumed to indicate development,
except where there is also evidence of some gain to the locality in which they
are present.
Evidence/rationale
In both Uganda and South Africa, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that
cellular phone ownership is a major social status symbol. People, especially the
young, are reported to be willing to pay a large proportion of their income and
savings towards purchasing and maintaining a phone. (To a lesser extent,
e-mail and Internet use is also a status symbol.) In Internet cafés, services are
used primarily for e-mail, and secondarily for games and other entertainment
which have no clear economic return. Again, this contradicts the optimistic
national policy assumption that ICTs will be used in ways that stimulate
development.
Recommendations
Since national universal access strategies are motivated by a desire for devel-
opment and equal opportunity, they should be monitored through indicators
which, going beyond mere access, are tied to national development priorities.
Affordability of ICT services also needs to be defined by the national regulator
according to national conditions.
Lesson 9. The relationship between the market and initiatives set up by
external funders varies according to factors such as infrastructure and local
economic activity. Market factors are often not well assessed or understood
before a project is implemented. This can result in funded projects which,
driven by their own sustainability requirements, emulate rather than
complement their market counterparts.
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Evidence/rationale
In Uganda, donor-funded telecentres were often slower to react to new market
and technological opportunities than their private-sector counterparts. The
African Highlands Initiative (AHI) telecentres in both Nabweru and Kabale
had to disconnect their dial-up Internet connections when private com-
petitors got cheaper broadband access. Neither managed to extend its user base
significantly outside the same segment of the population that private centres
catered to, and neither could meet its operating costs as had been intended by
the project planners.
Recommendations
Any agency involved in implementing a not-for-profit access centre needs to
assess the current and likely future market situation in the locale where the
centre is to be located. Specifically, if the market is not active in the area, why
not? It may be because of lack of demand, or because the infrastructure makes
offering services far too expensive, or because entrepreneurs do not have
start-up capital. Once the local context is understood, the implementing
agents should be clear as to what their centre will accomplish that the market
cannot, so that it does not become victim to the same limitations (eg, poor
infrastructure) or simply end up offering the same services already available
through the market. Partnership with and support for local entrepreneurs
should be considered.
Lesson 10. Sustainability implies managing costs and complexity. Embed-
ding ICT services within, and building upon, existing institutions is one of the
best ways to do this. That strategy can also help maximize the development
impact of services.
Evidence/rationale
World Links school-based telecentres in Uganda, the New Era Driving School
in Khayelitsha, and RANET Uganda’s partnership with World Vision are all
examples of how the provision of ICT access has been sustained in large part
by embedding it in an existing institution.
Recommendations
Those who implement access centres should consider collaborating with
and, where possible, working within existing organizations in communities.
Policy makers should consider ways to encourage such organizations to
provide public access to their own ICT facilities where they exist. This can be
done, for example, by easing licensing requirements and giving preferential
rates or tax incentives. However, these organizations may have characteristics
that will prevent them reaching the whole public, and these should also be
taken into consideration. For example, schools are often slightly isolated and
may be unwelcoming to illiterate community members.
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Lesson 11. One of the biggest impacts of ICT use appears to be the main-
tenance of links between geographically dispersed family members. This may
help to equalize other inequalities implied by the introduction of ICTs since
family members with better education, ICT skills and related job opportunities
usually share economic benefits with extended family members who would
otherwise be unable to benefit.
Evidence/rationale
Telephones are most commonly used for communicating with family
members. Significantly, this is a use that cuts across all sectors of society in
both countries. For example, rural, largely subsistence-based family members
use the telephone to communicate with formally employed relatives based
in towns and cities. This communication facilitates the ongoing function
of extended family support networks within and across countries. In Uganda,
many families have overseas relatives and e-mail is likewise used by some of
these as a cheap means of maintaining contact.
Recommendations
The role of within-country migration and international Diaspora com-
munities in maintaining and contributing to rural development, and the role
of ICTs in supporting it, is an area requiring greater attention from both policy
makers and researchers.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xxiii
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
This book focuses on developing understanding around two key issues:
• the role that different models of shared access ICT (information
and communication technology) centres have played in meeting
universal access goals and supporting development in South Africa and
Uganda;
• the external factors that have facilitated and constrained the activities of
these centres.
Shared access ICT centres include cybercafés, telecentres, public phone shops
and booths, computer secretarial services, and any centre, for profit or not,
that provides shared public access to one or more ICTs.1
South Africa and Uganda were selected for the study because their political
leaders had expressed commitment to the idea of using ICTs for development,
and because both countries have had relatively early experience in putting
such ideas into action. Each country chose a different path to implement its
ideas, with much of Uganda’s early experiences sparked by foreign donor
interest. Thus, the depth and range of experience within these two countries
provide a valuable opportunity for broader learning around these issues. The
analysis is based on a review of national policy and implementation strategies,
case studies of access centres in five communities (two in South Africa, three in
Uganda), and analysis of the links between national policy and strategies and
on-the-ground experiences. This analysis is intended to clarify the role that
access centres play in larger universal access and development strategies. This
is further used to identify and recommend strategies that policy makers, donor
agencies and supportive intermediaries (such as national NGOs, networks and
associations) can use to support and strengthen shared ICT centres and to
increase their developmental impact.
The study had four research objectives:
• describing what universal access means and is intended to achieve, as
stated by policy and national leaders in South Africa and Uganda;
• exploring what forms shared access centres have taken and their role in
national universal access strategies;
• analysing the roles that different forms of shared access centres have
played in development;
• identifying the ways policy makers, donors and supportive intermediaries
can expand, sustain and use shared access initiatives to achieve universal
access goals and maximize developmental benefits.
Key definitions
Shared access centres
Shared access centres, sometimes referred to as access points, are resources
available to either all or a significant segment of the public. They provide
direct access to ICTs and related value-added services. Common examples
are public telephones, cybercafés, telecentres, computer training centres, and
computer secretarial services and business centres.
Telecentres
‘Telecentre’ is a widely recognized term that encompasses most variants of
shared access facility with an explicit development objective. Most telecentres
are multipurpose, offering a range of services and ICTs, often including photo-
copying, computer typesetting, faxing, Internet (although many are beset by
connectivity problems), phone and computer training, plus other value-added
services that vary from site to site. Most telecentres in Africa have been
established by external funding agencies in partnership with local NGOs
and/or government structures. They are intended to ‘bridge the digital divide’
by reaching those who otherwise would be unlikely to access services. As such,
telecentres are sometimes located in places where the market is not providing
such services, or otherwise attempt to reach a broader segment of the popula-
tion than the market would.
Information and communication technologies (ICTs)
The term ICTs usually refers to telecommunication-related and digital com-
puter technologies, although with technological convergence, the distinction
between telecommunication and broadcasting technologies is decreasing in
both clarity and relevance. This research focuses specifically on telephone,
fax, computer and Internet/e-mail, although it also includes a project that
uses data and voice transmission over satellite broadcasts. While radio is also
considered within the scope of the research, it is not considered an ICT but
rather a ‘close relative’, while television and other media are not included. This
follows general convention and the definitions used in most national access
policies.
2 TELECENTRES, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT
Universal access
Universal access is a common policy goal in which 100 per cent of the popula-
tion is able to make use of a publicly available resource, whether it be basic
schooling, health centres, or in this instance, ICTs. Universal access to ICTs
is defined by some benchmark that changes from country to country and
over time. For example, South Africa defined universal access as the popula-
tion within 30 minutes of a public telephone, while Uganda defined it
as a public telephone at every subcounty or community with a population of
5,000 or more. Once targets are reached, the benchmarks can be raised: for
example, from within 30 to within 15 minutes of a telephone. Rapid tech-
nological change also requires that these definitions be regularly reviewed.
Most policies attempt to be ‘technologically neutral,’ focusing on the service
(ie, point-to-point voice telephony) rather than the means of achieving it. In
practice, however, monopoly rights granted through licensing often limit the
application of new technologies that could otherwise help to reach access
targets.
Universal service
Universal service is a common policy goal whereby 100 per cent of the popula-
tion is able to receive, by reasonable request and at a reasonable cost, a specific
service on an individual or household basis. Traditionally, in the realm of ICTs,
the target has been universal telephone service; that is, all households should
be able to have, on request, home telephone service at an affordable rate. This
definition has expanded in many countries to include value-added phone
services such as messaging and voice mail as well as data transmission and
Internet capacity. In countries with low average incomes and very low tele-
densities, universal service is not normally an immediate short-term policy
goal, but may remain as a long-term goal.
Development
In this research, ‘development’ is understood in two senses. Firstly, it is pro-
gress towards whatever a national government has defined within its policy as
the priority goals of its people.2 Secondly, it refers to the increased capacity to
choose. When applied to a community or national collective, this definition
further requires that the capacity of one individual to choose does not reduce
the range of freedom of others. Thus, it is an increase in the overall range of
choice and freedom at the individual and collective level. This latter definition
is based primarily on the work of Amartya Sen.
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Context and rationale
Brief background on universal access in South Africa and Uganda
In recent years, universal access to ICTs has become a policy goal for many
national governments, international development agencies and intergovern-
mental agencies such as those of the United Nations. ICTs are widely seen as a
fundamental element of a newly emerging global information (or knowledge)
society. As such, they represent both threat and promise. They may lead to
greater opportunities for those who can partake of them; but they may also
lead to greater exclusion for those who cannot.
The fear of this rift is made more urgent by the observation that new and
deepening forms of exclusion are appearing in our globalizing society. In
Africa, the development of nations has often been slow or stagnant and even
when national indicators are moving up, close observers are often skeptical as
to how much of this growth is reaching the poorest people and communities
(eg, Jamal, 1998). In the context of rural Africa, the focus is not only on
including people in the information society, but also on what these ICTs
can offer individuals and communities who are in immediate need of better
services and livelihood opportunities.
South Africa and Uganda are two African nations which made early and
strong political commitment to the concept of universal access and whose
leaders publicly requested the international community to help them in their
efforts. By the mid-1990s, the governments of both countries were engaged
in similar processes of developing universal access policies and setting up
bodies to regulate telecom operators and implement access initiatives, while
beginning to privatize and liberalize their telecommunication sectors. They
were influenced and supported by a large number of international players and
to a lesser extent by their own private and civil sectors. These two nations had
unique experiences with universal access as a whole and with the role of
shared access centres in particular. Their stories illustrate the relationship
between shared access centres and broader universal access and telecommuni-
cation reform strategies, and the kinds of influence that national governments
can exert, positively or negatively, on grassroots ICT access efforts.
The rhetoric of universal access is often underlain with self-interested polit-
ical and economic forces redefining the public interest to coincide with their
own. In particular, international telecommunication companies and the
old state telecommunication monopolies are infamous for their talents as
influential lobbyists on their own behalf. The American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company (now known simply as AT&T), coined the term ‘universal
service’ in an argument to be granted monopoly rights in the USA in the early
twentieth century (Melody, 1998). More recently, large telecommunication
operators attempt to influence the international playing field and enter into
new markets on terms that will maximize their own profits. ‘Universal service’
is still an argument that they use to justify monopolistic conditions that they
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claim are necessary to allow and justify large investment in telecommunica-
tion infrastructure.
The WTO in 1998 established rules of telecommunication sector reform in
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). South Africa and Uganda
were both signatories to this agreement. It requires signatory nations to set
up an independent regulator while allowing them to determine their own
definitions and indicators for universal service and access.
National policy makers and regulators play the crucial role of protecting
the public interest through policy creation, implementation, monitoring and
revision, and through the effective enforcement of regulatory conditions. On
the one hand, failure to do so implies that universal access policy is simply
rhetoric to sugarcoat the self-interested actions of powerful telecom operators,
which are unlikely to coincide with public interest or to achieve universal
access (Melody, 1998). On the other hand, success in creating publicly mean-
ingful universal access policies that are integrated into a larger development
strategy implies greatly increased opportunities for socio-economic develop-
ment and improved well-being.
Shared access centres, universal access and development
Telecommunication reform has been undertaken in many African countries,
including South Africa and Uganda. These processes follow the same general
structure and logic, although heavy lobbying by various interested parties
means that they do not always run quickly or smoothly. Interesting dramas are
often created along the way.
Both South Africa and Uganda, like most African countries, previously had
state-owned telecom monopolies with lacklustre performance, resulting in
low teledensities, a large unmet demand for telephone service, low quality
of service and little telecom infrastructure outside major urban centres. In
addition, South Africa, although it had one of the highest teledensities
in Africa at the end of the apartheid era, suffered a huge disparity in service
between different racial groups.
The process of reform has generally involved partial privatization of the
telecom company. Typically, one or more companies, mainly foreign-owned,
buy shares while the government retains a significant number of shares which
it is supposed to dispose of over time. The company is granted a period of
exclusivity, usually about five years, coupled with licensing obligations
related to performance measures and universal service targets. At the end of
exclusivity, the market is opened to further competition, which may include
one or more licensed operators. During the same period, cellular phone com-
panies have entered the market and been licensed under a separate category.
South Africa and Uganda each had three licensed cellular operators in 2003.
Both telecom sector reform and licensing obligations are intended to
directly support universal service and access goals. By themselves, however,
they are not sufficient to realize the full potential of ICTs for development. Bill
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Melody argues that while these changes may increase the supply of telecom
infrastructure, they are unlikely, given historical precedent, to fully penetrate
rural areas. Even if they do, they will not bridge the accessibility divide unless
demand can be built through greater public awareness of ICTs and capacity to
use them (Melody, 1998).
This is where the potential role of shared access centres becomes apparent.
Telecentres, for example, originated in Scandinavia as a way to make ICTs
more economical, but more importantly, to build demand by sensitizing and
training previously unexposed segments of the population to the potential
utility of the technologies. The collective aspect of the centres also meant they
could serve as focal points for community development. In the mid-1990s,
many African countries were exposed to the telecentre concept through inter-
national symposia, where the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
championed them as valuable development tools. A number of international
donor agencies set up pilot telecentre projects in Africa. And the South African
government implemented an ambitious telecentre programme as part of its
own universal access strategy. At the same time, entrepreneurs in African cities
and towns began setting up cybercafés, telephone bureaux and business
centres offering ICT services. While these were motivated by perceived market
opportunities, not development goals, they often offered similar services, and
sometimes competed directly with the telecentres.
Where this research fits in
This research aims to analyse and learn from on-the-ground experience with
different forms of shared access centre in the context of overall universal
access policy goals and strategies. These centres are generally recognized to be
an important component in universal access, and especially in harnessing ICTs
for development. However, it is not yet well understood how these centres
contribute to, and are affected by, broader universal access strategies in the
African context. Because most initiatives have been on a pilot scale, they have
not yet been fully employed towards achieving universal access on a national
scale. South Africa did make an ambitious attempt to do this, but unfor-
tunately fell well short of the mark, as described later. However, these efforts,
together with various pilot projects, stand-alone initiatives and market-driven
entrepreneurial centres, provide an important chance to learn what role
shared access centres could play, on a larger scale, in promoting universal
access in a way that furthers development.
Methodology
The overall goal of the research was to understand, across multiple contexts,
phenomena that are inherently dynamic and complex. Policies, markets,
communities and projects are continually changing. So it was important to
capture trends over time rather than merely take a snapshot of individual
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situations. Because there was no clear conceptual basis at the outset for
deciding which elements should be the focus of attention, the research had to
be somewhat open-ended.
The general methodology was to conduct five local case studies nested
in two national case studies. Uganda and South Africa, as the national cases,
allowed for comparison in terms of policies, market environments, and the
apparent effects of these. The selected local communities in each country were
analysed both as sub-components of the national studies and as case studies in
their own right. These communities were selected based on two main criteria:
firstly, they had an access centre that had been previously documented, and
secondly, together with the other communities, they were representative
of the spectrum of contexts (traditionally underserviced areas, both rural and
disadvantaged urban) typically targeted by access initiatives. Within each
community, the known access centre was researched with a view to under-
standing change. In addition, other access centres and ICT services available
within the area were identified and researched. These typically included
about ten other centres, including cybercafés, computer-based secretarial and
printing services, public phone shops, local radio stations and training centres.
This research included a semi-structured interview with management or staff
and was sometimes augmented by user exit surveys. A small survey of between
65 and 95 households was conducted in each area. In total, 62 access centres
were included in the study and 370 households were surveyed.
The national case studies were augmented by primary and secondary
research on national policy, regulation, ICT-related service providers, national
government programmes and NGOs. Research in each country also included
examples of local projects extraneous to the community case studies.
As with any research, the approach was also delimited by available time and
resources. Fieldwork was carried out over three and a half months, with locally
hired research assistants doing the bulk of the survey work, as well as serving
as guides and cultural and linguistic interpreters. Research assistants also
contributed to the design of the case research.
Field methods used
Data collection took place over a period of six and a half weeks in South Africa
(April to June, 2003) and seven and a half weeks in Uganda (June to July,
2003). Field methods are described in Table 1.1. Appendix 1 is a list of what was
included in data collection and from whom.
Data handling and analysis
Interviews were recorded through note-taking. Observations were noted
and typed after the event. Questionnaires and surveys were recorded directly
onto pre-made sheets. Any translation was done on the spot by the research
assistants so that all information was recorded in English. Survey and
INTRODUCTION 7
Table 1.1 Field methods
Method Target group(s) Description
Meetings Key informants: other
researchers, individuals with





Access centre staff and
management (also included






These, along with secondary
data review, were the primary
data collection technique used
at the national level and were
also used extensively with key
people at the local level
Access centre surveys Staff and/or management at
access centres
These were an abbreviated and
more structured form of the
access centre interviews
User exit surveys Clients of access centres These were standardized
surveys across all cases and
were conducted at access
centres over the course of a day
or a half-day, coupled with
observation. Surveys were
administered orally in the local
language. Sample size varied
from 2 to 20, depending on the
volume of users
Student questionnaires Those who were currently in a
computer training course
Variant of user exit surveys
Household surveys Households were randomly
visited within 3 or 4 purposively
selected neighbourhoods or
villages, representing relatively
rich, poor and average wealth
settlements
Sample size from 65 to 95,
structured questionnaires took
about 20 minutes to complete
and collected household and
individual data on livelihood
activities and ICT awareness
and use
Observation General operation and use of
access centres
Notes and discussion amongst
research assistants of
observations made during other
data collection
Document review National level policy and
analysis, previous history of one
access centre in each
community case study, other
documentation as available/
relevant
Collection and review of existing
documentation
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questionnaire data were entered into an Access database and from there
could be imported into Excel and SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences) for quantitative analysis. Most of the analysis techniques used were
qualitative. Where quantitative techniques were used, caution was exercised
in their interpretation as in no case were the samples of sufficient size and the
sampling of sufficient rigour to be considered representative of the popula-
tions sampled within 95 per cent confidence, or to meet the criteria of most
statistical tests.
The general approach to analysis has been to build a coherent picture of
the cases through consideration of all available data. Thus, triangulation
across different collection methods combined with due consideration of the
limitations of the methods is the best insurance of rigour. Since this research
often traded off rigour for breadth, the pictures that emerge are ones ‘painted
with broad strokes’ rather than highly detailed images.
Conceptual framework
To understand the link between universal access policies and on-the-ground
experiences, one must first understand the overall context and analyse the
ability of the centres themselves to provide for universal access and contribute
to development. This conceptual framework attempts to do both. By abstract-
ing from the immediate situation and identifying key actors, processes and
factors that exist in different contexts, it also provides a tool for generalizing
across different contexts while remaining sensitive to the differences within
these contexts. For example, we will see that the Ugandan government’s path
to universal access (as depicted in Figure 1.1) involved market stimulation
whilst the South African government took a more direct approach to imple-
mentation through the purpose-specific Universal Service Agency. The final
chapter summarizes some of these similarities and differences and from these
draws general lessons.
Universal access policy arena and process
The policy arena
The formation and implementation of universal access policy take place in an
‘arena’ consisting of various actors from the public, private and civil sectors,
operating at the local, national and international level, as illustrated in Figure
1.1. The nature of the relationships and influences between all these actors is a
factor in understanding differing national experiences in supporting shared
access centres, and in identifying possible future interventions to strengthen
these initiatives. Figure 1.1 lists some of the generic actors in both South Africa
and Uganda, as well as other countries. The specifics of the national and local
situations in each country are further detailed in Chapters 2 (South Africa)
and 3 (Uganda).
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The policy formation and review process
General aspects of formulating, implementing and revising universal access
policy are shown in Figure 1.2. While this diagram fairly describes the main
components in South Africa and Uganda (though not necessarily those in
other countries), the emphasis on different means of implementing such
policy, the details of both implementation and policy, and the relationship
between mechanisms are unique to each country. This is covered in further
detail in Chapters 2 and 3. For each national case study, a small number of
community case studies are used to focus on the apparent effects of ICT
policy and national-level activities upon ICT access within the communities
generally, and shared access centres specifically. These are then compared with
the original goals of the relevant policies.
Figure 1.1 Policy arena
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Figure 1.2 Policy formulation and review process
The policy intent behind universal access and service to ICTs occurs within a
broader framework of a national development policy. The policy will outline
specific implementation mechanisms. Some of these may operate by stimulat-
ing and regulating the market. Through licensing telecom operators, govern-
ments can impose certain obligations upon them but may also grant them
privileges, usually monopoly rights. One obligation is to contribute to a fund
that supports access initiatives. Fund resources may be used to subsidize
market enterprises or to support government or not-for-profit activities. In
addition, non-governmental actors may undertake access-related initiatives or
projects independently. The government may wish to support or monitor
these initiatives so that they better contribute to overall access targets.
Four success factors for access centres
This research focuses on four factors as criteria for understanding the strengths
and limitations of the various models of access centre encountered in the case
studies and elsewhere. These factors are scalability, sustainability, reach and
use, and development impact.
Scalability
Scalability in the context of this research means the capacity to provide
enough access centres to reach the population of an entire country. At the
micro-level, the key questions related to scalability are: What are the require-
ments to set up a centre, and who will actually do it? Market-based initiatives
will depend on the capacity of local entrepreneurs, entry requirements and
local demand, while non-profit initiatives may depend on local organizational
capacity, the relationship between local and external implementers, and an
adequate source of funding. Both will require technologies that allow the
centre to offer services, and these technologies in turn will likely require infra-
structure, especially telephone lines and electricity.
Scalability in the context of universal access doesn’t demand that one model
fit all situations. Rather, it requires a strategy in which a number of models
and broad approaches are intelligently applied and locally adapted across dif-
ferent circumstances, allowing the entire population to be reached. Chapter 4
analyses the scalability of different centre types encountered in the case study
areas.
Sustainability
Sustainability, the capacity to continue once begun, is a natural second
requirement for access services. From a broad perspective, it doesn’t much
matter whether the services persist because a single centre persists, or because
when that centre fails, another one or more take its place. The continuation of
services will normally depend on local demand and the ability of local actors
to recognize and respond to that demand. Initial access centres in previously
underserved areas are sometimes described as ‘market primers’ because they
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are able to expand the local market for ICT services, creating a particular kind
of sustainability that may outlast the centre itself (Fuchs, 1997).
Sustainability depends on factors both external and internal to a centre (see
Box 1.1). Key external factors include the local market, national market and
outside support mechanisms. Internal factors play the ultimate role in deter-
mining whether a centre will succeed, since ingenuity and strong manage-
ment may overcome many obstacles. Yet external factors are important
determinants of how tough an environment is and, in most parts of Africa,
they add up at least to ‘very tough’. All of these factors can be influenced to
some degree, and often directly, by national policy. If large numbers of centres
are failing within a country, the cause is more likely to be a set of inhibiting
external factors than widespread manager incompetence.
Access centre reach and use
To provide universal access, access centres should be priced, distributed and
designed such that any person can use the target services if he or she so
chooses. This means that the price of the service must be within the reach of
prospective users’ ability to pay, that the users are aware of the service, and
that they have the capacity to use it, or feel able to acquire such capacity. The
requirements, then, are based on the characteristics of not only the access
centre (supply) but also the potential users (demand).
To understand the contextual relevance of ICT use, this research uses a live-
lihoods approach to explore why some groups of people use ICTs and others
do not, how different groups use them, and the likely impacts of such use. By
applying livelihoods approaches across the community case studies, we can
gain insights into common motivations for using ICTs and common barriers
to use, and how current patterns of use are likely to influence development.
Box 1.1 Key factors in sustainability
Internal management and leadership: Vision/champion, capacity, cohesion versus
complexity in decision making, level of internal conflict, ability to partner, network,
technical know-how, marketing skills, flexibility and quick response.
Internal assets: Building, location, equipment, available services.
Local market: Awareness, income levels, perceived relevance, capacity to use, effective
demand, local technical support and equipment supplies.
National market: Operators, available/legal technologies, prices, technical support.
External support mechanisms: Support to address gaps in the local market, including
capacity, awareness and ability to pay (ie, via subsidy); support to build managerial
and operational capacity (eg, to enhance procurement, maintenance, business and
marketing skills); advocacy on behalf of local suppliers and consumers in national
policy and market issues; provision of adequate basic infrastructure (electricity, roads,
telecommunications).
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Chapter 5 applies this analysis to different types of access centre, generalizing
across contexts where possible.
Development impact
The development impact of universal access initiatives will be the sum of the
centres themselves, the process of establishing them, the services they provide
over time, and the improvements they engender in people’s lives. Some access
centres may involve complex processes of community mobilization and these
processes in turn may have a development impact, irrespective of the centre’s
performance. Local employment opportunities, the capacity developed by
staff, and the money that flows into, out of, and circulates through the com-
munity as a result of the centre also have important implications for local
economic development. The services themselves are the focus of most expec-
tations for development impact, and this impact will vary according to the
kinds of service, who uses them and the nature of the community.
The dual definition of development given earlier provides the basis for
analysing development impact based on two questions. How do the centres
support relevant national development goals? And what role do they play in
increasing (or decreasing) the overall range of choices of local community
members? In assessing the latter aspect, this book focuses primarily on local
livelihood activities and priorities, as determined through household surveys
and census data.
In Chapters 2 and 3, community experiences with ICTs are compared with
development goals set out in policy. Chapter 5 focuses on development impact
of access centre services, but also of productive opportunities associated with
providing services, through the lens of livelihoods.
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CHAPTER TWO
Access centres and South Africa’s universal
access policy
This chapter reviews the role that shared access centres have played in uni-
versal access within South Africa, with a specific focus on the policy intent
driving universal access.1 After reviewing the overall ICT policy intent and
some of the mechanisms for achieving universal access, it focuses on the
experiences of two communities. One is a small rural settlement in Kwa Zulu
Natal, north-east of Durban; the other a large township in the Western Cape,
south-east of Cape Town, on the same peninsula (see Figure 2.1).
South Africa’s experience is interesting. It took a leadership position in
Africa, with top-level political commitment to universal access to ICTs. This
engagement was driven by the need to redress the legacy of apartheid, and by a
Figure 2.1 Map of South Africa (Source: CIA )
strong belief that communication and broad access to information were keys
to democracy and development. Moreover, South Africa’s government had
relatively more money and human capacity than its neighbours to address the
task. However, nine years after it began, the results have been largely dis-
appointing. In communities examined here, telephone access has improved
greatly, mainly due to cellular phone networks, but rates remain high, and the
Internet is barely present and rarely used. Much of this has to do with the
market and regulatory environment at the time of research. The incumbent
landline telephone operator had a strong monopoly and had kept rates high
and connectivity options outside of central business hubs limited (Emdon,
2003). Any process of policy reform is also an opportunity for various actors to
pursue their own interests. The number of actors influencing policy within
South Africa is large and the process itself has been complex. The situation in
South Africa is a reminder that feedback from the experience of implementing
universal access initiatives may be a lesser influence on policy revision than
political interests.
National optimism and the emergence of universal access policy
Historical context
Universal access policy was developed in the historical context of the end of
apartheid and the dawning of a new democratic era in South Africa. This was a
time of great optimism and activity. Key leaders, including Nelson Mandela,
the first democratically elected president of South Africa, and Thabo Mbeki,
his deputy president, and later president, believed that ICTs were important to
the development of South Africa. Indeed, they made public statements in
high-profile international gatherings to that effect. Their interest converged
with increasing global interest in the issue of the information society and the
digital divide amongst governments, multilateral agencies and civil society
groups.
South African civil society also believed firmly in the importance of informa-
tion and communication and the tools that could facilitate these. This interest
could be considered a legacy of apartheid, since the previous government,
through censorship and attempts to control and limit information sharing
and communication, had reminded its opposition that these could be effective
tools for empowerment.
Finally, the opening of South African markets during the time of transition
in the early and mid-1990s represented an interesting and potentially lucrative
opportunity for both international and domestic companies. This resulted
in great activity and high expectations for ICT-related developments in the
country.
South Africa, as a signatory to the WTO GATS in 1998, was committed to
telecom sector privatization and liberalization. Global pressure to undertake
these reforms was present before this and created some tension within South
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Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) had strong ties to the Commun-
ist Party and to labour unions, which had also been instrumental in resistance
to apartheid. These were opposed to both privatization and liberalization
measures since they would reduce sovereignty by selling off state assets to
foreign-owned companies and would likely result in heavy job losses within
the newly privatized entities.
Development policy framework
The Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) base document, released in
1994, was the key framework for the new government’s activities and provided
the overarching context for the development of the original universal access
policy. It referred to ICTs as powerful tools for multi-sector development and
emphasized the need to strengthen a diversity of media, including community
media, and to encourage the exchange of information between citizens
and governments. Within this framework are the Urban Renewal Strategy and
the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy. Both emphasize
mobilizing people to become active participants in their own development
and tend to focus on infrastructure development, which was lacking in
Black-populated areas under the apartheid regime. The Rural Development
Strategy aims to create sustainable rural communities capable of attracting
and maintaining skilled, knowledgeable people through capacity-building,
provision of universally accessible social services, and creation of vibrant local
economies (CMS Task Team, 2003).
Universal access policy
The key policies guiding universal access to ICTs are the Telecommunications
White Paper of 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Tele-
communications Act Amendment of 2001. The 1996 Act set up the regulatory
body for telecommunications, which in 2000 merged with the broadcasting
regulator to form the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
(ICASA). It also set up the Universal Service Agency as a statutory body without
any power to regulate or enforce.
The Universal Service Agency was a uniquely South African invention – no
other country had created a separate body devoted to universal service
and access. This was evidence of strong national commitment to the issue
(Benjamin, 2001a, b). The Agency was mandated to:
• explore and promote innovative ways to promote universal service;
• increase public awareness around the benefits of telecommunications;
• encourage and guide other universal access schemes;
• survey and evaluate the extent of universal service;
• develop and revise definitions and targets for universal access and
universal service;
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• administer the Universal Service Fund by paying subsidies to assist ‘needy
persons’ in accessing services. This also required developing a definition of
what a ‘needy person’ was.
One problem with the Act is that it did not clearly establish the roles and
responsibilities of the Agency and the regulator, and there appeared to be some
overlap (Benjamin, 2001a, b). Also lacking in the Act were clear definitions and
benchmarks, which the Agency was supposed to establish. However, at the
time of this research, seven years after the original act, these definitions were
still missing, which seriously undermined any ordered and logical attempt at
implementing and monitoring access strategies.
The Telecommunications White Paper of 1996 had defined universal access
as ‘every person within a 30 minute walk of a public telephone’. The Universal
Service Agency, however, also considered itself committed to achieving uni-
versal access to advanced telecommunications, including the Internet. No
clear strategy for doing this was ever developed. A few discussion papers and
public discussions were begun but not concluded in 1998. The process was due
to restart in 2003. Sam Galube, who became chief executive officer of the
Universal Service Agency in early 2003, defined universal access to ICTs as
follows: ‘Each and every household having access to telecommunications
technology . . . . This access must be affordable and convenient . . . within a
10 to 15 minute walk, a person should have a point where he or she can access
a telephone or the Internet’.
The 2001 Telecommunications Amendment established multimedia
licenses and laid the groundwork for the granting of licenses to telecom
operators in ten (out of 27 identified) underserved rural areas. These licenses
were being put out to tender at the time of research and therefore were
not yet in effect. The Universal Service Agency’s mandate was expanded to
include the administration of subsidies of about R10 million to these licensees
(Lewis, 2003). A Convergence Act was passed in December 2003, after field
research.
Besides these core documents, numerous task teams and advisory bodies
have produced reports for the Presidency, Cabinet and various sectoral
departments. The Department of Education, the Department of Trade and
Investment, and the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology
have been actively involved in issues surrounding ICT access provision and
related capacity building, and each has its own projects and related policy.
The large number of activities within various sectors of government poses a
challenge for co-ordination. Fruitful engagement with non-governmental
actors has been a further challenge. Recent policy formulations attempt to
address this by acknowledging existing bodies and their efforts and emphasiz-
ing the need for partnership with them.
Table 2.1, which draws on the over-arching documents and public state-
ments from leading government officials, summarizes the key policy intentions
regarding universal access in South Africa.
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Implementing universal access
South Africa has a large, somewhat confusing array of government pro-
grammes and non-governmental programmes and projects aimed at providing
access to ICTs, media and related services. In addition, its telecom sector
has gone through a number of tumultuous regulatory changes. The market
situation was likely to change as a new convergence bill came into effect and a
second national telecom operator finally became licensed (2003–2004). The
market was one of the most visible influences across the whole telecommuni-
cations sector in South Africa, also limiting governmental and not-for-profit
efforts, which by law depended upon licensed operators for basic services. For
example, wireless technology that expanded beyond private property for
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private use was illegal if implemented by any other than the incumbent
telecom operator.
The main mechanisms by which ICT access was provided in South Africa
are:
• the market: cellular telephone, computer, fax, Internet;
• licensed telecom operators, who were given both rights and obligations to
fulfil under their licenses, regulated by the Independent Communications
Authority of South Africa (ICASA);
• licensed radio and community radio stations, the latter also receiving
support from the Department of Communications and the non-
governmental National Community Radio Forum;
• the Universal Service Agency’s telecentre programme;
• multipurpose Community Centres of the Government Communication
and Information System (GCIS);
• a variety of largely independent, uncoordinated, not-for-profit initiatives,
often affiliated with libraries, community centres and local NGOs;
• school computer labs.
The most prominent of these (based on the findings in the community case
studies) are described below.
Licensing obligations, regulation and the market structure
‘Telkom is very expensive. Sometimes we get phone bills that are too high;
but you can’t argue with Telkom because while they have you cut off from
services your business is dwindling. Soon they will introduce ADSL here,
which has a flat rate. That will make a big difference’.
Business owner, Randburg
Telkom, the former South African parastatal, was given a five-year monopoly
for fixed-line service plus a one-year extension that officially ended in early
2002. Because no second national operator had been identified, the monopoly
was still in effect during the time of research in 2003. Telkom, whose monop-
oly extended to most voice- and data-transmission services, was required by
its license to provide 2.7 million new lines, including 1.7 million in under-
serviced areas and 120,000 pay phones, plus contribute about R40 million to
the Universal Service Fund (USF).2
Sentech, the major broadcasting signal distributor in the country, was given
a multimedia license, including the right to license others, in May 2002. This
created partial competition in data transmission and broadcasting, but the
effects were limited. For example, various options for accessing the Internet
such as wireless broadband and very small aperture terminal (VSAT) remained
expensive and their deployment was limited.
The cellular market included three operators: Vodacom (with 65 per cent
market share), Mobile Telephony Networks (MTN) and Cell C. MTN and
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Vodacom were granted licenses in 1993 and Cell C was licensed in 2001. By
October 2003, South Africa had 15 million cellular users and the fourth fastest
growing market in the world (Burger, 2004). Low-income groups, constituting
the vast majority of people, use pre-paid card services as these do not require
up-front payments or a contract stipulating income conditions.
Community service obligations for the cellular operators were set at 22,000
for Vodacom, 7,500 for MTN and 52,000 for Cell C. These obligations required
each operator to set up the requisite number of public phones in ‘under-
serviced areas’. Because densely populated townships were considered
underserved, but were relatively easier and more profitable to cover than rural
areas, operators focused most of their efforts in these areas (Benjamin, 2001a,
b). Community service obligations were also, retrospectively, set very low
given how lucrative the market turned out to be. Despite this limitation,
Vodacom’s approach to community service was generally seen as very success-
ful and was later emulated by the other operators.
All licensed operators have been required to pay into a Universal Service
Fund (USF) since the Telecommunications Act was passed in 1996. Until 2001,
contributions to the fund were capped at a total of R20 million a year, which
was very low compared with the revenue generated (much less than 0.1 per
cent of turnover) and the requirements of other countries. In 2003, ICASA set
the actual required contribution at 0.2 per cent for each licensee, still low but a
substantial increase (Msimang, 2003).
Access centres and cybercafés, whether for-profit or NGO, were not specially
licensed. However, they were profoundly affected by the market and licensing
conditions of the large infrastructure providers as they were all required to buy
their services from the licensed telecom operators.
The Universal Service Agency’s telecentre programme
‘When [the Universal Service Agency] started off, it was about putting boxes
in communities. Now we see it’s about what those boxes deliver – services
such as school subjects, computer literacy and e-health. We will partner with
companies to deliver these’.
Dennis Mamela, Universal Service Agency
The Universal Service Agency was established by the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act to explore and promote creative methods of universal service and
access. The original Act established it for five years. During this initial period,
the Agency devoted most of its energies to supporting the creation of tele-
centres across the country, paid through the Universal Service Fund (USF). It
invited applications from NGOs and community organizations. Those selected
were given equipment and basic training; from that point, they were supposed
to run the telecentres as self-sustaining entities.
While its original target was hundreds of such telecentres, the Agency
developed only 65, which experienced a variety of problems almost immedi-
ately. By 2001, one-third were not functioning, half did not have phones, and
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only a few had access to the Internet (Benjamin, 2001a, b). By 2003, the
situation had deteriorated.
The Universal Service Agency itself was hampered by a poor reputation,
internal management difficulties and poor relationships with other key
organizations (Benjamin, 2001a, b). It was unable to get crucial information
from operators that would allow it to map telecom provision and thus
effectively monitor progress. It never developed definitions, indicators or
benchmarks for any key terms that would allow it to strategize effectively. In
addition, the Agency, partly in response to political pressure, moved quickly
towards an attempt at massive rollout of telecentres without proper piloting of
the concept.
In 2001, the Universal Service Agency’s mandate was renewed and
expanded. And in 2003 it underwent internal restructuring and renewal,
including an audit of the remains of the existing telecentres. The Agency is
now working more closely with the Department of Communications and the
GCIS (see below), and is pursuing partnerships with other actors including
Sentech.
The GCIS Multipurpose Community Centre (MPCC) Programme
‘MPCCs need to be more than just government service centres’.
Holly Luton-Nel, Director of Aleksan Kopano Resource Centre, Alexandra
The Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) began
operations in 1998 with the goal of increasing the accessibility of government
information and services and improving communication between the govern-
ment and the people. The focus has been on establishing Multipurpose
Community Centres (MPCCs), with an initial goal of 65 MPCCs: one in each
district municipality. The basic concept is that of a shared facility housing
at least six government departmental offices plus a telecentre (established by
the Universal Service Agency). The centre may also house community groups
and facilities, including community radio stations. The departmental offices
provide relevant information and services to the local community, including
training and outreach activities. The telecentre provides telecommunication
services to other MPCC tenants, allowing it to provide public services at
reasonable cost and at the same time contributing to the telecentre’s sustain-
ability. At the time of research, about 30 MPCCs had been established across
the country and others were to be established in the following year.
Non-governmental initiatives
Various external, national and local non-governmental organizations have
launched their own initiatives. These tend to focus on each organization’s
own implementation activities, although there is some partnering and infor-
mation sharing. Links between these initiatives and government initiatives
have generally been weak. Thus, government policy and efforts have not acted
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as a co-ordinating or unifying force across these independent initiatives, and
shared learning has also been limited.
Access achieved? Review of the case in two communities
Bhamshela
‘In 1998, people didn’t understand what a computer was or what it could do.
The person who stole our school computer buried it’.
High school principal, Bhamshela
‘In the past, we’d identify a CBO [community-based organization], donate
computers, train them and then the organization would be responsible
for the running costs, including paying the staff. But the centres were serv-
ing poor communities so business isn’t attractive. They were unable to pay
salaries and the staff would end up taking money from the telecentre’.
Universal Service Agency co-ordinator, Kwa Zulu Natal
Bhamshela is a densely populated rural community and trading centre,
less than two hours’ drive from Durban. Until 1998, when a telecentre was
established, there were few telephones. The telecentre predated all other
public ICT services and was very popular. While it offered a full range of
services, including computer and Internet rental, only telephone and, to a
lesser degree, photocopying services were used. This was partially due to the
lack of expertise of the staff in using these, and partially to lack of awareness
and demand on the part of potential clients.
The telecentre ceased phone, fax and Internet services in 2000 after experi-
encing problems with the telephone company, resulting in a large bill it
could not pay, exacerbated by problems with its phone metering system.
Local demand for phone services persisted, though, and a Vodacom shop and
Telkom container were opened the following year, the latter by a former staff
member of the telecentre. Meanwhile, the telecentre further developed its
staff’s expertise in computers and began to offer basic training courses. There
was demand for such courses due to the high priority many people placed
on finding employment and the perceived importance of computer skills in
formal-sector jobs. Many students defaulted on their tuition payments because
they could not afford them. A few found jobs.
A GCIS-implemented MPCC officially opened in 2002 and began operations
in 2003. It had depended on being able to receive ICT services from the tele-
centre, but because the telecentre could not deliver, the Village Bank began to
offer fax services and later intended to launch public Internet services.
The full impact of the telecentre is difficult to assess with certainty since
phone penetration, especially in the cellular market, increased quickly across
the country over the same period. For many local people, the telecentre was
the first place they made a phone call. Many people knew it had computers
(although many didn’t), and the students taking the courses had often done so
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on the recommendation of others. It is also clear that the telecentre motivated
other valued community development processes, including the application
for the MPCC and establishment of a free bi-weekly health clinic.
Lessons
It is not clear that the telecentre, with its bundle of services – some appreci-
ated, some not – was the best model for this community. Arguably, it should
have been either explicitly wider in scope to formally include facilitation of
community development in its mandate (which would require funding other
than from user fees), or else more focused on locally relevant ICT services.
A needs assessment could easily have identified both the demand for voice
telephony and for job-related computer skills (in fact, any job skills). These
could have been delivered more efficiently and effectively via two separate
means. For example, the Vodacom container could offer lower prices than
the telecentre while generating a better profit margin for its owner. Part of
the reason is that uneconomical services offered by the telecentre must be
subsidized by services in demand such as phone, which affects pricing.
Since phone is the service most in demand, and cost is a limiting factor in
accessibility, such a strategy does not appear to serve the public interest.
The computer classes were not part of the telecentre’s original service mix
because the staff did not then have the capacity to deliver them. Resorting to
this training service was as much a survival strategy as a service to the com-
munity. In this sense, they relied too heavily on phone services while they
were able to do so and demand was high. Again, this does not appear to serve
the community in the best manner. A clear needs assessment and targeting of
resources where necessary – for example, on staff training and a set of
appropriate textbooks – would be a better use of money than setting up a
clearly unsustainable, unaffordable Internet connection.
This leads to a third major lesson that can be drawn from Bhamshela:
offering Internet services where they are too expensive to be sustained and
where local demand is absent only creates a further strain on the overall
viability of the telecentre. At very best, it is a symbolic gesture and a service to a
handful of people. There are two basic options: introduce a different pricing
structure so that local demand can be accommodated and increased over time
(implying subsidization over the medium term), or focus the organization’s
efforts in areas likely to yield better results.
Finally, the MPCC appears to offer great potential for developing the area,
and ICTs can clearly enhance its services. The situation in Bhamshela has
created an inadvertent but interesting example of a strategy whereby the
government has indirectly supported access to ICTs by providing an anchor
market that stimulated a private entity (the Village Bank) to provide the actual
services.
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Khayelitsha
‘Lack of knowledge of computer skills is one reason for the high unemploy-
ment in Khayelitsha, and may also be one reason why the Public Infor-
mation Terminal is underutilized’.
Director, KERIC, Khayelitsha
‘In Guguletu, computers and the Internet are more in demand [compared
with Khayelitsha] because of multiracial schools. The public libraries there
are full and an Internet café just opened three or four months ago. In
Khayelitsha, nothing has really changed in the last three years except
competition is getting higher [for phone services]’.
Local phone shop owner, Khayelitsha
Khayelitsha is a fast growing, densely populated, predominantly Xhosa
township with a population of about one million people. It is located on the
Cape Flats about 30 kilometres from Cape Town. Despite its large population,
it sustains only limited economic activity, with most residents shopping and
working elsewhere. It contains a combination of informal and formal settle-
ments with varying levels of infrastructure. Both public phones and private
cell phones are widely available and phones are used by over 90 per cent of the
population. This situation is markedly different from 1996, when only about
half had made at least one phone call. However, the use of other ICTs remains
quite limited, mainly due to cost and lack of capacity.
Photo 2.1 Khayelitsha’s shopping centre
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The market in Khayelitsha sustains many phone shops initiated in part due
to the license obligations of the major operators, plus some independent
phone shops. It also has at least one large computer training centre and a
couple of other businesses that offer non-phone ICT services in addition to
their core business (a phone shop and a driving school respectively). These
include value-added services such as typing CVs, letters and funeral pro-
grammes. Most of these are centred in and around one of Khayelitsha’s few
shopping areas, the Sanlam Centre shown in Photo 2.1.
The non-profit sector in Khayelitsha offers a similar range of ICTs. In
addition, one library offers Internet access. Although some entities have tried
to do so, public Internet provision cannot be sustained via the market due
to the large gap between the cost of providing it and people’s ability (and
willingness) to pay. There need to be cheaper ways to offer Internet access. The
high prices can be attributed largely to Telkom’s monopoly in effect at the time
of research. Given the experiences at the library, market prices would have to
be substantially lower before people would use Internet services. This implies
that even in a fair and competitive market, many people would not consider
the Internet an affordable and justifiable expense if they must pay by the
minute or hour.
Lessons
In Khayelitsha, providing phone service can be done within the market, while
providing Internet service cannot. Other ICT-related services such as CV
typing and faxing are barely sustainable within the market, and generally have
to be combined with other services, whether ICT-related or not.
Finding work is the first priority of most people within Khayelitsha, and a
gap between skill levels and the requirements of formal-sector jobs is generally
understood as a large contributing factor to unemployment. Yet there are
relatively few services in place to address this. Megabro is a private-sector
training organization while Learn to Earn, a Christian NGO, provides com-
puter training with a focus on creating self-employment opportunities.
The failure of the market to address the local need for ICT training and
to harness ICTs for local entrepreneurial opportunities is attributable only
in part to the high costs of telecom services. It is also reflects historical eco-
nomic neglect within Khayelitsha and the tendency of residents to conduct
business outside the township. This in turn implies that strategies to provide
access to ICTs should be integrated with, or complementary to, other
initiatives to stimulate local economic development. Targeted training
and capital loans for current and potential entrepreneurs are two ways to
stimulate such activity. However, non-phone ICTs are high-risk ventures and
appear to be most successful when introduced into existing enterprises. They
should be encouraged only where careful market research shows they are
viable.
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Comparing the South African cases with access-related development objectives
Table 2.2 summarizes the study findings as they pertain to relevant national
objectives, which were compiled from policy documents and public state-
ments. In some instances, ‘progress’ is a rather subjective term. For example,
there are no indicators or benchmarks to give precision to what a South
African information society would look like, especially in townships and rural
areas.
Table 2.2 Development goals versus actual progress




Good progress in telephone: combination of public and private phone
services accommodates over 90% of population.
redressing historic Internet penetration and use are extremely limited.
inequities
Bhamshela
Phone accessibility has improved greatly, although cost and geography
remain barriers.
Access to other ICTs remains low because of limited awareness, high






as e-health and e-
education
Government social services have improved greatly in Khayelitsha,
although ICTs are not an important delivery mechanism. There is one
public information terminal (PIT), reportedly underutilized.1
Bhamshela
The MPCC is delivering a range of locally relevant government services,







This has not occurred via the ICT services reviewed in this research. If
effective, the PIT provides a one-way (government-to-people) flow of
information. No evident demand for this from the community.
Bhamshela







Radio Zibonele, the local community radio station, is widely listened to
and appreciated. Some computer secretarial services offered limited
desktop publishing capacity; this was used to produce items such as
funeral and wedding programmes.
Bhamshela
None of the ICT-related facilities in Bhamshela is related to media or
local information production.
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Table 2.2 – continued






NGOs such as KERIC were doing this in the context of a larger advocacy
role. However, this was not linked to their ICT services. Other NGO
activities such as the Lovelife social marketing campaign provided
information targeted at social change in the face of AIDS. Links
between these and ICT access were not evident in the case studies.
Bhamshela





Public phone services were a strong area of entrepreneurial activity.
Selling connection time and cell phone accessories, as well as
repairing cell phones, radios and TVs, were also popular as small
enterprises. Since there are relatively few job opportunities within
Khayelitsha, the amount of activity in this sector appeared
significant.
Bhamshela
The Department of Labour has a presence at the MPCC and offers
related services. The Vodacom container provided two local jobs,
and the computer training at the telecentre had helped at least three
local people find work. Paid and volunteer positions at the telecentre
also allowed several people to gain experience and improve their
employability, although the centre itself proved a poor employer.
Other ICT services such as fax and photocopying nominally offer






Most residents use radio and phone but have little awareness of or
opportunity to access digital ICTs such as computers and the
Internet. People see these digital ICTs as important for increasing
their job prospects.
Bhamshela
Phone services have eased communication in and out of Bhamshela
considerably. Other ICTs are not part of the daily life of the vast
majority. Interest in computers is widespread despite low awareness,
both for employment opportunities and because people understand
them as a part of the modern world.
1 The South African Department of Communications was involved in implementing Public Internet Terminals
(PITs) from about 1998. These were Internet kiosks installed in some post offices in disadvantaged areas.
Many did not actually have Internet connectivity and simply provided information from a CD-ROM
(Benjamin, 2001a, b).
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Learning from South Africa’s experience
South Africa’s situation is in many ways unique, linked to its history and the
fact that it remains, after Brazil, the most inequitable country in the world in
terms of wealth distribution. Despite the great optimism unleashed by the
coming of democracy, the legacy of its past and the great economic division
that still characterizes the population influence the behaviour of both the
large dominant telecom agencies, especially Telkom, and poor, historically
disadvantaged communities.
Because there is such great wealth in the large cities – the Province of
Gauteng, home to Johannesburg and Pretoria, for example, generates 9 per
cent of the GDP of all Africa – and the infrastructure is much better there,
large telecom companies may be tempted to focus on urban markets, avoiding
poor townships and rural areas. Pricing is not geared towards these latter areas
and certain services, such as ADSL (asymmetric data subscriber line), may not
be available much beyond the major urban centres.
South Africa reportedly has one of the lowest levels of entrepreneurship in
the world. Within both townships and rural communities, there is relatively
little entrepreneurial interest or risk taking beyond very simple and proven
business models. Telephone services have become widely recognized and
coveted as small business ventures, especially where franchises are available.
Relatively few entrepreneurs have explored other forms of ICT service pro-
vision; and those who have often have not done well. Because of high over-
head costs and low profit margins, most small businesses offering ICT services
do so in addition to another pre-existing business activity (eg, a hair salon,
traditional healer, or driving school). Such hybrid businesses were quite
limited in number in the two case communities studied. They were more vis-
ible, however, in large, high-traffic urban areas such as Johannesburg, Rand-
burg, Soweto and even in the business districts of mid-sized towns.
Although Bhamshela is rural and Khayelitsha is urban, the two areas were
observed to have similar access and use rates, especially for computers and the
Internet. This was mainly due to the lack of Internet access in both cases and,
further, because the Bhamshela telecentre had exposed some of the population
to computers and, briefly, the Internet. People throughout the country who
had experience dealing with Internet access issues commonly identified
the high cost, and to a lesser degree the low quality, of Internet connectivity as
factors that had severely limited or blocked their efforts to offer and use it in
communities and schools. This in turn was generally attributed to the failure
to liberalize the telecom market and effectively regulate price increases, which
were unjustifiable in face of the profits being made (Emdon, 2003).
The South African government took a direct role in implementing access
centres, through the activities of several departments and the Universal
Service Agency. This experience was generally not very successful. Neither of
the Agency’s telecentres in the case studies was well used and both had severe
financial problems. Based on anecdotal and documented experiences of other
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telecentres, their experiences were typical. A major reason for this failure was
simply that the larger issue of high cost was not addressed. Many of these
centres reported receiving poor service and having to pay high costs with
little profit in return. On the implementation side, roles and strategies were
not well defined, and there were never clear benchmarks to aim for. The
Agency, reporting to the Department of Communications, was sometimes
under political pressure to act before it was ready to, at the same time suffering
from various problems of internal capacity that rendered it relatively ineffec-
tive and gave it a poor reputation (Benjamin, 2001a, b).
The Agency might have been a more effective champion of universal access
in South Africa had it been more closely aligned with, and perhaps even a part
of, the regulator. As such, it would have had greater power vis-à-vis the telecom
operators. It also required greater independence and internal capacity so that
it might play an advocacy role on behalf of telecommunications consumers
and small service-providing entrepreneurs. Given the general market condi-
tion, this role was more urgent than that of implementer. Luckily, a number of
NGOs have taken on this role to some degree. These include Sangonet, the
LINK Centre at the University of the Witswatersrand, and bridges.org. By
engaging in independent and public research and monitoring, these organiza-
tions provided an important counterbalance to the vested interests of the
large telecom companies that otherwise dominate the field. The South African
media, especially the business media, have also given a fair amount of
coverage to telecom issues and have voiced criticism of the disadvantages
of monopolies and the government’s slow movement towards liberalization.
South Africa has made significant progress towards universal telephone
access, although not in the way foreseen in policy. In particular, cellular tech-
nology and the huge uptake of cellular phones, both through personal owner-
ship and phone shops, were not anticipated in the policy. Since many people
had their phone service disconnected (an estimated two million lines), the
issue of landline service has not been one of installation and availability,
but of affordability. Ironically, this has been the case with phone shops and
telecentres as well – entrepreneurs cannot afford the narrow profit margins
and poor service from Telkom; they much prefer Vodacom or one of the
other cellular operators. Telkom had recently adopted pay-as-you-go landline
services in an attempt to imitate the success of this payment system for cellular
phones. The effects of this were not yet clear by the time of study, but some
people were reconnecting their landline phones with this service. Even the
Khayelitsha telecentre was considering using it.
The Vodacom phone shop model seemed particularly popular with both
entrepreneurs and customers. The service was reliable and, for the shop
owners, the great advantage of Vodacom’s preferential rates, compared with
arrangements with other phone shops, was that they saw gross profit margins
of about one-third. In return, they helped to meet Vodacom’s universal service
obligations and advertised the Vodacom brand amongst potential new cell
phone users. The preferential in-network rates also meant that customers
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tended to maintain loyalty to the Vodacom network. After about four years,
the Vodacom phone shop model, although undertaken to meet its licensing
obligations, was not costing the company anything.
In South Africa, the first government priority would appear to be the true
liberalization of the telecommunications market. The second is to ensure that
smaller South African companies, entrepreneurs and potential employees
from disadvantaged groups share in the wealth generated by the rapid growth
of the telecom sector. Thus, for poor communities the benefits of sectoral
growth should outweigh the costs. Two important movements in that
direction were the ISETT SETA, which supported training within the ICT
sector amongst historically disadvantaged populations, and the ICT Black
Empowerment Charter, which was still in draft form in 2003 (but due to come
into effect in March 2005). The intention of the latter is to give preference to
black-owned businesses under certain circumstances. Another area of priority
is putting computers in schools and ensuring that teachers and students can
use them. For most South Africans, the acquisition of practical job skills is an
absolute priority. The provision of computer training in public schools is one
of the best ways to achieve this.
Finally, given the great inequalities within South African society, an
organization devoted to universal service could serve an important role in
safeguarding public interest and in strengthening the capacity of people to
create access within their own communities. Here, small business and not-for-
profit organizations have an important role to play. At the time of this research
and before, the Universal Service Agency appeared to be a weak and ineffective
institution. However, if it were able to step back from implementation
and focus on monitoring, research, advocacy and capacity building, including
provision of small grants and loans to entrepreneurs from historically dis-
advantaged areas, then it might be able to further the cause for which it was
created.
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CHAPTER THREE
Uganda’s experience with shared access
centres and universal access policy
Overview: Universal access policy and implementation
This chapter examines policies concerned with universal access in Uganda, the
mechanisms for implementing them, and the on-the-ground experiences
across three different cases. The case study communities are Lira municipality
(surrounding the town of Lira as shown in Figure 3.1), Nabweru subcounty
(slightly north of Kampala), and Kabale district, including Kabale town and
the rural subcounties of Rubaya and Bukinda.
Uganda is often held up as an example of success, for other countries to take
note. It was able to partially liberalize its telecom market quite early and,
Figure 3.1 Map of Uganda (Source: CIA )
against common convention, it introduced a second major operator before it
had privatized the incumbent. Somewhat ironically, part of the reason for its
relatively smooth transition was that the incumbent operator had been losing
money – which meant there was little incentive for the government to try
and maintain control. Three cellular operators, especially the most popular
and widespread operator, MTN, have provided cellular coverage to the majority
of the country’s population. However, as most citizens are poor and rural, the
tariffs and associated expenses of owning a phone are still beyond them.
A large urban-rural divide is strikingly evident, not just between Kampala and
the rest of the country, but between small towns and surrounding villages.
This suggests that, despite significant progress, universal access to either
phone or the Internet is unlikely to be fully achieved by the market alone.
In towns, entrepreneurial activity, not just in phone services, but also in
other ICT-related services, was prevalent. The success of these businesses
appeared quite mixed. Profit margins were often low and sometimes negative.
As in South Africa, phone services had a ready demand and seemed to be much
safer and often more profitable business ventures, although competition was
high. In rural areas, information services are unlikely to spark spontaneous
market demand despite a perceived need for them, especially regarding market
information for farm produce. Integrating such services into other rural
development and extension efforts seems the most promising way forward,
and a number of projects and efforts in this direction have already been
made – specifically the new agricultural extension programme (National
Agricultural Advisory Service) and a climate-information programme called
RANET, delivered through the Department of Meteorology.
Universal access and policy intent in Uganda
Historical context
Uganda has 26.4 million people (2004 estimate), 86 per cent of whom live
in rural areas. Its history following transition from British colonial to inde-
pendent rule under Milton Obote and Idi Amin was one of oppression.
Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, many more were exiled, and the
country suffered extreme economic and institutional instability and decline.
In 1986, Yoweri Museveni seized power and established a no-party
democratic system. He instigated major economic and social reforms in line
with the emerging theories and practices of major multilateral institutions.
Economic reform, consistent with thinking at the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, focused on liberalization, privatization and
reducing the role of the government in the market to one of regulator and
enabler. Uganda’s GDP grew by an average of 7 per cent a year from 1990 to
2000. Many exiles, well educated and optimistic, came home. Keen to help the
new Uganda reform itself, donor agencies and foreign governments provided
large amounts of foreign aid and loans.
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Uganda has a decentralized government system composed of five levels. It is
broken into regions and then districts which are further broken into counties,
sub-counties and parishes. Most local government activity occurs at the dis-
trict and subcounty level. All development has been guided by overarching
frameworks, namely Vision 2025 and the Poverty Eradication Action Plan.
National leaders identified ICTs as a potential tool to support their national
development objectives. In 1997, President Museveni attended the Global
Knowledge Conference in Toronto, Canada, and requested the global com-
munity to assist Uganda in developing ICT capacities that could improve the
lives of its rural and disadvantaged communities. A number of other ministers
and high-level politicians championed the cause of ICTs as potential tools for
national development (Ofir, 2002).
The telecom sector was privatized and partially liberalized from 1995 to
2000. During this period, some ICT-focused pilot projects were implemented
by donor agencies. The most noteworthy were the Nakaseke multipurpose
community telecentre, established in 1998 by a partnership between ITU,
UNESCO and IDRC, and the Nabweru and Buwama telecentres, established
in 1999 by IDRC. In 1999, World Links for Development, sponsored by the
World Bank, began to implement school-based telecentres in partnership with
Schoolnet Uganda.
Before liberalization in 1996, Uganda Post and Telecom was the parastatal
responsible for providing telecommunications service in the country. Tele-
density was low and concentrated in Kampala. The quality of service and
speed of delivery were also low while costs were high. As part of the liberaliza-
tion, the Communications Act of 1997 established an independent regulator,
the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC). Part of its mandate was to
establish and administer a Rural Communications Development Fund (RCDF).
This, along with licensing agreements and, later, full and effective liberaliza-
tion, was to be the main tool for ensuring universal access to communications
services.
Development policy framework
Ugandan national priorities and strategies have been effectively guided by a
number of national development policy frameworks. The 1997 Poverty
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) identifies priority areas and strategies. Progress
is reviewed regularly through a Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) which
includes community-level workshops. Carried out under the Ministry of
Finance, Planning and Economic Development, the first PPA resulted in the
revision of the PEAP in 2000.
The revised PEAP defines four major goals: fast, sustainable economic
growth and structural transformation, good governance and security,
increased ability of the poor to raise their incomes, and increased quality of
life for the poor. It emphasizes the role of increased market liberalization
and private sector development as an indirect strategy to reduce poverty.
34 TELECENTRES, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT
Cross-sectoral objectives relevant to ICT-access issues include better public
health information, sensitivity to gender issues, and addressing wide geo-
graphic disparities, especially in infrastructure. Infrastructure is also noted as
important for facilitating private sector development in Uganda, which is
in turn a key strategy, although indirect, for reducing poverty. Universal
primary education and the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture are two
major initiatives aimed at reducing poverty and stimulating development.
The PPAs suggest priorities for poverty reduction and provide feedback on
the success of policy implementation. In the most recent PPA, ill health was
seen as a primary cause of poverty, followed by limited access to land, lack
of markets, high taxes, deaths in the family, alcoholism, polygamy, large
families, and lack of women’s control over productive assets. In the north
and west of Uganda, insurgency and insecurity leading to displacement were
identified as key causes of poverty. Access to education, skills, gainful
employment (or multiple income sources), and start-up capital were all viewed
as key factors in moving out of poverty. Lack of empowerment and knowledge
were identified as defining elements of poverty.
Universal access policy
Three policy documents, central to understanding universal access policy in
Uganda, are briefly described below.
Uganda Communications Act, 1997
The Act establishes the UCC and the Rural Communications Development
Fund (RCDF). It emphasizes that the communication sector should have as
little government interference as possible, including direct and indirect
subsidies.
Rural Communications Development Policy (RCDP), July 2001
This is the key policy document on universal access in Uganda. Produced by
the UCC, it links access objectives to development issues, and provides clear
detail on implementation strategies, benchmarks and indicators. Various
multilateral institutions, such as the ITU, have showcased this policy as an
excellent example of an access policy. Implementation was under way but in
the early stages at the time of this research.
The policy explains how the UCC intends to administer the RCDF. It
aims to ensure that rural residents have reasonable and affordable access to
communications services. Specific objectives are described in Table 3.1.
‘Rural’ is not defined within the policy. In Uganda, Kampala has a far greater
proportion of ICT-related services than any other area in the country, and
‘rural’ is often used to refer to any place outside it. The UCC uses the political
demarcation of the country into regions, districts, counties and subcounties as
a basis for planning equitably disbursed services. District capitals, therefore,
are the first targets for expanded services and act as hubs for surrounding areas.
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As benchmarks are reached, the UCC targets counties, subcounties and
eventually parishes.
National Information and Communication Technology Policy, July 2002
The Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) spear-
headed this policy. It was developed through extensive stakeholder con-
sultation, with input from government, the private sector, civil society and
donor agencies beginning in 1999. It affirms the government’s commitment
to ICTs as major tools in Uganda’s development, serves to unite otherwise
fragmented efforts, both by governmental and non-governmental parties, and
creates clear links between ICT activities and overall national development
objectives and strategies. While the RCDP more directly addresses universal
access issues, what this policy adds is a greater emphasis on content and on
the flow of existing information. It puts ICTs into the larger framework of
communication systems, including both traditional communication systems
and mass media. It also sets up a co-ordinating body so that all ICT-
related initiatives, both within government and those instituted by donor
agencies and NGOs, work together and are in line with the policy’s national
objectives.
The policy attempts to strike a balance between content and infrastructure.
It has three foci: ‘information as a resource for development, mechanisms for
accessing information, and ICT as an industry, including e-business, software
development and manufacturing’ (Government of Uganda, 2002). While
infrastructure is not sectoral, information generally is, and the policy includes
health, education, agriculture, energy, environment, business, science and
technology, and other areas as specific sectors. Taken together, the RCDP and
the National ICT Policy identify eight broad areas in which ICT is expected to 
contribute to national development, as shown in Table 3.2.
Without the implementation plan, the policy is somewhat abstract. It was
still being debated in Cabinet at the time of field research, although an imple-
mentation strategy was simultaneously under development. This policy is
fully compatible with and cognizant of existing communication policies,
including the RCDP, which fit as components within this framework. In view
of the early stage of implementation at the time of the research, the policy had
had few practical effects. Nevertheless, it did suggest that the government was
well co-ordinated on the issue of ICTs and committed to their use as develop-
ment tools. Having such a policy also allows for greater government control
over international development projects using ICTs within Uganda.
Sectoral and other policies
In addition to the core policies described above, there are a number of sectoral
policies in place. Again, the ICT policy is intended to act as a co-ordinating
framework for these other initiatives, and the 2000-revised PEAP is also an
important co-ordinating framework. The following are among the various
sectoral ICT initiatives by government bodies:
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• The Ministry of Education has developed a technology-enhanced
education policy.
• The Meteorology Department has participated in an international
initiative (RANET) that uses Worldspace technology to transmit seasonal
forecasts to rural farmers, especially in drought-prone areas.
• The Ministry of Local Government, sponsored by the World Bank, is
implementing a database across the districts that will allow for greater
tracking and transparency of local facilities and activities. This will
eventually be networked for better information flow between local and
national government and across local levels.
While many sectoral activities are not concerned with universal access per se,
the decentralized nature of government and the largely rural population
necessitate a decentralized ICT infrastructure. Thus, the activities of the UCC
to encourage this are highly relevant, just as innovative efforts within sectors
(like the health ‘personal data assistant’ project) to achieve far-reaching con-
nectivity in a low-density rural environment are of potential significance
for other access initiatives. Those initiatives concerned with reaching farmers
especially would directly benefit from widely accessible public access points in
their own strategies.
Other related policies and actions of note include the scrapping of import
tax on ICT-related hardware (computers, etc.) as an incentive for ICT adoption
in Uganda, and the 1992 liberalization of broadcasting. Broadcasting is classi-
fied as separate from point-to-point communications and is licensed through
the Broadcasting Council, outside the mandate of the UCC. Radio Uganda, the
state-owned station, broadcasts countrywide in 28 languages. According to a
1998 field survey, it is the major source of information in Uganda (Govern-
ment of Uganda, 2002). Liberalization has resulted in an explosion of
FM stations across Uganda – 119 were operating at the time of research. Thus,
most districts now have at least one such station broadcasting over a more
limited range in local languages. Only about four community radio stations
exist, primarily because licenses are almost impossible to obtain. FM stations
have often linked with, promoted, used and sometimes started Internet cafés
in mid-sized Ugandan towns, including Mbale, Lira and Kabale
Implementing universal access
‘It costs us US$300 a month for the connection, compared to $70 a month
for the same service in Kampala. We break even and make money on other
services. The equipment is 30 per cent subsidized by UCC’.
Joseph Elotu, cybercafé owner in Mbale
Uganda’s national strategy for universal access to ICTs has focused on stimulat-
ing the market wherever possible and avoiding subsidy (see Figure 3.2.). This
applies mainly to infrastructure or mechanisms for information transfer as
well as many value-added services. The market will not be fully liberalized
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until the exclusivity period of the two major operators – MTN and Uganda
Telecommunications Ltd. (UTL) – ends in July 2005. Until that date, the licens-
ing obligations of these operators are another tool for encouraging the growth
of infrastructure and services in areas that the companies otherwise view as too
unprofitable. In addition, the RCDF is being used to subsidize specific infra-
structure and services in areas designated as ‘unprotected’ due to the stated
lack of interest of the incumbent operators in doing business there. Of the
three case study areas, only Lira was a direct beneficiary of the RCDP at the
time of research, a ‘point-of-presence’ subsidized by RCDP having been estab-
lished there in May 2003.
Locally relevant development-related information is a separate matter. The
government sees itself as a large producer of relevant information and the
overall intention is to freely distribute it. This falls largely outside the mandate
of the UCC, although it is also subsidizing the creation of local content via
district portals.
Regulation, licensing obligations and enforcement
The UCC, the telecom regulatory body in Uganda, drafted the RCDP and is
implementing it. This policy is widely seen as innovative and progressive, a
potential model for other countries (see Box 3.1).
Table 3.1 Goals for universal access in Uganda (from UCC Rural Communications
Development Policy)
Goal Implementation mechanism(s)
Bring access to basic communications to
all subcounty levels in Uganda or to every
community, which has a population of at
least 5,000 in habitants, by the year
2005
Licensing obligations, use of RCDF where market
is insufficient, increased liberalization after end
of exclusivity period
Ensure effective utilization of the Rural
Communication Development Fund
(RCDF) for rural communications
development
Identification of underserved areas, allocation
of service lots to private enterprises via least-
subsidy method, subsidization of 30–50% of
costs, 100% for content development
Promote ICT use in Uganda Establish cybercafés and telecentres at district
level, enable market, pursue liberalized
technology-neutral policy, provide ICT training
through vanguard institutions, support
development of locally relevant content
Promote communications in rural areas
as a profitable business
Pilot projects, subsidization of start-up of
business initiatives that will be economically
viable over the long term
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Box 3.1 Licensing obligations for major operators
Line roll-outs
100,000–200,000 distributed at the district, then county level
MTN: 87,000 lines distributed according to region
UTL: 100,000 lines
Pay phones
One pay phone per operator per county
MTN: total 2,000 pay phones
UTL: total 3,000 pay phones
Identification of ‘unprotected areas’
By July 2002, each operator had to declare which areas they were not going to serve
because they are not commercially viable; these would then be opened to competitive
subsidy using the RCDF.
Payment into RCDF
Each operator to pay $200,000 at commencement of licensing plus 1 per cent of gross
annual revenue.
Table 3.2 Links between universal access and national development objectives
(based on the RCDP and the National ICT Policy)












ICTs facilitate flow of information between levels of government,
and between government and citizens, and increase transparency.
Improved engagement
in markets









ICTs reduce rural isolation and improves access to and delivery of
these services.
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At the time of research, the market was limited because only two major
operators were licensed: MTN and UTL. The companies are permitted to
provide a full range of telecommunication services, including fixed line,
cellular and international data gateway. This legalized duopoly is seen as a
necessary incentive for the companies to invest in expensive infrastructure.
Uganda was generally not viewed as a favourable place for such investment
due to the high level of poverty and low levels of electrical and road infra-
structure. Retrospectively, it has turned out to be very lucrative for both com-
panies, but especially for MTN, which dominates the cellular market. As part of
the licensing process, each was also required to pay US$200,000 at the begin-
ning of the license, to pay 1 per cent of annual gross revenues, and to install
basic telephone services on a geographically determined basis.
The other cellular operator is Celtel Uganda Limited (which was actually the
first mobile operator, licensed in 1995). It was originally not recognized as a
major operator, since it was licensed before the Act was passed and the terms
had been clearly defined. Its license was later changed to recognize it as a
major operator, giving it greater rights, the most important being the ability to
Figure 3.2 Regulatory strategies for achieving universal access
Table 3.2 – continued
Development benefit Role of ICTs
Multi-sectoral
development
ICTs have applications relevant to health, education, agriculture,
government, commerce, etc.
Economic growth ICTs enhance competitiveness, increase trade and investment,
and can help modernize the private sector through improved




ICTs provide access to local and global markets and can be used to
promote rural development.
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operate its own international gateway (Tusubira et al., 2003). MTN has the
largest number of cellular subscribers, estimated at over 300,000 in 2003,
while Celtel had about 10 per cent of that. MTN also has the broadest network
coverage in Uganda. By the end of 2001, MTN was serving 85 towns covering
65 per cent of the country and 75 per cent of the population (Government of
Uganda, 2002). By the end of 2004 the coverage had expanded to 120 towns
and over 90 per cent of the nation’s urban population.
MTN and UTL are using the exclusivity period to strengthen their hold on
the market, especially with regard to the Internet services. UTL is also an Inter-
net service provider (ISP) and there is evidence that it is using its monopoly
position to squeeze out other ISPs, for example by offering a Freenet service.
While UCC is ‘technology neutral’ in its policies, VoIP is illegal in Uganda
unless one of the two major license holders is included as a third party. Like-
wise, no more international data gateway licenses will be issued during the
exclusivity period. Afsat is one company that held such a license predating
exclusivity and it is the only company that was marketing VSAT services in
Uganda in 2003, through a service called iWay. An iWay VSAT terminal cost
about US$4,000 and monthly service was in the range of about US$200 to
US$300. This price was much cheaper than what had been available a few
years earlier, when a satellite cost tens of thousands of dollars. However, this
accommodated a data transmission rate of only 64 kilobytes per second and
did not allow for bandwidth resale.
By 2003, 17 ISPs were licensed, with most offering services only in Kampala.
However, Bushnet offered wireless services to many areas outside of Kampala,
via line-of-sight transmission along the MTN GSM towers. And Afsat offered
VSAT, which could be installed wherever there was electricity. Neither of
these was a cheap option. The alternative was a long-distance phone call to a
Kampala ISP, which provided Internet service that was both expensive and of
poor quality.
Internet cafés previously required licenses but the UCC waived this require-
ment to encourage growth. Likewise, telecentres do not require licenses and
the UCC had no formal manner of tracking them.
Non-governmental initiatives
Uganda has a high level of donor and NGO activity, since it is seen as a stable,
well governed but poor country where development dollars are likely to make
a positive contribution to the country’s advancement. In addition, some
of Africa’s first telecentres were in Uganda, with donors often working in
collaboration with the government and local NGOs. Four of the telecentres
included in the case studies – the Nabweru telecentre, CPAR Community
Learning Centre (CLC) in Lira, and the African Highlands Initiative telecentres
in Kabale – were funded by IDRC. The UCC estimated there were about
14 non-governmental telecentres supported by outside donors (excluding
World Links telecentres), although nobody had exact figures.
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World Links is an international NGO set up by the World Bank. Its main
activity has been to set up school-based telecentres (SBTs). World Links
Uganda, run by former Nakaseke co-ordinator Meddie Mayanja, had estab-
lished 15 SBTs in 12 districts. Most were connected via Veristar C-band VSATs,
except for four in the area around Kampala that were using wireless broadband
(via microwave). These telecentres were computer facilities set up in secondary
schools and opened up to the public after-hours. The school is the core client,
and the students contribute to the telecentre through a fee of Ush5,000 to
10,000, paid as part of the school tuition fees each term. World Links provided
basic equipment and satellite connection, and subsidized the running costs for
the first three years of the programme. It also provided ongoing training to the
teachers running the SBT, some management and technical support, and net-
working and informational support including a quarterly newsletter. Schools
underwent feasibility assessment before being accepted and were required to
develop business plans for the SBTs.
The whole system was working well, according to the national co-ordinator,
and with many schools making a surplus, sustainability was not a pressing
issue. But then, in January 2003, Veristar went bankrupt. Because the equip-
ment was proprietary, it was not easy to find another service provider and
much of the original investment was lost. The schools were off-line for almost
eight months while this was being resolved (they eventually went to Afsat).
Fieldwork for the research reported here reported here coincided with the
sixth month without connectivity and with the end of subsidization looming.
While it was not the best time for a researcher to get a proper feel for the full
potential of these telecentres, two of them (in Lira and Kabale) were visited
during the course of the case study work.
Review of the three community case studies
Lira
‘I joined the computer club because the computer is important: without it
one can’t make a better study [in other school subjects]. I can get extra
material via Internet and get connected to friends outside’.
Student at Lango College, Lira
Lira District in northern Uganda has been subject to ongoing insecurity and
civil war, which have been especially hard on rural civilians. The town of Lira
has been a place of refuge and stability and has grown quickly as people flee
the countryside. Traditionally, though, it has had a subsistence economy with
very little local industry. It lacks adequate health facilities and food shortages
are common.
From about 1998 to 2003, Lira town went from having virtually no ICT
services to offering a whole gamut of them: local FM radio stations, Internet
cafés, computer training, computer business services, and landline and cellular
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telephone services (private and public). With the exception of radio and, to a
lesser extent, telephone, awareness and use of most of these services remain
very limited and drop off quickly as one moves farther from the town. Except
for the MTN cellular network, services do not extend into the district beyond
the town because of poverty, poor infrastructure and insecurity. In town,
local entrepreneurs are enthusiastic about ICTs both as a community service
and as a livelihood. They have shown some creativity in marketing their
services and are willing to provide high levels of user support. Many of these
people are university-educated locals who have chosen to return to their
home town. Their ability and desire to create a livelihood in Lira benefit the
district.
In Lira town, the radio stations and public Internet centres have in some
sense grown up together. Radio presenters were some of the earliest users of
the Internet cafés, going there to find news and music for their broadcasts.
Radio stations and cybercafés support each other by exchanging free on-air
promotion for free Internet access. Radio Lira opened its own cybercafé and
also became the sales point for Afsat’s iWay VSAT services in northern Uganda.
Lessons
Lira town has seen immense changes in the availability and use of ICTs over
the last three years. It demonstrates the potential of radio as a way to directly
promote and popularize ICTs among people who might otherwise be unaware
of them. This can be sufficient to spark initial interest, although in Lira it was
still too early to say what the long-term effects of these promotional efforts
would be.
Lira’s experiences also show that, although ICT skills are sometimes seen to
promote brain drain away from areas with limited employment potential, they
can also provide an impetus for staying within a community. This has been
the case for a number of entrepreneurs who started ICT-related businesses,
focusing on popularizing their use and providing broad access. These
businesses have faced challenges, especially because of limited access to capital
and because of their dependence upon long-distance dial-up services for
Internet access. The availability of local points-of-presence and the opening of
the market to a greater range of technologies offered competitively can make a
huge difference to these smaller businesses. Otherwise, those larger businesses
or externally supported non-profit initiatives able to procure more expensive
but satisfactory services such as VSAT (currently expensive, in part because of
the single operator and illegality of resale) will be able to out-compete local
entrepreneurs based simply on their access to larger amounts of capital. This
limits the potential role of competition to the detriment of both the smaller
entrepreneurs and their potential customers.
Lira’s experiences also indicate that local businesses learn quickly from each
other, can respond to their customers’ needs, and are capable of providing
strong support when they understand that such support is necessary for their
own sustainability. In other places, there is a greater tendency to provide
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minimal support – to count on users already knowing the technology or
being able to learn it on their own. In Lira, the low levels of capacity and
awareness in the population have made this strategy less viable. Local
businesses have recognized the need to grow their customer base.
Despite the outreach efforts of businesses in Lira, there are obvious limita-
tions to the uptake of ICTs there, particularly computer-based technologies.
One is the relatively high cost of services given the very low incomes of the
rural majority, compounded by transportation and security issues. Many rural
people rely on radio. The use of the Internet by radio presenters increases the
listeners’ access to international and national news and other information,
and most programming is in local languages. Information on local security,
relayed by reporters in the villages, is the prime concern of most listeners. And
where phones can be used, these too facilitate the speedy communication of
security information.
Nabweru
‘Our marketing happens on a very small scale. We give introduction letters to
neighbouring schools, mainly to the teachers. We haven’t done more
because we don’t have the capacity for more customers’.
Owner, communications centre, Nansana
‘Those with less education will sometimes come for computer training to get
jobs because they don’t have money to continue with their studies’.
Attendant, computer training centre, Nansana
Nabweru Subcounty is just north of the city of Kampala. Its largely rural popu-
lation depends mainly on small businesses in trade and retail, services and
production. A third of households also grow food. Depending on where they
lived, people had reasonably easy access to services within Kampala and en
route to it. However, there were no ICT services within the subcounty proper
until 1998. At that time, a telecentre offering a full range of ICT services was
established at the subcounty headquarters, funded by IDRC and managed by
the UNCST and a local management committee. In 2002, the pilot phase
ended. The telecentre stopped receiving funding and was turned over to
subcounty authorities, which took full ownership.
The telecentre never had high usage levels; at its peak, it had about 300 users
a month. Outside competition gradually increased, especially in telephone
services. Dial-up Internet services were stopped in 2002 because the telecentre
could not compete with cybercafés using wireless.
The telecentre never had the sort of community ownership and input that
were hoped for, and it did not manage to make services widely accessible to
the public. One reason for this was simply the low level of public awareness
of ICTs within the subcounty. In addition, incomes and ability to pay were
generally quite low, although the subcounty was prosperous relative to most
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of Uganda. Per-hour user fees deterred the merely curious, while computer
training also was an investment too high for most to justify without a very
clear notion of the benefits. Another factor has to do with the telecentre itself:
its poor location. It was beside a jail and far from other shops, amenities and
convenient transportation.
Meanwhile, Nabweru is home to a large number of entrepreneurially
minded people. Small ICT-related businesses, especially those offering basic
computer training and business services, numbered about 15 within the
subcounty, not including phone bureaus. Most of these were clustered within
the trading centres of Nansana and Kawempe, while similar businesses were
also found just outside of Nabweru in Bwaise, including a cybercafé. Many of
these businesses struggled to find adequate start-up capital, did not have a
clear idea of the kind of demand they might expect for the services offered,
and invested little in marketing. Many had gone out of business, although the
sector as a whole was expanding.
Lessons
With the clarity of hindsight, it is easy to see that the design and implemen-
tation of the Nabweru telecentre could have been better. A more accessible
location, attention to marketing and pricing, and earlier local input into
substantive management issues, including expenditures, are all measures
that could have helped. Still, it is not obvious that there was ‘one best way’ for
the telecentre to address local needs. Even with the suggested improvements,
the situation would have remained a major challenge, especially with regard to
providing affordable services and building local demand.
It is interesting to speculate what might have been achieved had the original
funds been used not to set up a telecentre per se, but to support local entre-
preneurs in setting up their own ICT-related businesses. Perhaps local demand
was not sufficiently high at the time for this to have been a viable option,
although for phone services at least, it should have been. A loan or small-
grants programme could have enhanced the viability of entrepreneurs’ early
efforts and increased their reach, achieving many of the same objectives
as the original telecentre. The money could have been used, for example, to
capitalize start-ups, train maintenance technicians, market services, network
with other local entrepreneurs and share knowledge in other ways. Never-
theless, it would still have been quite a challenge for such entrepreneurs to
provide truly affordable access for those on very low incomes.
Kabale
‘One problem we have is that people don’t know how to handle the phones,
especially rural people. They have problems with timing and handling the
receivers. We also have problems with people stealing phones’.
Attendant, privately owned public phone booth, Kabale
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Kabale is a mountainous district in southwestern Uganda, bordering Rwanda.
The research focused on Kabale town, the district’s capital and business centre,
and on two rural subcounties, Bukinda and Rubaya. Kabale is a densely popu-
lated district and farmers face environmental threats related to soil erosion.
The area attracts a modest number of tourists because of its natural beauty and
the fact it is home to endangered mountain gorillas.
The Kabale case study highlighted the vast differences in ICT provision
between towns and rural areas in Uganda. While Kabale town had one
cybercafé, two telecentres (neither of which had Internet access at the time
of research) and numerous public phone and computer-related services, the
types of services offered by these centres were absent from rural areas. The
exceptions were private cellular phone ownership (but at low density) and two
or three ICT projects incorporated into broader development programmes.
In these areas, most people depend on subsistence agriculture and their
disposable incomes are small. Moreover, roads, water supply and electrical
infrastructure are generally in poor condition.
The experience in Kabale town was parallel to but also distinct from that in
Lira. Both towns had early attempts to provide Internet access via long dis-
tance dial-up which proved to be of poor quality and difficult to sustain. In
Kabale, a business centre at a large hotel and a subsidized telecentre had
managed to provide such services, but at a loss. Both towns had school-based
telecentres located a few kilometres from the town centre. Both towns
had business sectors that had been fairly active in experimenting with ICT
provision.
In Kabale, there were no businesses offering maintenance and repair
services, and most of the business support services such as typesetting and
printing had grown out of existing stationery shops. Businesses had responded
to the tourism market and often communication services were located within
or beside hotels. There was little emphasis on popularizing ICT services
beyond the small segments of student and professional groups who already
knew of and used such services. The exception to this was the African
Highlands Initiative (AHI) telecentre, since it had a mandate to serve rural
populations and contribute to local development. However, its staff did not
have any clear strategies for attracting the general population, had at that time
no resources for a marketing or advertising campaign, and had found that few
local farmers and non-professionals made use of their services. Money,
distance, interest and awareness were all widely noted as important factors
that restricted use of the telecentre.
Bukinda and Rubaya are rural subcounties that depend heavily on sub-
sistence farming. Each hosted a rural ICT project. The World Vision office in
Bukinda hosted RANET, a project in partnership with the Ugandan Depart-
ment of Meteorology and the international RANET consortium, which
delivers climatic and other information via a satellite. Rubaya had its own AHI
telecentre located beside the subcounty headquarters, linked to the telecentre
in Kabale town. Both of these had experienced technical problems that
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limited their service offerings. In Rubuya, for example, the telecentre could
not establish a wireless Internet link as originally intended and the cellular
phone network worked poorly. Insufficient local technical capacity also meant
the telecentres had to depend on relatively inaccessible external support
which tended to be slow in coming. Nonetheless, as far as these centres had
been able to integrate with other development activities, they had provided
interesting extra capacity. In Rubaya, such capacity was due more to the
organizational skills of the staff than to any ICT use. In Bukinda, the RANET
site allowed for the reception of climate forecasts and other information of use
to local farmers.
Lessons
Arguably, the most important lessons from this case study relate to rural
awareness and use of ICTs. While the ability to communicate and interact with
people in other locations is often highly valued in isolated rural areas, many
factors inhibit use of ICTs. Information-seeking behaviour does not occur
spontaneously if people are not already accustomed to the availability of
information and if they have their own methods of decision-making based on
custom and habit. Creating an access centre, especially a multi-purpose centre,
in a rural area thus implies much more than simply overcoming the great
obstacles to building and maintaining an infrastructure in an environment
where supports are few and far between. It also implies creating new organiza-
tional and social structures, and encouraging new behavioural patterns that
allow rural residents to seek out and gainfully apply information. Starting such
a venture from scratch is a complex, long-term proposition that may also
be expensive and risky. Predicting the venture’s specific gains to the local
community can be rather difficult.1
The experiences in both the Bukinda-RANET and Rubaya telecentres support
the argument that a more organic, gradual approach is needed, namely one
that builds on what is already there (in terms of both organization and phys-
ical infrastructure) and uses ICTs to augment it. The experience of both tel-
ecentres also supports the argument that user-pay systems are completely
inappropriate for rural ICT projects, at least in the early stages. This is because
rural people cannot afford to pay – and cannot be expected to pay for what
they do not yet value. This is especially true for information-related services, as
opposed to human communication services, like the telephone, which rural
people tend to value highly.
RANET has focused on a specific informational need and has trained
farmers how to apply the information. When the system is in place, farmers
notice tangible benefits to themselves within one season. They are better
able to plan for and cope with climatic conditions, resulting in more plentiful
harvests.2 But an additional, higher-level benefit is that they have learned how
to obtain, value and apply practical information delivered via ICTs. This is a
skill, a behavioural change, that can help them improve many other aspects of
their livelihoods.
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Comparing the Ugandan cases with access-related development objectives
Table 3.3 gathers observational evidence from the three case communities and
relates it to the eight development benefits that Ugandan policies indicate
ICTs can provide. Overall, it shows mixed movement towards the intended
benefits. In many instances, these observations are tentative without further
economic data – for example, on the contribution of ICTs to local business.




Situation observed in case study communities
All three case studies show similar patterns:
Connection to the global
information society
** The vast majority of people have never heard of the Internet.
** A small minority of young, educated adults use the Internet
primarily for e-mail and, to a lesser extent, to gain access to
international information, especially related to their studies and
NGO work.
** SBTs allow students to participate in international fora and online





There is some degree of support to the subcounty headquarters,
mainly through computer typesetting and telephone
communication.
Kabale
Rubaya subcounty headquarters were located near the telecentre;
district staff had access in Kabale town. While actual use remains
low, some civil servants reportedly do use the services in their work
(mainly administrative tasks).
Lira
Local district civil servants had access to ICT services and some were
using them. The Ministry of Local Government was in the process of





Mobile phones and public phones are used by business people and
can facilitate this. However, there is not sufficient evidence to draw
clear conclusions.
Kabale
Within and around Kabale town, telephones have improved contacts
within local and national markets. Benefits are more limited in
remote areas, although the potential is there. RANET participants in
Bukinda hope to link the climate information to marketing
strategies.
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Intended development
benefit
Situation observed in case study communities
Lira
Use of ICTs for this purpose was very limited in the agricultural




This has been achieved to some degree through the provision of
phone service. Computers are used largely as advanced
typewriters.
Kabale
Phones and photocopying are broadly used, where available, to
support more efficient practices (communicating, recording and
distributing information) while computer-based ICTs and fax remain
limited and mainly used for word processing activities.
Lira
Some civil servants were using ICTs, although this was still fairly
novel. Staff of public access centres characterized NGOs and civil





There has been very limited use of ICTs for this purpose. Some
professionals make use of the Internet at cafés, including teachers
and health professionals. Agricultural information delivery
programmes at the telecentre have been of limited reach and
duration.
Kabale
Public access centres support individual professionals within
these fields who choose to use the services. The SBT at Kigezi High
School offers some students enhanced educational opportunities
(in international exchanges and projects). ICTs have improved
delivery of international news services. Agricultural uses have
not flourished, with the exception of RANET, delivering climate
information.
Lira
Civil servants from these sectors had better communication with
Kampala offices and more streamlined administration. Phones could
be used for health emergencies. The SBT at Lango College offered
some educational opportunities to students (but limited because of




The impact of ICTs on local enterprises and livelihoods is not
clear from the data gathered, although telephones have been
adopted by many small local businesses, especially in trade-related
areas.
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Table 3.3 – continued
Intended development
benefit
Situation observed in case study communities
Kabale
Uptake of ICTs has been limited in most sectors, especially small
businesses and farming; so its impact on the development of these
sectors is likewise limited.
Lira
The sector most affected appeared to be the news media. Both
radio and newspapers were benefiting from increased information
flows.
In all three:
Economic growth • Proliferation of ICT-related businesses and business expansion
suggest that ICTs have contributed to local economic activity. The
contribution of ICTs to local wealth generation is less certain.
While phone services are usually viable, computer-related services
have low profits and many businesses do not survive. Further, the
equipment and many of the operating services (ie, connection,
repairs, consumables and electricity) are bought from external
suppliers. Economic activity directly due to ICTs in town is large,
but because money leaves the community, economic growth may
be marginal.
• Access centres provide some local jobs.
• In more remote towns, the opportunity to begin local ICT
businesses may help to retain skilled and educated local
entrepreneurs.
• If ICTs help retain the elite who tend to use these services (it is too
early to tell if this is the case), then they may contribute to local
economic growth because these are people who can afford to
invest locally.
• Telephone, fax and Internet allowed local business people to
communicate and do business with those in other centres,




• Where there are increased local services, most of the population
lacks the awareness and capacity to profit from them. Those who
do are overwhelmingly wealthier and more educated, thus
evidencing localized ‘digital divides.’
• For those who live in towns and can pay, ICTs have offered a range
of opportunities – for example, for Ugandans based in Kabale
engaging and monitoring in international investment activities
without ICTs.
• In rural areas, ICTs offer opportunities only where they are
integrated into broader development programmes, such as
RANET.
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Another important overall observation is that this situation was clearly
dynamic. There was a clear divide between towns and villages in the level
of awareness and use of telephones, but many village families had relatives
working in town. These people would often introduce their rural relatives to
telephones or even buy them cellular phones, and this trend meant the divide
might be transitory. With computers and the Internet, this was much less
likely, since these required a reliable source of electricity, maintenance, and
literacy to use.
Learning from Uganda’s experience
Liberalization, cost and technological availability
Uganda’s decision to introduce a second national operator before completing
privatization of its state-owned operator has meant that it has had more com-
petition in its telecom market than most other African countries. Under these
conditions, fixed-line service has improved greatly although cellular penetra-
tion has increased much more quickly. The spread of fax and the Internet are
both limited to fixed-line penetration. Wireless broadband use has been very
popular as ISPs can offer it directly. However, it can only be practically used
within a relatively small distance of an international data gateway. Its use,
therefore, is widespread in Kampala but rare in other towns.3
Opening the market has created relatively more opportunities than in
South Africa. However, many technologies, such as VoIP, are still effectively
unavailable or only available through a limited number of operators, under
certain conditions. And prices remain high. Cellular phones and public
phones are affordable in the sense that a single service unit can be purchased at
a time (ie, pay-as-you-go). Nonetheless, the tariff rates remain high, and for the
rural majority, phone isn’t affordable.
The expense of connecting to the Internet through international gateways
limits bandwidth availability and keeps costs high. Some people are working
around this by maximizing the within-country connectivity, which is poten-
tially much cheaper. Bushnet, for example, has a system that manages traffic to
maximize the within-country speed and bandwidth and reduce international
Intended development
benefit
Situation observed in case study communities
• The growth of ICT as a sector and the provision of ICT services
allowed those from Lira but educated elsewhere to seek local
economic opportunities and bring their education back to their
hometown. This opportunity to stay home was important to the
whole community, as these were people who had much to
contribute both economically and socially.
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bottlenecks. Others have spoken of creating within-country broadband net-
works that minimize their use of the international link.
In Uganda, radio and telecommunications were liberalized during the same
period. This has had some interesting outcomes, especially in towns far from
Kampala, where there has often been a convergence of ownership and interest
between the two. Specifically, some radio station owners have introduced
on-site cybercafés, promoting them through their broadcasts.
Reach of centres and the urban-rural divide
In Uganda, the decentralized government structure, including the wide spread
of district capitals, encourages a broad but superficial distribution of ICTs
across the country. This has been further encouraged by the relatively high
level of liberalization and by explicit UCC policies that set reach targets by
district and subcounty. Despite this spread, there is a big gap between towns
and even the closest surrounding villages in terms of awareness and use. This
gap has not been bridged, although in some places, such as Lira, people are
trying. School-based telecentres, often located on town outskirts, also increase
accessibility for the neighbouring populations.
Providing access in rural areas is a big challenge. On the supply side, limiting
factors include infrastructure, maintenance, equipment supplies, staff capacity
and transport. On the demand side, several things are lacking: money, aware-
ness, client transportation to the centres, and clarity (sometimes on the part of
the centre itself) about how the services can be used to improve livelihoods.
The experiences of access centres in this study suggest that user fees are
major barriers in popularizing services. Within rural areas, one of the best ways
to overcome inhibiting factors is to embed access to and use of ICTs into
existing development processes. RANET is an example of this. It helps to
absorb the costs and complications of supply and to address demand limita-
tions, by using existing programme delivery mechanisms, relationships and
organizational structures. In developing access centres, especially in rural
areas, small steps are best. The more remote and difficult the situation, the
more important it is to build on what exists and to break down and deal with
complexity in stages.
Strategies for the short, medium and long term
Strategies to increase access to ICTs must run along a number of different
timelines and be harmonized with other efforts. Infrastructure development,
especially fixed line and electricity, are important factors that can limit the
effective supply of telecommunications. Lack of awareness and capacity
amongst the general population limits both supply (ie, people able to develop,
offer and maintain services) and demand (people aware of and able to use
services). The UCC is already using its funds to sponsor development of
vanguard ICT-training institutions within different districts as a way to build
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this capacity. Over the long term, equipping schools, training teachers, and
developing appropriate curricula are important strategies that are being
pursued by both the government and NGOs (such as Schoolnet Uganda).
Within the different timelines, the specific role of shared access centres, and
specifically those that are subsidized, is dynamic and requires some careful
thought. Where centres are set up under the most adverse conditions, they
often fail because they do have the vast resources needed to confront those
conditions. But attempting to surmount the obstacles may not actually be a
top priority for the communities in which the centres are located. So we have a
conundrum: since community members are unfamiliar with ICTs and their
potential uses, they are unable to make an informed decision as to how
valuable a telecentre-type service would be. Arguably, at least some of the
inhibiting factors, such as lack of electricity, should be first addressed by
separate efforts so that the complexity and expense of introducing ICT services
is reduced to some manageable level. At the other end of the spectrum, some
development-funded efforts have established public access centres in places
where the market was already effective. Or they have subsidized or donated
expensive equipment to local organizations, including businesses. Such anti-
competitive behaviour is unfair and as likely to inhibit local development as to
support it.
This dilemma has no magic solution. But it does stress the need for reflection
before the establishment of funded centres. Feasibility has to be balanced with
need, and in practice the two often have a strong inverse relationship. The
purpose, target users, differentiation from other services, and the longer-term
vision for the centre all require forethought, with the understanding that the
ICT sector is dynamic and that some ‘rural’ areas, although far from Kampala,
nonetheless host entrepreneurial centres.
Developmental impact and potential
That the developmental impact of ICTs depends entirely upon how they are
used is almost a truism. Yet it bears repeating. Use in turn depends on the
needs, capacity, inclination and awareness of the user, plus the larger organiza-
tional and social structures in which the ICT is embedded. The Internet can
be used to find pornography or to find information useful to basic food pro-
duction. The telephone can be used to make a life-saving call during an
emergency, to contact Short Message Service (SMS, which allows messaging
to mobile phones and other wireless devices) for current market prices on
food commodities in Kampala, or as an expensive social status symbol. One
use does not preclude the other; indeed, even if a phone was purchased
to make a social statement, it still opens the potential for uses with tangible
value.4
In Uganda, trends in Internet use favour it as a tool for sending e-mail,
especially internationally. The World Wide Web is most often used as a source
of entertainment, music, pornography, education, information on overseas
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educational opportunities and scholarships, job opportunities and inter-
national news. Some professionals also use it in their work-related activities.
F.F. Tusubira, a commissioner of the UCC, has noted that cellular companies
found the peak use of phones was between 4 pm and 9 pm, strongly implying
social use. This further implies that most phone use does not create economic
value for the user, but rather produces profit for the large companies at the
expense of poor Ugandans. This research also found that social use of the
telephone, especially to contact family members, is the primary use. However,
because economic interdependence amongst family members is such an
important part of most people’s livelihoods, such use is not necessarily non-
economic. It is very difficult, however, to judge the economic value of tele-
phone use versus cost – there is no clear linear relationship. It is also apparent,
in both South Africa and Uganda, that social factors, as much as or more than
economic factors, motivate people, particularly young people, to acquire a
cellular phone. It is very rare, for example, to see a Ugandan owning the
cheapest model of phone available in the shops; indeed, many people own
higher-end models.
Public access centres remain the main vehicle for ICT use for most people
in Uganda. They can also be important sites of socialization around ICT use.
Pure public use (where the centre sells a service) tends to mirror the patterns
people have learned in using ICTs at university or in work settings, which
often include entertainment-related uses. Purpose-driven ICT projects, such as
RANET or specific online collaborations amongst students at an SBT, are rarer
and generally target users who have not been socialized to ICT use in other
settings. They also tend to embed the use of ICT in activities that have a
specific, intended value.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Start-up and scalability of access centres
This chapter examines the related issues of access centre scalability and sus-
tainability. Scalability can be considered at a micro-level as the question
of how a centre actually starts up. From a national policy perspective, this
means looking at what favours a successful start-up and how best to create
these conditions. Sustainability is the issue of how a centre manages to
continue operating, whether through user fees or some other means, and
the types of conditions that may put a centre at risk of closing or compromise
its services. Again, from the perspective of national policy, the main issue is
how best to support conditions in which access centres have a reasonable
chance of surviving and operating in a way that their services will be useful
and accessible.
In the course of this study, about 65 different access centres were
encountered. While most were within the case study communities, about 10
more were from different areas of South Africa and Uganda. The extras were
included because they in some way expanded the lessons and experiences
from the case communities.
Access centres can be broadly placed in two categories: for-profit and
not-for-profit. The former grouping comprises phone shops, Internet cafés,
communication centres (including computer training establishments), and
services within an existing business such as a hair salon, traditional healer or
stationery shop. Not-for-profit public- and NGO-sector services include those
within an existing not-for-profit organization, those that are part of an
integrated development strategy, and telecentres. The access-related services
offered by these centres are here broken down into five types:
1. direct access to one or more ICT tools, often including basic customer
support;
2. training and skills building in the use of computer software packages,
sometimes for business management;
3. access to climatic information, market prices and other information;
4. information production or processing such as desktop publishing, video
editing and graphic design;
5. some other kind of activity augmented by ICTs (access as a means to an
end).
Table 4.1 correlates the seven types of access centre with the five types of
access-related services.
The rest of this chapter explores how the different types of access centres
began and sustained (or failed to sustain) themselves, and why they offered the
types of services they did. It also compares and contrasts communities with
regards to the types of access centres available (see Table 4.2).
For-profit sector
Private phone shops
‘I’m the owner and I got the start-up money from selling land. To me, the
greatest success of this centre is my marriage – I got my wife through
this centre’.
Owner/operator, public phone booth, Kabale
Privately owned and run phone shops existed in all case study sites except
Bhamshela and rural areas of Kabale. These shops often consisted of nothing
more than a single metered phone on a plastic table set up outdoors. Photo 4.1
shows a wooden booth on the side of a street, housing a metered wireless
phone and an attendant with an account book and a customer. This was a
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typical set-up in Lira. In some instances the phone shop was integrated into an
existing business, such as a hair salon. Almost all of these used fixed wireless
technology rather than landlines. There were often many of them in a single
town, generally clustered around high-traffic areas such as taxi ranks and
shopping centres. Typically, they advertised their service and rates to passers-
by via simple outdoor signboards.
Phone shops were popular with entrepreneurs, most of whom lived in or
close to the area where their shop was located. These enterprises cost little to
start and run. Owners usually hired attendants and sometimes opened phone
shops in various locations. While attendants often worked long hours for low
wages, the shops were at least able to cover the costs of both the staff and
phone line and make a profit. Owners were almost always motivated merely
by profit. In interviews, some said they had considered expanding into other
ICT-related services, but this would normally require a great deal of invest-
ment, especially for those who were simply operating on the street. As most
were reasonably satisfied with their profits, they had little immediate motive
to expand.
While most phone shops offered only basic phone service, a few also
provided connection time and phone cards. Often the attendant would dial
the number for the customer. Because charges were typically ‘per unit’ and
the attendant often did not know how long a unit lasted (it was tracked
automatically on the metering system), the charges and charging method were
generally not transparent to customers.
Photo 4.1 Privately owned phone shop on Main Street, Lira
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Table 4.2 Types of services available in five case communities
Case Centre type For profit? Number Year started Sample services
South Africa
Bhamshela Universal Service Agency telecentre no 1 1998 phone, fax, computer access, computer training, Internet
MPCC no 1 2003 government services: birth, death, marriage registration;
social security cheques; employment assistance;
educational information
services within other organization
(Village Bank)
yes 1 2002 fax, photocopying, possibly Internet
phone shop franchises yes 2 2001 phone, phone cards
Khayelitsha Universal Service Agency telecentre no 1 2000 photocopy, fax, computer training, computer access,
typesetting, printing
phone shop franchises yes many 1998 onwards phone, air time cards
services within existing businesses yes 2 or 3 2000 onwards photocopy, fax, typesetting
services within existing NGOs no 1 1999 photocopy, fax, typesetting, e-mail, computer access,
printing
private computer training centres yes 2 ? computer training, mainly on commercial software packages
NGO computer training no 1 ? computer training and entrepreneurial skills-building, aimed
at starting own desktop publishing businesses, etc.
services within library no 1 2000 Internet (4 other libraries with photocopying)
independent phone shops yes many ~2001 onwards calls to all networks
Uganda
Lira private communication centres yes 6 1997 to 2001 computer training, computer repair, consultancy,
photocopying, typesetting, binding, printing, stationery
sales, fax, e-mail
independent phone shops yes many ~2002 onwards local, regional and international phone services, phone cards

































World Links telecentre no 1 2001 computer training, computer and Internet access
CPAR Community Learning Centre no 1 2003 planned services to include Internet, video and audio
editing, secretarial and desktop publishing services
post office yes 1 about 2000 fax, phone
Kabale town private communication centres yes 12 ~1999 onwards desktop publishing, typesetting, video rental, tape and video
editing, scanning, video games, phone, graphic design,
compact disk (CD) burning
private Internet cafés yes 1 2003 Internet, printing, typesetting
private computer training centres yes 2 or 3 2002 onwards basic software packages
Christian Ministry Vocational
College computer training
no 1 1998 computer classes (mainly directed towards secretarial skills)
private phone shops yes 20 1999 onwards phone (fixed wireless)
World Links telecentre no 1 2000 public computer and Internet access
AHI telecentre no 1 2000 photocopying, typesetting, computer training, phone,
agricultural content production, links/support to rural
telecentre (in Rubaya)
Kabale rural AHI telecentre (Rubaya) no 1 2000 typesetting, printing, meeting space, projector,
photocopying, phone, computer training, small resource
library
RANET site (World Vision area
office, Bukinda)
no 1 2001 agricultural information, especially climatic information,
disseminated through farmer groups
Nabweru IDRC/UNCST telecentre no 1 1999 computer training, typesetting, computer access,
agricultural information and outreach, photocopy, phone, fax
(not working), TV, video library
private communication/training
centres
yes 8 or 9 1999 onwards phone, fax, photocopy, typesetting, computer training
(software packages), desktop publishing, binding
private Internet cafés yes 11 2002 Internet, printing, typesetting
private phone shops yes many ~2002 phone: national, East Africa, sometimes international



































Since most phone shops were very basic, there were few service features on
which to compete. Location was probably the biggest single advantage one
shop might have over another, although privacy, reliable and honest billing,
and good rates were also factors customers tended to consider. Because the
phone service was purchased by entrepreneurs from a major telecom operator
(usually on a prepaid basis), there was little room for competition on pricing.
This motivated some owners to surreptitiously shorten the length of a unit –
so that it looked like prices were cheaper when they were not. The ease of entry
into this kind of service provision meant that competition was high and,
despite high demand, profit margins low.
The start-up of these types of phone shops often lagged slightly behind other
types of phone access that had been offered through either the licensing obli-
gations of major operators or public centres and larger communication
centres. This is probably because the entrepreneurs running these businesses
had relatively little capital and little tolerance for risk. The biggest barrier to
start-up was the absence of a phone network and electricity.
Phone shop franchises
‘I want to get phones in but I have to wait a month or two for MTN, and [I]
don’t want to. But Vodacom is full in Site C, Cell C’s network is bad, Telkom
is too expensive and most people these days want to call cell phones, so I’m
not interested in them.’
Entrepreneur on opening up a public phone shop in Khayelitsha
Phone shop or phone booth franchises, present in both South Africa and
Uganda, were due almost entirely to the licensing obligations of major
operators. Vodacom, South Africa’s largest cellular service provider, had
created its own model of phone shop franchise that turned out to be highly
successful. Although it initially required subsidization by Vodacom, by 2003
the programme was self-sustaining and generating significant publicity for the
company and a potential customer base in the communities where it was
operating.
A Vodacom phone shop was typically housed in a shipping container
painted green with a large sign outside. It contained between four and eight
fixed wireless phones attached to a central meter operated by an attendant.
Entrepreneurs could buy a container for a small sum, which included a set
amount of prepaid connection time to the Vodacom network, which they
would replenish as they needed. Vodacom also gave the initial group of
entrepreneurs training and access to credit for shop start-up. All Vodacom
containers encountered in this research (one in Bhamshela and several in
Khayelitsha) were well used and generated good profits for their owners.
Arguably, one of the big successes of the Vodacom container model is that it
did not require much planning on the part of the local entrepreneurs: the
system of pre-paying connection time (which is then resold to clients) means
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that one cannot get into trouble running up debts. Vodacom subsidized the
rate on the connection time sold to the owner, meaning that she or he had a
decent profit margin. No other cellular operator gave preferential rates to
their franchisees, meaning that those working with other networks or inde-
pendently were making much smaller profits. Telkom, the major telecom
operator in South Africa, also franchised phone shops but the profit margins
on these were too small for entrepreneurs to make a living. The owner of the
Telkom container in Bhamshela explained that he had opened it only because
he saw a need for such a service in his community. He made his income
through other means, and generated virtually no profit from the container.
Internet cafés
‘We do get some illiterate people from the country and we try to help them.
Some people panic with the machine’.
Attendant, Internet café, Bwaise
While Internet cafés certainly exist in South Africa, they were not present in
either of the case communities, and typically existed only in big cities such as
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. These cafés catered mainly to middle-
class people, and sometimes university students. Prices were generally high, up
to R1 a minute. Telkom had begun offering ADSL in selected areas, usually big
cities, and this brought the cost of Internet access down. In Khayelitsha
and Bhamshela, the only real option was dial-up, but this had proven too
expensive for entrepreneurs to offer and recoup their costs.
In Uganda, Internet cafés existed in cities and mid-sized towns. Most of the
cafés in towns were newer and benefited from more recently available con-
nectivity options. These connections included VSAT, wireless broadband and
local PoPs that had been set up by UTL, subsidized by the Universal Service
Fund through the Rural Communication and Development Policy (RCDP).
Earlier attempts to create Internet cafés (or other types of centres offering
Internet access) through long-distance dial-up had proven to be unsustainable
since the cost was very high and service poor.
Unlike phone shops, Internet cafés took a fair amount of capital to start up,
since they required a reasonably large space plus computers and the Internet
connection. They also required a higher level of technical expertise to set up
and run than a phone shop. They were often begun by individuals who already
had a successful business and could use the capital from this to finance them
in part. In the towns especially, it was common for FM radio stations to open
Internet cafés. This worked well because the stations were usually profitable
and able to finance and advertise the cafés over the airwaves. Moreover, pre-
senters could use the Internet to get information and music for their shows.
Because most Internet cafés were new and had better, cheaper Internet con-
nectivity than their predecessors, it was not clear how sustainable they were.
High overheads and narrow profit margins made the business fairly risky. In
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bigger towns and cities, the demand was evident but competition was also
high. Isaac Kasana, who had been associated with an ISP, noted that most of
their client Internet cafés, based in Kampala, had gone bankrupt or ceased
operation. Despite the volatility, many new cafés were opening. As with the
phone shops, a major challenge for such cafés was that, while they had many
competitors, they shared many of the same fixed costs, which kept profit
margins very low. In Mbale, for example, the price war between the five or so
Internet cafés was so fierce that most were offering rates below the cost of
provision. One of the business owners said he was trying to organize with the
others and discuss setting the prices so that they could survive. In the com-
munities reviewed in this research, most Internet cafés focused mainly on
Internet services with some level of client support. While other services such as
typesetting were sometimes available, they were not much emphasized by
owners or requested by clients.
In Lira, in northern Uganda, the Internet cafés were actively marketing
themselves over the radio and on large signs. In this region, overall awareness
of, and experience with, the Internet was low. Even relatively educated people
often needed a high level of support from the staff. One Internet café, opened
by Radio Lira, used the airwaves to encourage people to come in and get
e-mail addresses, emphasizing that no previous experience with computers or
the Internet was necessary. It reported that about 20 people a day, some from
surrounding rural areas, were visiting just to see the place and make inquiries
in response to the radio ads. However, at this and other Internet cafés in town,
user levels were modest. In contrast, the cafés in Kabale town and in Bwaise
(on the border of Nabweru subcounty, on the periphery of Kampala) were well
used and sometimes had line-ups. Their owners put less emphasis on building
awareness, probably because word-of-mouth was sufficient.
Communication centres (some providing computer training)
‘As service providers, we have a problem because the [dial-up Internet] con-
nection is so slow, the line drops, the client doesn’t get service, and you end
up absorbing the loss. Most people who started the service had been in
Kampala and wanted to bring the service home [to Lira]. They got high bills,
were disconnected, and were out of business’.
Communication centre manager discussing the problems of
dial-up Internet service, Lira
‘In Khayelitsha, individuals get computers to start businesses producing CVs,
but it isn’t cheap and people fade away. Customers don’t have money but
they have high expectations’.
Owner of communication centre/phone shop, Khayelitsha
Communication centres were the ‘jacks of all trades’ for ICTs, the market-
based equivalent of telecentres. They were usually set up by local entrepreneurs
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who had some ICT training, usually in computers or business, and who per-
ceived local demand or need for ICT services. They were often inspired by
similar centres they had seen elsewhere. The services these centres offered
often evolved based on the skills and equipment the owner managed to
acquire and the market response. For example, if phone service proved
too costly due to light local demand, the centre might cut it and introduce
binding and lamination instead as a way to survive. If there were relatively few
people interested in computer classes, the centre might shift to consultancy
services.
In the case communities reviewed in South Africa, there were no such
centres – with one exception. In Khayelitsha, a man named Tony Lamati,
who owned a Vodacom phone shop, expanded his services to include fax,
photocopy, typing and the design of funeral programmes and CVs. Other local
businesses that he knew had tried to offer similar services had not survived. In
his case, phone service profits were keeping the business healthy, while the
other services did not generate much profit and may even have been running
at a loss. The only other businesses in Bhamshela and Khayelitsha that offered
ICT services other than phone did so as an addition to their core activities. The
reason for this was that demand was light and overhead was high for other
services. As Mr. Lamati remarked, people had high expectations but were not
willing to pay much. As soon as a particular service was known to be in
demand, other entrepreneurs mimicked it. For example, at least three places in
Khayelitsha specifically advertised rates for producing funeral programmes
and CVs.
Communication centres did exist in other communities, but they were
high-risk ventures. Getting the mix of services right could be difficult, and any
errors of capital investment in required equipment could be costly. In South
Africa, the model of ICT services within an existing business appeared to be
much more likely to succeed. The scarcity of businesses offering Internet-based
services could not be attributed entirely to high telecom costs since there were
also few centres offering other forms of ICT services such as desktop publish-
ing, especially compared with the Ugandan case studies.
In Uganda, there were many more stand-alone communication centres
in the communities reviewed, especially in towns and trading centres. This
seemed due, at least in part, to a generally high level of entrepreneurship.
Opportunities in the formal sector were few and wages generally low, even for
people with post-secondary education. For this reason, many people saw more
opportunity in creating their own businesses. Those people with computer
and business skills often saw provision of ICT access and related services as an
excellent opportunity. The sector was just opening up, many places were still
underserved, and they could put their skills to use. By 2003, there were enough
examples of existing businesses around to provide inspiration to others. Most
people who had gone to university had done so in Kampala, and some were
struck by the presence of Internet cafés and communication centres in the city
that were not yet available in their home towns.
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In contrast to people who began phone businesses, many of those who
began communication centres claimed to be motivated not only by profit
potential but also by the idea that the services offered would help their com-
munities. Many had ambitious visions of centres that would offer a range of
information and communication services, often focused on the Internet. But
the hurdles were many, either related to business start-up or to the fact that
dial-up, the only Internet connectivity option available, was too expensive to
maintain.
Across the different communities in Uganda, one or a small number of
people commonly acted as ‘pioneers’ by taking the initial risk. These people
tended to have higher skill levels and a clear vision of what they hoped to
achieve. The centres they started usually sparked interest amongst other
entrepreneurs, with a flurry of similar centres opening over a short period.
Some ‘copycat’ centres were poorly planned and run and chronically under-
funded. Many failed. Because these centres opened so quickly after the
first one, they created fierce competition in a market which was often quite
undeveloped.
In Nabweru, for example, about 15 communication centres were clustered in
trading areas in and bordering the subcounty. These began opening from
about 2000 onwards. Six were reviewed in this research. Of these, two were
reportedly making a modest profit, two were breaking even, and the other
two were losing money. Although a number of communication centres had
attempted to offer computer training, they did not attract many students, and
competition kept prices low. Many businesses reported plans to expand their
services. However, such intentions were not based on market research, since
some competitors who already offered those other services noted a lack of
customers.
These centres needed to be quite flexible as the market shifted. In Lira, for
example, although early centres had done well by offering phone services
before these were widely available, the situation changed once the MTN
network reached the area. These same centres then had to change their service
mix, reducing their reliance on phone and bringing in new services. During
such transition periods, some centres failed, while others reinvented them-
selves and survived. Their fate depended a lot on the centre’s capacity and
on good, flexible management. Most centres had a simple organizational
structure and were managed by one person or a partnership.
A big challenge faced by communication centres (and Internet cafés) was
obtaining capital for investment. Bank loans were not popular as interest rates
were generally high and many people would not in any case have met the
conditions for loan approval. Rather, people depended on their own savings or
soft loans from family or friends. These tended to be small amounts of money.
While some businesses were able to expand over time, in other cases, lack of
funding seemed to chronically limit the growth of the business and weaken its
overall sustainability. This was particularly visible with connectivity options:
those with access to sizable amounts of capital could install a VSAT, a much
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better long-term option for Internet connectivity than long-distance dial-up
but with high initial costs. Plenty of smaller businesses aspired to offer Internet
service; but, unless there was a local Internet PoP, they were unable to afford it.
Services within an existing business
‘I saw a need for services, especially for kids at schools nearby who need to
do their assignments. So we started with photocopying, then CVs, then
computer programming and fax services’.
Xolandi Hatana, manager of New Era Driving School
Hybrids between communication centres and other types of business were
common across all communities included in the research. These were usually
set up by the owners of existing businesses who perceived a demand, or poten-
tial demand, for ICT-related services. Sometimes they were natural extensions
of existing services. For example, many stationery shops in Kabale town had
expanded into photocopying and typesetting, and sometimes into desktop
publishing and binding. Sometimes, they were odd combinations – for
example, a driving school in Khayelitsha that offered photocopying and
desktop publishing; traditional healers in Randburg with fax services, and hair
salons in Nabweru with phone services. Some owners said they liked to offer
these extra services because they attracted extra customers who might then
make use of their mainstay services. This was especially important where the
profits realized on ICT services were slim.
Sometimes the businesses were able to use the ICTs for their own internal
needs as well. Since the businesses were already established and required little
extra space or staff to run the services, they needed only to invest in the
equipment. Some owners found that the ICT services generated only a modest
income, but once they had the equipment, there was little reason to stop if
operating costs were low. Also, the existing business provided a buffer that
allowed them to take a loss while they tried to build up a customer base. Some
said they were happy to provide a service of value to the community even if
they did not realize a return on it. In this sense, these services were quite robust
and sustainable, especially in comparison to stand-alone ventures such as
communication centres and Internet cafés. Some services were rare, especially
Internet access, since the operating costs were often much greater than the
revenues they generated. Businesses that tried offering such access usually
ended up halting the service and using the computers for other purposes such
as typesetting.
Not-for-profit sector
The not-for-profit ICT access services were generally set up by a national or
international programme, or through partnerships, rather than as purely local
initiatives. These partnerships often created unique opportunities for the
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centres to offer specific services or to set up in places lacking basic infra-
structure. But they also posed risks, especially around the issue of decision
making. Many decisions were made by national rather than local bodies, or
sometimes by international bodies. In some cases, the decisions were slow to
be made and inappropriate for the local area. This problem was reported, for
example, in relation to equipment procurement and attempts to resolve tech-
nical maintenance issues. At the local level, lack of capacity and the political
manoeuvring of board members motivated by self-interest rather than com-
munity benefit were frequently cited problems. Another major stumbling
block for these centres was the optimistic assumptions that local demand for
ICT services would be relatively easy to develop and that services could be
largely or entirely sustained through user fees. These assumptions were rarely
true.
Hard-won lessons from early initiatives, however, were helping to inform
more recent efforts. In Uganda, many people who had been involved in the
early telecentres were critical of various aspects of the experience: the use of
expensive outside consultants; delays in receiving funds and setting up infra-
structure; political problems within local boards and committees; and poorly
defined sustainability plans. Nonetheless, many of these people remained
committed to the general idea and had gone on to establish new telecentres.
For example, Meddie Mayanja, the original national co-ordinator of the
Nakaseke telecentre – Uganda’s first and perhaps most famous telecentre –
went on to become the World Links for Development Uganda co-ordinator,
putting into practice many of the early lessons. In South Africa, the Universal
Service Agency had stopped implementing telecentres after 2000, in part
because of the numerous problems encountered by existing ones. In 2003,
they were in the process of assessing the situation and deciding how to pro-
ceed. Greater emphasis was being placed on feasibility assessments, but it was
not clear how much institutional learning had actually taken place since many
staff, especially managers, were fairly new. Their plans remained ambitious,
key definitions were still not in place, and the high cost of landline phone
connectivity remained a daunting barrier.
Services within an existing not-for-profit organization
Offering public or semi-public ICT access through an existing not-for-profit
organization is a common approach with many different faces, shaped by the
characteristics, especially the structure and goals, of the host organization.
Examples of this type of set-up that were encountered in the course of the
research include:
• World Links Uganda school-based telecentres (in Lira and Kabale,
Uganda);
• South African schools with plans to provide public access;
• libraries with Internet access (Khayelitsha, South Africa);
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• community centre with public ICT access (Aleksan Kopano Resource
Centre in Alexandra township, South Africa);
• NGOs with public ICT access (Khayelitsha Educational Resource and
Information Centre (KERIC), South Africa);
• the RANET Uganda programme, which worked from World Vision field
offices.
There are considerable differences in the ways these organizations began
offering ICT access. A brief sketch of the main issues arising from the
establishment and maintenance of each is presented below.
ICT access in schools
‘The problem [of break-ins] in the school environment has not been as bad as
in the telecentres. In schools, the problem is with the cost of the Internet
connection. For example, in Pietermaritzburg, one year ago, I was excited to
see the students were surfing the Web to prepare for a debate. But three
months later I found out the school had cut their Internet service due to
cost’.
Universal Service Agency co-ordinator, Kwa Zulu Natal
‘Our school-based telecentres don’t have a sustainability issue. The school is
the core client; it is durable and networked to support. The telecentres are
actually making a surplus: the issue is how to use it’.
Meddie Mayanja, World Links Uganda
The programme run by World Links for Development, an NGO sponsored by
the World Bank, has provided schools with computer labs that must be open
not only to students but also to the public, during certain hours. This model
increases the range of people with access and also allows schools to recoup
their costs. (See also Chapter 3.) Schools were informed of the programme and
could choose to apply. Applications were accepted based on a feasibility
assessment, including evidence that the school had the basic infrastructure
(including electricity) and capacity to sustain the centre. Computer teachers
were given short intensive training courses over school holiday periods,
including one on technical maintenance which several people described as
particularly valuable. Schools received funding for two to three years after
their centres were set up, and by the end of that period were expected to be
sustainable. They were also required to develop a business plan to help them
achieve this purpose. Despite the serious setback caused by their ISP going
bankrupt, the overall approach appeared to be working quite well. The
national co-ordinator said many schools in the programme were reporting
surpluses, and most had plans in place to upgrade and expand their
equipment.
Some South African schools were also reportedly opening themselves to
after-hours public access. No schools offering public access were identified
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within this research, although teachers in a number of schools with computer
facilities said they were considering doing so. Security risks were a major
deterrent to expanding access; schools were often victims of vandalism and
theft, and computers were prime targets. Another major problem was the high
cost of Internet connectivity, due to the high per-minute dial-up rates. Some
schools had support getting onto the Internet, but were forced to disconnect
because the bills were too expensive to pay. One innovative solution to this
was being pioneered by Wizzy Digital Courier, the brainchild of Andy Rab-
agliati. This focused on partial connectivity, whereby the school’s local area
network (LAN) could be connected to the Internet via an automatic dial-up at
night when rates were much cheaper, or by using a USB (Universal Serial Bus)
flash drive, a miniature data storage device, couriered to and from an Internet
connection that might be some distance away. Rabagliati, a programmer by
training, had designed an open-source solution that allowed e-mails to be
uploaded and downloaded this way and which also allowed teachers to iden-
tify web sites that would be automatically ‘scooped’ and downloaded onto the
school’s LAN. The project had been going for about eight months as of June
2003, and they had connected four schools. They were focusing most of their
efforts in Eshowe, where they hoped to network all five schools using a hub
system where the more wealthy former Model C School could provide some
technical support to the others.1 They found that besides the technology, pro-
ject management and building up the internal capacity to use the equipment
within the school took a lot of effort and it was worth going slowly. In
Khayelitsha, for example, they had identified a number of schools in which
computers were underused.
ICT access in libraries
‘Some people are angry because of the few centres with these services . . .
People want more centres close to them because they cannot afford to go to
town. At the library there are few people because it is too expensive to use
the computer’.
Research assistant’s observations, Khayelitsha
In South Africa, a number of public libraries had been given computers and
Internet connections with which they could provide public access for a fee. In
Khayelitsha, only one of the five libraries within the township had Internet
access. It had four computers that were given to the library in 2000 for the sole
purpose of Internet use. Six library staff also received basic training in sending
e-mail and surfing the Internet. However, most of the staff who received the
training had since left. The City of Cape Town provided technical main-
tenance. Technical problems were frequent. At the time of research, only one
of the four computers was working. From anecdotal evidence, this was a fairly
typical experience. For example, another library in Bethlehem, South Africa,
reported they had computers donated to them from a local college, but
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received no technical support and did not really know how to maintain them.
This also meant that the quality of service tended to be low and users had to be
independent.
ICT access in community centres
‘[Setting up the centre] has taken a lot of networking . . . You need to
analyse your environment, decide what you need, and bring in expertise as
necessary . . . You need a bigger vision’.
Holly Luton-Nel, Director, Aleksan Kopano Resource
Centre, Alexandra Township
This model was quite common in South Africa. In Bhamshela, the telecentre
had not been part of a community centre, but through the efforts of the tele-
centre management, a building that housed various community activities
had been built beside the telecentre along with a multipurpose community
centre (MPCC) housing various government services.
One of the most influential role models for the GCIS MPCC programme
was the Aleksan Kopano Community Resource Centre, opened in 1992 as
Alexandra’s first and only community centre. Alexandra is an old high-density
township just outside of Johannesburg, with high unemployment rates and a
reputation for violent crime. Aleksan Kopano Educational Trust is the not-for-
profit body that owns the centre. While at first the centre served as a general
purpose gap-filler in community needs, focusing on education, its purpose has
shifted towards job creation, reflecting both an overall increase in community
capacity over the years and the current priority needs of the community. The
centre, a large three-storey complex, did not have a telecentre as such within
it; rather, the various services one might expect to find in a telecentre were
scattered throughout. A photocopier was at reception, Telkom public phone
booths were on site, and the library had six computer stations available for
basic off-line applications such as word processing, plus a separate room that
operated as an Internet café. Both the off-line stations and the Internet café
services were free of charge. In addition, it offered a subsidized six-month
course that included computer training and basic business skills, designed to
increase the employability of its graduates. Alex FM, the township’s com-
munity radio station, was also a tenant of the centre. In this model, the ICTs
available complemented the other services and activities at the centre, which
was very active and dynamic. The other activities also helped to draw people
to the centre. While all services were well used, they depended on outside
support, mainly from the private sector. Its success in securing such funding
was largely due to the dynamic efforts of the centre’s director, Holly Luton-
Nel. The Internet café was fully used when it was free, but when the centre
tried to introduce user fees, people stopped coming. Since the centre could
afford to offer only three hours of service a day to begin with, this created a
potential problem for the sustainability of the café, Again, this was largely
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attributed to the high cost of Internet services. If and when better connectivity
options were to become available, the resulting lower user fees might be more
acceptable by the community. Nonetheless, because of high unemployment
and poverty, people were generally reluctant to pay.
ICT access in NGOs
‘I had thought that offering computer-related services would be income-
generating. Now I question how this can happen because people here don’t
have money. Over the long term, we’re taking a 30 per cent loss’.
Manager, KERIC
‘RANET would be very expensive for one group to implement, but because of
partnerships, the costs were minimal’.
Milton Waiswa, Manager, RANET Uganda
Some NGOs offered ICT access as part of their operations. Two very different
examples from the case communities are the Khayelitsha Educational
Resource and Information Centre (KERIC) in Khayelitsha, South Africa, and
the RANET programme that was based out of a number of World Vision
field offices in Uganda, including one in Bukinda, Kabale. The former was a
stand-alone service that had been implemented on the initiative of KERIC’s
manager. The latter was an international programme implemented through a
partnership among several large, high-capacity stakeholders.
KERIC, an NGO established in 1993, was located within a community centre
complex in Site B of Khayelitsha Township. KERIC’s aim was to contribute to
community development by focusing on educational advocacy and lobbying,
while developing strategies to improve local pass rates. It had offered a small
typing pool within the office for the last four years. This included e-mail
services and fax. Clients could ask the staff to use the computers, or use them
directly. They were encouraged to do the latter, especially for preparing
their personal CVs. However, since this office is also used for KERIC’s other
activities, high usage of these services leads to congestion. The typing pool
was running at a loss of approximately 30 per cent and service prices were
subsidized, since the actual cost was unaffordable. The manager said that
although he had originally believed the typing pool would be an income
source, the focus was on providing accessible service. This, however, posed
some problems for sustainability, as ongoing donor funding for this kind of
activity seemed unlikely.
RANET was an international programme centred on delivering seasonal
climatic information to farmers, especially in drought-prone areas. In
Uganda, the Department of Meteorology had partnered originally with World
Vision Uganda, whose area development offices were situated in needy rural
locations, equipped with knowledgeable staff, an administrative computer,
and a source of electricity, often via a generator or solar panel. These offices
served as the 10 original RANET sites (by 2004 these had expanded to 24 sites,
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through additional partnerships with ActionAid and Africa 2000 Networks).
The existing computer was equipped with the satellite data receiver, which
cost about US$50, and an antenna. It could download data from the World-
space satellite, including the RANET climatic information and other data
from the African Learning Channel. Dissemination of the information was
through social structures such as farmer groups, public postings and
announcements over local radio. Farmers were also provided training about
how to use the climatic information to best advantage in planning their
planting and harvesting activities, and this information was also disseminated
largely through the farmer groups. One interesting outcome of this process
is that the farmers wanted greater direct access to the information on the
computers, and to a broader range of information. Thus, the programme
was looking into acquiring dedicated computers for public use, which would
begin to resemble a telecentre. However, no fees were in effect for these
services.
The RANET programme did not attempt cost recovery through user fees.
Rather, its running costs were kept low and mainly absorbed by the World
Vision Area Development Programme (ADP) budget, since the computer,
electricity, staff and transport (for technical repairs, etc.) were all supplied by
World Vision. The additional equipment, an annual ream of paper and
training sessions were paid for by the Ministry of Land and Water, which in
turn received money from the RANET international programme. This inter-
national programme consisted of a consortium of various funding groups,
most notably USAID. As RANET helped to achieve priority objectives of World
Vision and the Ugandan government and appeared highly relevant to the
communities it was serving, it seemed likely that they would continue to
support the programme and that it would be feasible to do so within their
main budgets.
However, lack of further resources limited the potential growth of the
programme. It was up to each area office whether and how to disseminate
information on topics other than climate. For example, the area offices also
received a large amount of information on agriculture, health and water
management. The RANET manager at the Department of Meteorology
expected to use the same technique that he had used to date – namely,
nurturing partnerships of mutual interest – to expand the programme.
Telecentres
South Africa
‘We’ve started provincial forums to help telecentres. But almost all the tele-
centre managers now are volunteers, and that means big turnover. I and
one other are the only ones left in the province. Almost all the telecentres
are not working, especially in Kwa Zulu Natal – that’s our main problem,
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there’s no money coming in. We don’t even have enough to buy cleaning
supplies. Some are thinking of stealing equipment because now all USA
[Universal Service Agency] telecentres are insured’.
Telecentre manager, Kwa Zulu Natal
Both telecentres in the South African case studies were established through the
Universal Service Agency. They were created by local NGOs that applied to the
Agency after hearing about the programme. The telecentres were established
as separate not-for-profit corporations, each governed by a board of directors.
The Agency provided the initial equipment and training, while the founding
partners supplied the rest. Although they were intended to offer a full range
of services, including Internet access, most telecentres never achieved
connectivity.
The Bhamshela telecentre, which began operations in 1998, was one of the
earliest Universal Service Agency telecentres. It was set up in a rented four-
room building near a taxi rank and equipped with a photocopier, five Pentium
computers with internal modems, a printer, TV and video equipment, fax, an
overhead projector and screen, and six Telkom landlines and handsets. It was
one of the few telecentres that did get Internet services, which it offered for a
year and a half until it ran into financial difficulties following a Telkom billing
error, resulting in their phone lines being disconnected. The telecentre began
to explore other service avenues, and began to offer computer training certi-
fied by a Durban-based college. Until this time, the telecentre had depended
mainly on telephone services for its profit, while all other services, with the
exception of photocopying, were hardly used.
The Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) established a telecentre in a
primarily residential area of Khayelitsha in July 2000. In 2001, Microsoft
donated nine computers to the telecentre. At the time of research, they had 10
personal computers and one staff person. The telecentre offered fax, computer,
photocopying and printing services. There was also a pay phone nearby. The
computer services included computer rental, typing and computer training.
However, none of these had a big demand, and at the time, computer training
sessions had not been offered for the previous four months due to the low
demand. The telecentre was not breaking even. The manager had another job
and subsidized the telecentre from this. He felt that marketing and the lack
of Internet access were the main problems and he was taking steps to rectify
both.
The experiences of these telecentres were unfortunately typical of the
Universal Service Agency programme. Although the Agency had helped them
get started (which had also been a slow process with frequent delays), the
basic model was premised on the idea that they would then be able to sustain
themselves through user fees. This turned out to be unrealistic for several
reasons. Firstly, there were long delays in getting service. Secondly, the high
costs of phone and Internet connectivity meant that centres often generated
very little profit on these services. And thirdly, there was little ready demand
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for many of the services, and the centres did not have the capacity to build
such demand. Maintenance was also an issue and problems could take months
to resolve. According to research conducted up to 2000, about one-third of the
Universal Service Agency’s telecentres had managed to become sustainable by
incorporating ICT-related value-added services for which sufficient demand
existed (Benjamin, 2001a, b). But by 2003, some centres that had appeared
stable a few years earlier had gone into decline. They had little financial
capacity and so were unable to withstand large shocks such as equipment
damage and theft. Chronic lack of finance had also limited the telecentres’
capacity building and sometimes provoked internal conflicts. Some thefts
appeared to be ‘inside jobs’. After years of struggle, often without pay, many
telecentre staff had become demoralized.
Uganda
‘Looking at school-based telecentres, they’re so much easier. They have
security, management, more opportunities. Community-based telecentres
have a kind of rigidity because of the low capacity and limited outlook of the
management. Local government hasn’t been that supportive’.
Former manager of Nakaseke Telecentre
‘Telecentres work but people need to be assured and trained. They also need
relevant content. There’s a need for seed money in rural areas to grow
demand’.
Goretti Zavuga, Council for Economic Empowerment
for Women in Africa [CEEWA]
All the telecentres included in the Ugandan case studies were funded primarily
by Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and each
was implemented by a separate agency. IDRC’s Acacia programme had been
one of the earliest and most prolific funders of telecentres in Uganda through a
variety of different projects and partners.
The Nabweru telecentre, which opened in May 1999, was one of the first in
Uganda and was administered by the Ugandan National Council for Science
and Technology (UNCST). It was also ahead of the market in the subcounty,
predating any similar public facilities. The telecentre was situated at the
Nabweru subcounty headquarters, based on the rationale that the subcounty
administration would be its anchor clients, and that they would play a role in
its management and become its eventual owners.
Photocopying was originally the Nabweru telecentre’s most popular service,
followed by telephone. In the summer of 2001, the telecentre had an MTN pay
phone installed outside, which became much more popular than the phone
services within the building. When Internet access and e-mail were offered,
they were provided by dial-up and cost Ush170 per minute. The telecentre
was paying about Ush50 per minute for the connection and could not afford
to charge less than Ush100 per minute. When cybercafés began to switch to
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wireless and bring down their prices to Ush50 per minute, the telecentre could
no longer compete. It discontinued Internet services in March 2002.
Sustainability had always been an issue for the Nabweru telecentre. From its
inception until August 2002, it was subsidized to cover expenses and all profits
were banked. The financial management of the telecentre had been largely out
of the hands of the local management. For example, they could not spend
above a predetermined amount on each service, even if it would generate
more profit to do so. The prescriptive structure of the budget also limited the
telecentre’s capacity to experiment with new or expanded services. After trans-
fer, the local authorities were responsible for approving monthly budgets. In
practice, while they continued to act as anchor clients for telecentre services,
especially photocopying and typesetting, they had not otherwise taken an
active interest in supporting and developing the telecentre.
The telecentre’s monthly expenses were about 15 per cent short of its
income. Customer numbers had dropped for phone and printing services
because of competition, while computer rental services had always been in low
demand. Computer training generated about half of its income, followed by
typesetting and printing, the photocopier, telephone, consulting services to
other agencies, and renting out the generator. The constant shortage of money
limited many activities. For example, low local awareness was an acknow-
ledged problem but there was no money to pursue an extended marketing
campaign.
A number of new projects implied ongoing relations with external funders,
which management welcomed as a needed source of support for the telecentre.
One project was focused on documenting indigenous knowledge through
video and written narratives. The World Bank supplied equipment for this
initiative, and the UNESCO High Commission for Uganda led it. UNESCO had
also contributed Ush5 million towards setting up a community radio station,
and the subcounty Ush2.6 million. The radio station was due to start within a
month or so. Staff members were also hopeful that the radio station would
provide sufficient motivation and support to bring in a wireless Internet
connection.
It is difficult to say whether local communication centres were inspired to
begin business because of the telecentre. The out-of-the-way location of the
telecentre probably limited its influence. Overall public awareness of the tele-
centre appeared low, even amongst those living nearby. Four independently
owned phone bureaus were started in the immediate vicinity of the subcounty
headquarters. These may have been influenced by the telecentre, but probably
also by the moderate traffic of subcounty headquarters staff and visitors.
The Community Learning Centre in Lira was a Canadian Physicians for
Aid and Relief (CPAR) pilot project funded by IDRC. The CLC was set up within
the CPAR base camp on the edge of Lira town. Its core purpose was to train
200 women and youth in ICT skills in a manner that would improve their
livelihoods, and to document the process. The targeted beneficiaries of the
project were individuals who had been directly affected by the war, most of
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whom had been earlier abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and
some of whom were orphans. Although the business plan included public
access, not as its core activity but as a partial means of sustaining itself, this was
not yet being offered; in fact, nothing other than some preliminary training
activities had taken place. The project began in March 2002 with three years of
assured funding, and took a number of years before this to develop. The slow
progress was due in part to challenges in administration and management for
both IDRC and CPAR. Finding and retaining capable staff were also problems.
The centre had benefited from the involvement of two Engineers Without
Borders interns from Canada: Ryan Sparkes and Avi Caplan, who between
them provided about 10 months of voluntary support, focused mainly on
technical issues and training staff. The Lira CLC was supposed to be one of four
such centres, with the other three planned for more remote areas. However,
the security situation had prevented development of the other centres,
although one other outreach centre at CPAR’s Loro base camp opened some
months later.
The African Highlands Initiative (AHI) telecentres in Kabale were set up
in 2000 as part of a larger initiative to improve the livelihoods of farmers in
the African highlands and to help them redress problems of environmental
degradation through participatory action research projects focused on
improved farming methods and natural resource management. These tele-
centres fit into this larger project as hubs for information generation, dis-
semination and exchange. One telecentre was located in Kabale town and
offered similar services to many of the commercial secretarial and computer
training services. A second telecentre was set up in Rubaya at the subcounty
headquarters. Rubaya is a mountainous area with poor roads and no
electricity. The telecentre offered computer training, typesetting, photo-
copying and phone services, and was the only place in the area that offered
such services. It also had a meeting hall and a demonstration plot for
experimentation with seed varieties and farming techniques. A library held a
small collection related mainly to agricultural practices. It was within the
vicinity of the trading area, four high schools, a polytechnic institute and
a number of NGO offices. Although open to the public, its activities and
structure specifically targeted farmers, schools, local NGOs and government
workers. Both the Rubaya telecentre and the Kabale telecentre were translating
brochures and pamphlets into local languages and making them available in
the libraries. This service was free. They also planned to expand the collection
to include textbooks and resources for students available to photocopy.
It had been expected that both telecentres would be connected to the Inter-
net, but in 2003 neither of them had such access. The town telecentre had
had dial-up connectivity that it disconnected when a nearby competitor (the
Voice of Kigezi Internet Café) acquired a VSAT connection that provided
faster, cheaper service. A wireless Internet connection had been planned for
the Rubaya telecentre, but this proved technically unfeasible due to the
mountainous terrain.
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Both telecentres confronted major obstacles in becoming sustainable. The
town telecentre faced strong competition and high overhead costs. It was not
able to compete with commercial centres that were located in more visible
areas, had greater flexibility to make immediate decisions about services and,
in the case of the Kigezi Internet café, had a better Internet connection. The
rural telecentre had no competition, but had to contend with poor infra-
structure, high operating costs and a relatively low demand for services
resulting from low awareness, literacy and income levels of the surrounding
population. Equipment maintenance and the purchase of consumables,
including telephone connection time, all had to be done via Kabale town and,
for major repairs, Kampala. This could be a lengthy process leading to service
interruptions of a month or more. The two full-time staff did not have the
technical expertise or supplies to perform on-site maintenance and repair. The
telecentre depended on a generator that charged batteries which, in turn,
could supply power requirements for up to three days. Plans were made to
switch to solar power as a more cost-efficient energy system.
The Kabale telecentre had been intended to be self-sufficient, and perhaps to
contribute towards the running costs of its rural sister centre. This proved to be
overly optimistic because of high competition, and it was only generating
enough income to cover about one-third of its operating costs. The most
serious problem, however, was due to an extended gap between periods of
donor subsidy. Although IDRC had agreed in principle to fund the telecentres
for another three years, the funds had been delayed for almost a year. This
had serious consequences for both the centres in Kabale Town and Rubaya,
limiting their ability to function and plan, and reducing staff morale. Staff
members in Kabale Town felt their telecentre had the potential to be sustain-
able with greater up-front investment. In particular, acquiring a VSAT would
allow it to compete and gain customers. Whether this would be sufficient to
support its sister telecentre in Rubaya or allow it to focus on its value-added
development objectives was questionable: the necessity to survive and the
strategies staff had identified for doing so were quite unrelated to develop-
ment-focused activities, which tended not to be income-generating.
The end of the first three-year phase of donor funding brought AHI to
the conclusion that rural telecentres and information provision required
subsidization, because the target users simply could not afford to pay and did
not attach monetary value to information.
Telecentres and the local market
‘At first there was some lack in the computer field in the telecentre – a lack of
promotion of computer services because the telecentre was busy with the
telephone. But if you want your thing to work, you need to strategize.
Awareness about computers has changed, the staff have gained experience
in computers and now they are counsellors to others’.
Telecentre board member, Bhamshela
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Telecentres and other non-market ICT ventures are sometimes observed, as
well as expected, to develop a local market for other public ICT services by
creating local awareness and demand for such services. In South Africa and
Uganda, the following relationships between non-market initiatives and local
market activity in ICT provision were observed:
• Some places simply do not have the capacity to sustain a market. It may
also be quite difficult to establish a funded project there due to lack of
infrastructure, capacity and isolation. In those instances where a
telecentre or other funded ICT project can be established under such
conditions, it will have an effective monopoly. However, it may not be
able to charge more than minimal prices, insufficient to cover costs, and
will not be able to create a market until other conditions, such as
infrastructure, also become more favourable. The biggest contribution
that a telecentre or funded project can make toward establishing
favorable conditions is often to increase the awareness and capacity of
the staff, who may then go on to create other services.
• Some places already had an active market in ICT services, if not at the time
the telecentre was first planned, then by the time it was implemented.
Internationally funded projects, especially those involving multiple
partners, can be complex and slow, whereas local entrepreneurs can move
quickly. In such cases, it is possible that the telecentre has further
strengthened the perceived viability of ICT services amongst local
entrepreneurs, while at the same time, creating competition and making
it more difficult for others to enter the market and gain a profit.
• In some places, the impact of telecentres on market activity has been
minimal, even where they were early on the scene. This was due to
internal limitations affecting services, to poor marketing or to poor
location.
• In places such as Bhamshela, where infrastructure was reasonable and
there was already a strong local demand for some ICT services such as
phone, the telecentre raised awareness within the small business
community about the opportunities for ICT provision, and acted as a
catalyst for such services. More unusually, the MPCC provided an anchor
market for ICT services not yet available, and prompted local business to
start offering them.
Part of an integrated development strategy
‘Telecentres can’t stand alone in Africa – they have to work in networks and
partnerships’.
Former manager of Nakaseke Telecentre
Both South Africa and Uganda were in the process of implementing major
rural development strategies in which ICTs had the potential to play a key role.
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Multipurpose Community Centres (MPCCs), South Africa
‘The MPCC is a means of integration, the “mother of all”. The NCRF
is positioning itself around the MPCC, but we need to safeguard the
independence of community radio’.
Chris Armstrong, National Community Radio Forum (NCRF)
In South Africa, discussion and brainstorming in the mid-1990s about the role
of ICTs in furthering development in rural and township areas produced a
number of ideas, including the multipurpose community centre, or MPCC.
The government and civil society organizations collaborated through a
number of forums in developing the notion, one of the earliest being the
Empowering Communities in the Information Society Conference, held at
Helderfontein in 1996. The government perspective has tended to focus on
the MPCC as a vehicle for government service delivery plus some two-way
interaction between government and citizens. In contrast, the South African
NGO sector has emphasized the MPCC as a tool for community organizing,
development and creating local media.
Initial research in 1998 attempted to catalog what sorts of existing organiza-
tions might be considered MPCCs, using the following definition: ‘An MPCC
is an organisation offering a range of developmental services (including
information services) to a specific community and with a large degree of
community involvement’ (Benjamin, 1998). The research identified 235
centres fitting this definition, although many of these had few or no ICT
services. Implementation of government-sponsored MPCCs began formally in
1999 when the Government Communication and Information System acted
as the secretariat of a large multi-stakeholder process operating through
national, provincial and municipal intersectoral committees and working
groups. While in practice many MPCCs, especially in rural areas, remain
without connectivity and some do not have electricity, the idea is that they
should be fully connected to ICTs by containing a Universal Service Agency
telecentre as one element, both to support their own services and for public
access.
At the time of research, about 30 MPCCs had been established across the
country and the others were expected to be established within the next year.
An MPCC had recently opened in Bhamshela, thanks largely to the efforts
of the telecentre’s management. It was owned by the municipal authorities
and began operations in early 2003, housing six government offices from
the departments of Home Affairs, Labour, Education, Health, Agriculture and
GCIS which offered a variety of on-site and outreach services. Those offices
housed in the MPCC had signed an agreement that they would not bring their
own equipment with them (photocopiers, printers and fax machines), but
would use telecentre services, thus becoming anchor clients. By the time the
MPCC opened, the telecentre could no longer offer these services. Motivated
in part by the urgent needs of these government offices, the nearby Village
Bank began to offer photocopying and fax services and the telecentre referred
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customers to them. Thus, the MPCC in this situation had helped to stimulate
the growth of ICT services without actually providing them. While ICTs could
help the functioning of MPCCs, which in turn had the potential to fulfil a
variety of community needs, the biggest obstacle, common to all ICT-related
endeavours, was the high cost of landline phone and Internet services,
meaning that many centres remained without.
National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAADS), Uganda
The National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAADS), which replaced the old
government extension system, has a communication strategy that draws on a
variety of techniques and media. Telecom tools are one component of this
strategy. In some cases, NAADS was already working with telecentres at the
time of research. Access to accurate and timely market information had been
identified as a priority area for NAADS.
NAADS focuses on the ‘demand side’ of agricultural extension services by
organizing farmer groups that can collectively demand and buy information
related to agriculture and markets. NAADS helps the groups to pay in the
beginning, on the assumption that once they are putting new farm practices
and market knowledge into practice, they will be successful enough to buy
the information themselves, while the collective activity reduces the per-
farmer cost. Thus, NAADS is helping to create effective demand for the kind of
services that telecentres provide.
The rural telecentre in Rubaya had been working with NAADS since 2001,
since they shared many goals. The telecentre staff had been contracted by
NAADS to help organize local farmer groups. This relationship appeared to be
of great mutual benefit. It might increase the telecentre’s value to the com-
munity, if the NAADS farmer groups learned to seek and apply the different
kinds of information the telecentre might provide. In Nabweru, NAADS was
also beginning activities and thus opened up the possibility of collaborating
with the telecentre there, with similar potential. Since both of these telecentres
had struggled to increase demand for their agricultural information services,
the presence of NAADS could potentially help to sustain and increase the value
of these types of services. The co-ordinator of RANET Uganda was also in dis-
cussion with NAADS about possible collaboration. Ideally, this programme,
which was far-reaching and integrated into overall national development
efforts, might act as an umbrella for many otherwise disparate projects and
programmes aimed at providing development-related information in rural
areas.
Analysis and key lessons
This chapter has so far reviewed the various types of ICT access found in five
case communities (and a few other places) in South Africa and Uganda, how
these centres began, and how they have continued. The chapter’s concluding
section explores a number of broad themes emerging from this study.
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Firstly, telephone access appears much easier to establish and maintain than
other forms of ICT access. For this reason, it is worth distinguishing between
phone and other ICTs when one considers universal access.
Many of the challenges related to centre start-up and sustainability relate to
the local market. Particularly, the relationship between the market and various
initiatives established outside the market is an important but complex one.
The relationship between local access centres and national operators is always
an uneven one – the latter have much greater resources and political leverage
than the former. Yet local access centres, whether public or private, provide
value to the communities they operate in, to national development, and to
the major operators. Their contribution needs to be recognized by regulators
and other bodies so that they do not constantly have to struggle while large
operators reap most of the profits.
Sustainability is often a challenge for both for-profit and not-for-profit
access centres. While there is no easy or magic solution to the problem of
providing long-term, far-reaching ICT services to populations who often lack
the means to pay for it, some strategies can reduce the cost, complexity and
associated risks of providing ICT access.
Finally, if access centres are to make a significant contribution to universal
access and national development, they need to be integrated into larger
strategies. The market alone will not create access in all parts of either country.
Even where centres are created with external funding, they are generally not
sufficient to build local demand. These strategies are especially important in
rural areas as well as for reaching poor urban populations.
Telephone, an ICT with ready demand
In the 1990s, strategies for providing Internet access were often conceptualized
as extensions of strategies for providing telephone access. At that time, this
made sense since, for technical reasons, policy makers intended to achieve
universal access goals primarily through fixed line telephones, and cellular
technology was perceived as an elite service. The concepts of multi-purpose
centres and one-stop shopping for communication services – that is, providing
a full range of services using the same infrastructure, building and staff – were
seen as ways to achieve economies of scale.
In both South Africa and Uganda, cellular phone subscription has greatly
outstripped the number of landline phones. This is even more marked in rural
and low-income areas where cellular phones are often the only form of tele-
phony available. But cellular technology is not well suited to data transmission
and does not readily support Web browsing. Although Web browsing by
cell phone is available in South Africa, it is expensive and few people use
it. Thus, the technical and infrastructural link between telephone provision
and Internet provision is not as strong and straight-forward as it once
appeared.
The other important difference between Internet and telephone access,
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consistent across all the case studies within this research, is local demand.
With telephone services, uptake is quick. And when people have money, they
are willing to pay, especially if they can purchase by the unit without large
costs. Conversely, there is little upfront demand for Internet access, although
this demand was more evident in Uganda, possibly because of the larger
proportion of people with family and friends overseas.
The cost of Internet access, coupled with low awareness of the technology
and little expertise in its use, are the main factors preventing people from
using it. Those with little or no experience with computers may quickly catch
on to the basics of Web browsing, just as they are able to master options
on their cellular phones. Younger people, in their teens and twenties, are gen-
erally quicker and more interested in learning than their elders. However,
typing on a keyboard is time-consuming, and per-minute pay schemes mean
that people without any typing skills or basic familiarity with the layout of
keys will pay considerably more because of their own inefficiency. This is a
powerful practical disincentive to learn, implying that those who are most
likely to use public pay-as-you-go Internet access have other places, such as a
university computer lab or workplace, where they can at least master some
basic computer skills. This further implies that this type of public Internet
access largely fails to serve those without other options, and is not, by itself, a
viable means of providing universal access.
The same methods of pricing and delivery that seem to work well for tele-
phone do not seem to work well for Internet access. Early multipurpose centres
offering a range of services have tended in practice to focus upon one or two
popular services, neglecting those for which there is little ready demand and
limited staff capacity to support. These underutilized services do not add value
to what the centre does; rather, they burden the centre and its customers with
added costs.
Access centres and local markets
Shared access ICT centres have a number of ongoing relationships with the
local market to sustain themselves. Most not-for-profit initiatives still depend
to some extent on generating revenue from their customers for financial
viability, and this involves certain assumptions about what the local market
can support. Seven types of intervention to establish access centres are
summarized in Table 4.3. Each intervention type depends on a different
type of relationship to the local market to be successful. The last two are most
suited to rural and traditionally underserved areas and populations.
The first strategy is ‘hands off’ (no intervention): a centre is both established
and maintained by the market. In cities, small towns and their peripheries,
local entrepreneurs perceive market opportunities and set up their own access
centres, often motivated by services they have seen elsewhere.
The second intervention type assumes that the local market can support
access services but that no local entrepreneurs have so far been inspired to do
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so. If people see from a demonstration project that they can start up an access
centre and run it profitably, they will do so. A number of early communication
centres in Lira claimed that their success quickly inspired others to follow suit.
In Bhamshela, the telecentre demonstrated strong local demand for telephone
services.
The third intervention addresses a situation in which local entrepreneurs or
NGOs may not be able to start up an access centre, even if they wish to and
there is ready local demand, because they lack capital and technical training.
Support to meet such requirements allows the centres to start up successfully
and then run sustainably on their own or even generate a profit. This was
the scenario assumed by the Universal Service Agency telecentre model.
Unfortunately, in many communities, things did not occur according to plan.
The multiple services offered by the telecentres actually weakened them since
the few services for which ready demand did exist had to subsidize the rest.
This model also assumes that service of reasonable quality and at reasonable
cost is available from national operators.
Intervention 4 recognizes that there may not be ready demand for ICT ser-
vices amongst the local population, usually due to lack of previous exposure.
Also, it may take some time for the centre to establish itself and build up its
internal capacity, especially since the staff may have limited prior experience
with ICTs. A short-term subsidy usually covers setup and running costs for
about three years. This was the approach taken for many of the funded tele-
centres in Uganda. While sound in theory, many technical difficulties tend to
Table 4.3 Interventions to create access and intended market response
Intervention Intended market response
1. None The market will establish and maintain appropriate services.
2. Demonstration project The market will duplicate and sustain additional services in
response to user demand shown for the demonstration.
3. Start-up grant or support The market will maintain the services created through start-up
grants.
4. Establish services and
build the market (through
short-term subsidy)
As demand increases, the market will maintain or duplicate
the services with greater efficiency, eliminating the need for
subsidy.
5. Ongoing subsidy (to
operator or to end user)
The market will meet the gap between subsidy and actual price
(through user fees).
6. Build an anchor market Anchor users will cover a proportion of running costs and may
create value-added public services (eg, MPCCs).
The market will meet the gap between anchor income and
running costs.
7. Embed new services in
existing structures
The host structure will absorb some costs and may also be an
anchor user; the market will cover additional running costs of
providing the public service.
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arise in practice, especially with infrastructure, and the funding must be flex-
ible to allow the centre to respond fully to areas of strong local demand. Even
as a market does develop in certain services, private operators may prove more
nimble and compete successfully with the centre.
Intervention 5 recognizes there may be a basic gap between the cost of pro-
viding service and the required number of clients able to pay. Ongoing sub-
sidization makes up the difference. This often happens when local NGOs
provide services, usually not by design but because demand and willingness to
pay proves lower than anticipated. The problem with such subsidization is
that it is difficult to secure over the long term and tends to be unreliable. Thus,
issues of affordability need to be met either at the national level by lowering
the cost of basic services, or the centre itself must find a way to reduce the cost
of offering the service.
Intervention 6 is well suited to rural areas where ability to pay is low.
However, it still requires the presence of affordable, reliable basic telecom and
electrical infrastructure. An anchor user, such as a government office, covers
some proportion of the operational costs of the services, and may even create
extra public services such as training or access to specialized information. The
public can use the services as well, for an affordable fee. The combined income
sustains the centre.
Finally, in the seventh type of intervention, the anchor user owns and hosts
the centre within its own infrastructure. The World Links school-based
telecentres are a good example of this. The host structure absorbs some costs
and usually benefits from using the services itself, while public user fees help to
maintain the facility.
Sustainability inside and outside the market
The sustainability of access centres has been an ongoing concern, typically
focused on the issue of direct revenue generation through user fees. Such fees
often undermine efforts to increase the reach of access centres, especially
amongst populations with no previous experience of ICTs.
In practice, sustainability can be thought of as a strategic management issue
that aims to reduce costs and to reduce or manage complexity. For example,
building a telecentre as an institution from scratch involves great complexity.
Embedding ICT services in existing institutions and institutional practices
simplifies matters. A school-based telecentre is one way to do this; but it does
imply an expansion of the school’s functions and structures, as well as a new
relationship between school and community. RANET is another example; in
this instance, climate information was delivered via the existing World Vision
programme structures and staff. This sort of approach also allows for costs
to be at least partially absorbed by the host institute, especially where the
ICT services also add value or support existing functions. Such institutions
can also act as anchor markets for services, which is the cornerstone of the
MPCC/telecentre relationship in South Africa.
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National and local operators
A key problem facing many access centres is the high cost of telecom services
available to them, often accompanied by poor service. For instance, com-
plaints about billing errors were common in both countries, as were
complaints of low-quality service, particularly the poor line quality on
long-distance dial-up. In both countries, areas outside of major population
centres may still have only one or two options in terms of both operators and
services, and little room to bargain. For telecom providers, access centres
bundle local demand to make it more cost effective to deliver services to low-
income populations. They also increase both people’s exposure to services and
their overall use of telephone networks since access centre users call to, and
sometimes receive from, private lines. In other words, telecom operators
benefit from access centres, even if such centres and populations are not the
most lucrative segment of their business. Yet because access centres are small
and often far from the capital cities, they have relatively little economic or
political power. In Bhamshela, for example, the Telkom container was well
used, but almost all of the considerable profit it generated went to Telkom,
even though the enterprise was started and nurtured by a local person. One
simple but important way for regulators to pursue universal access, therefore,
is to put in place regulations that explicitly recognize the value of local access
centres, both public and private, and give such centres preferential rates con-
sistent with a reasonable profit margin. Vodacom has done this with its phone
shops. Although motivated by licensing obligations, this programme is now
self-sustaining and has also benefited Vodacom, mainly through increased
promotion of its brand.
Access centres in the context of larger strategies
Dymond and Oestmann (2002) argue that the ‘access gap’ is really two gaps.
The first is that between current and potential reach of the market. The second
is the gap between the potential reach of the market and universal access. That
is, there are certain population segments that will not be able to reach and
afford ICT services even when the market is operating under ideal conditions
of full and fair competition. Given, however, that the market is not operating
under those ideal conditions, governments, and especially regulators, should
focus on stimulating market growth, since this strategy is cheaper and more
sustainable than massive direct subsidization.
This research has argued that there is a qualitative difference between
the access gap in phone services and the access gap in Internet services. This
difference implies the need to address each of these situations with a different
strategy, where doing so has been identified as part of the public interest.
Melody (1998) has argued that infrastructure provision on the supply side does
not address lack of demand. From this research, it would appear that his claim
applies much more strongly to Internet access and computer services than to
84 TELECENTRES, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT
the telephone. Because user fees strongly inhibit the creation of new demand
through access centres, creative ways of establishing ICT access through low-
or no-fee services are necessary. RANET is one example of this approach.
Otherwise, shared access centres are quite limited in creating universal or even
popular access in the absence of other conditions such as universal secondary
education where all schools are equipped with ICTs. The majority of public
attention and funds should therefore be directed towards these more funda-
mental requirements, while access centres should be left to the market.
Arguably, this is what is happening in urban areas where the market does
support access centres such as cybercafés.
Urban cybercafés service mainly those people who also have access else-
where. Large segments of urban populations, notably those with low levels of
education and professional skills, remain largely untouched by these services.
If universal access and inclusiveness are genuine policy goals, these popula-
tions must be targeted by other means and strategies. Increased access to
formal education that incorporates ICT use and training, including adult edu-
cation, would seem to be the first option. Continuing to stimulate the market
to offer access centres in urban areas remains a useful policy tool, since it does
not cost the public anything and there are potential benefits from doing so.
However, achieving universal access is not likely to be one of these benefits.
Rather, the presence of such centres in the absence of larger strategies to
promote digital inclusion implies a worsening local digital divide.
In most rural situations, the market is a limited force. With the notable
exception of some cell phone penetration, it is unlikely to generate access to
ICTs spontaneously and cannot sustain such access. Initial strategies to pro-
vide access to ICTs in rural areas need to be carefully integrated into other
development efforts. This helps to minimize costs and to provide tangible
benefits to local people without those same people needing, at the outset, to
pay for services, know how to use them, or even know much about them at all.
Such a strategy can eventually stimulate greater awareness and greater interest
in further exploration. RANET is a good example of this. Over time, and
depending upon other conditions, this can help to prime the market so that
ICT services can eventually be supported.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Local livelihoods, reach and
development impact
Livelihood strategies are methods people use to survive and thrive. People
choose their strategies according to the surrounding conditions, including
risks, opportunities and available assets.
In Chapter 4 we examined how different types of access centres start up and
survive under various conditions. In this chapter, we take a closer look at who
uses these centres – and ICTs more generally – and for what purposes. A basic
understanding of common livelihood strategies frames an analysis of both
motivations for using ICTs (eg, they are a perceived necessity within a chosen
strategy) and barriers to their use (eg, an ICT training course is too expensive).
This same understanding can stimulate fruitful speculation about the likely
contribution of ICT use to the well-being of an individual, a family or the
overall community.
The first section of this chapter describes the types of livelihood strategies
used by people across the case studies. The second explores usage patterns that
typify each of the access centre types introduced in Chapter 4, drawing on
the livelihoods framework and evidence from the case studies. Based on this,
the final analysis and policy recommendations focus on how to maximize the
potential development impact of access centres and strategies.
Livelihoods and priorities in the community cases
Living conditions varied considerably within and across the five community
case studies, depending on the threats people faced and the assets available to
them. People in rural areas typically depended on the natural resources around
them for much of their livelihood, but also on some sources of monetary
income, which provided added security in times of food shortage or sickness
and allowed parents to pay school fees. People in urban areas had more
opportunities to obtain money but little access to natural resources. Family
and friends were an important resource for most people. Sharing assets
and burdens within the extended family was a strategy for coping with
poverty, poor harvests, unemployment, displacement, sickness and death in
the family.
Common strategies
Although each person’s situation and choices are unique, this research groups
livelihood strategies into five broad types: survival, subsistence, subsistence
plus, self-employment and formal employment. Two cross-cutting strategies,
that is, used by all people except those in ‘survival mode’, regardless of life-
style, were the acquisition of assets and the maintenance and expansion of
family and social networks.
Survival
Survival is a short-term, reactive strategy, usually triggered by calamity,
whether it be personal, environmental or political. In Lira, the camps for
internally displaced persons are full of those in survival mode. These people
are not in a position to plan much beyond the immediate requirements of the
day. Other examples are the sick, the injured and children whose guardians
have died.
Subsistence
A subsistence livelihood depends more on natural assets than a cash economy.
People living a subsistence lifestyle are typically small-scale farmers who grow
crops and rear livestock. They also use traditional practices and natural, locally
available materials for building houses, getting drinking water and fuel, and
treating illness and injury.
Subsistence living is vulnerable to climatic conditions such as drought and
unseasonable variations in temperature, which have been occurring more
frequently in recent years. Political conflict and coercion over land, as well as
environmental problems such as soil erosion and deforestation, also threaten
those living at subsistence level.
Subsistence plus
Money is increasingly required and valued by households for the opportun-
ities it can bring. School fees are the single largest expense faced by households
that depend largely on subsistence strategies. While both South Africa and
Uganda have minimal or no official school fees for primary education, there
are often hidden fees or other associated expenses, such as school uniforms
and books, plus the opportunity cost of sending children to school rather than
keeping them home to help with work. Many parents also hope to provide
their children with an education beyond primary school, which increases the
overall expense. Having money is also very useful for dealing with the shocks
that subsistence living is so vulnerable to, such as illness and seasonal food
shortages, plus the expenses associated with weddings and funerals.
People in subsistence lifestyles typically try to maintain some assets that
they can sell if need arises, often in the form of farm produce or livestock.
Otherwise, they may manage to secure some income through a small side
business, part-time or casual work, or remittances from a family member.
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Self-employment
Business conducted through self-employment is a common livelihood option
in and around Ugandan towns and, to a lesser extent, in rural areas. It often
supplements subsistence farming. In Uganda, lack of formal job opportunities
necessitates this approach. For women, small business provides a degree
of control, allowing them to balance income generation with housework
and childcare. However, in many instances self-employed women do not
aspire to expand their businesses because of the demands of their home-
related duties.
Low literacy and numeracy can make small business risky and most entre-
preneurs do not seem to base their economic activities on any kind of market
research. This was certainly evident in the ICT sector at least, where people
often based their business strategies on a combination of copying others and
optimism.
In South Africa, people generally have a less entrepreneurial attitude and
tend to look first for formal employment, including casual or untrained labour.
However, people living in Khayelitsha may have other relatives depending
upon them and the unemployment rate is high. They typically turn to small
business to make a living if they cannot find a job.
In both countries, obtaining start-up capital and capital for expansion is
difficult. Bank loans are not popular because interest rates are high, especially
in Uganda. People typically use their own savings or loans from family
members. Lack of capital prevents many people from beginning businesses
or restricts the type of business they can do. It may also limit the growth of
businesses that do get started, due to perpetual underfunding.
Formal employment
Jobs in the formal sector are difficult to get because there are so few of them
and competition is intense. This is especially true in small towns and rural
areas, where such opportunities, normally rare, tend to be with NGOs. Other-
wise, people must relocate to larger cities. Formal sector jobs typically require
at least secondary or some post-secondary education. Families with the
necessary funds often invest in the advanced education of at least one child,
hoping this will eventually lead to formal sector employment. In turn, those
who eventually get such employment usually bear responsibility for a lot of
their family’s economic needs. Having a few salaried workers within a large
extended family can dramatically improve the living conditions of the whole
family. The situation in South Africa differs from that in Uganda because there
are more opportunities for salaried, regulated work, including domestic and
farm labour. These types of employment often require the workers to travel far
from their homes. Some workers, especially skilled workers in Uganda, venture
out of the country to seek better employment options. The remittances they
send back can become the most important income source for their relatives in
Uganda.
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Cross-cutting strategies
People trying merely to survive are rarely in a position to acquire assets or
expand social bonds. But in all other categories, these substrategies feature
prominently in people’s lifestyles – and with good reason. Family bonds have
been especially important in allowing family members to withstand shocks. As
a result of various social, economic and political crises, however, family bonds
have come under immense strain. While family is traditionally important
in both countries, Zulu and Xhosa cultures especially (in Bhamshela and
Khayelitsha respectively) put great emphasis on the importance of extended
family.
Acquiring assets
Whether people were engaged in a primarily subsistence or cash-based life-
style, investing in and acquiring assets was a basic strategy commonly used the
across the case studies. Acquiring assets normally implies some investment,
either time or money, which is expected to provide a pay-off in the form of
increased security, income opportunities, or both. What types of assets were
most valued and how to acquire them depended on the specific situation of
the respondent. A house was the asset that most people aspired to own,
whether they built it themselves or purchased it. Farmers were typically inter-
ested in acquiring land and livestock. Means of transportation were also
commonly desired, especially cars. In all cases, education was seen as an
increasingly necessary and important asset for improving the future of oneself
and one’s family.
Maintaining and expanding strong extended family bonds
Relationships with family, friends and acquaintances are another type of
asset that was particularly important and productive in all the communities
surveyed. Of all the case studies, people living in Bhamshela and Khayelitsha
put most emphasis on the importance of family, probably for cultural reasons.
In all places, family had traditionally served important economic as well as
social functions, and the importance of these had if anything increased under
modern pressures. Rural people especially looked to family members to
venture to towns and cities and share the income they were able to generate
there. South Africa traditionally has a high level of internal migration. During
apartheid, only men could get passes to travel to cities where they could find
work and send money back to their rural relatives. Although times have
changed and whole families now move wherever they like, the pattern of
urban-rural links remains strong. In Uganda, those who can have often chosen
to leave the country to seek opportunities in places with better economies.
These days, some people from neighbouring countries prefer to seek work in
Uganda; but Diaspora links continue to be important.
All five communities had been visibly affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Many people had to care for additional dependent family members. This,
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combined with high unemployment and limited options for income
generation, put great demands on those people who did hold such positions.
Besides providing economic support, especially for payment of school fees,
urban-based relatives were typically expected to mentor and sometimes host
younger family members so that they too could find work.
Local priorities
Table 5.1 shows the top priorities named by respondents in each household
survey. Respondents were asked to name their main priorities in an open-
ended manner (ie, they were not given a list of categories to select from), and
their responses were then categorized. These responses give some indication
as to the types of livelihood strategies most commonly employed in each
case study. Education and housing were the top priorities named by all
respondents. Many responses were specific to the particular situation (time
and place) of the survey participants. For example, people in Lira focused
mainly on basic survival. Their concerns were food, health and security. Their
educational aspirations also tended to be modest – they wanted to be able to
send their children to school, but were hampered by required school fees, and
sometimes by insecurity and forced displacement.
Table 5.1 Top priorities named by household respondents
Priority Nabweru Bhamshela Khayelitsha Lira Kabale
Education (for self, children) 25% 39% 39% 30% 67%
Build or buy house 29% 58% 41% 12% 18%
Start or expand own business 40% 6% 20% 0% 38%
Money 9% 28% 13% 39% 14%
Buy car or motorcycle 29% 32% 22% 0% 7%
Find a job 10% 22% 42% 0% 10%
Health 0% 0% 0% 41% 5%
Food 0% 0% 0% 44% 0%
Farming 12% 0% 0% 10% 17%
Family 0% 15% 13% 0% 0%
Marriage 0% 9% 0% 0% 19%
Security/peace 0% 0% 0% 26% 0%
Travel abroad 12% 0% 0% 0% 6%
Caring for children (own & orphans) 0% 0% 1% 18% 0%
Buy land 17% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Learn computers 0% 0% 7% 0% 8%
Become a professional 0% 0% 12% 0% 0%
Bicycle 0% 0% 0% 10% 0%
Religion 0% 0% 0% 8% 0%
Radio 0% 0% 0% 8% 0%
Clothes 0% 0% 0% 8% 0%
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ICT access and use in the case communities
Figure 5.1 shows the proportion of household survey respondents, by com-
munity, who reported having used phone, fax, computer and Internet/e-mail.
Not surprisingly, Khayelitsha holds first place in phone use since it is a densely
populated urban area in the wealthier country. More surprising is that Kabale
holds second place for phone use and first place in the use of every other ICT.
For Internet and e-mail use, respondents in Kabale reported more than double
the use rate of any other community.
The people included in this sample in Kabale are those from the town, who
were mainly sampled from a relatively wealthy suburb called Kigongi, and
those from surrounding areas, mainly sampled from a trading post about
seven kilometres from town. In these urban pockets, awareness and use of ICTs
appear relatively high, whereas those households sampled from the rural
areas, in Bukinda and Rubaya, had very low levels of use. This is illustrated in
Figure 5.2, where data from town, outskirts and rural respondents are disag-
gregated, further highlighting the urban-rural difference. The stark urban-rural
difference is largely due to differences in infrastructure.
Both Uganda and South Africa have rural electrification programmes in place
that will make the spread of these technologies much easier.
Radio is the one technology that was widely prevalent in all areas under
study, and which significantly narrowed the rural-urban divide. Bhamshela
and Khayelitsha were both within broadcast areas of community radio
Figure 5.1 Percentage of respondents who had used ICTs, 2003
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stations, while airwave liberalization has resulted in a proliferation of local FM
stations in Uganda, providing most listeners with a choice of at least three or
four. People living in camps for internally displaced persons and who were
from the more remote parts of rural northern Uganda were the one group
where radio use seemed to be less common. In rural areas, replacing batteries
can be a problem. Frequently, a rural household will have only one radio and
the man of the house will dominate its use. Nonetheless, both genders in all
areas reported listening to the radio on a daily or weekly basis and using it as
one of their major sources of information. Besides being information sources
in their own right, radio stations, in Uganda especially, often associate them-
selves with and promote communication centres, Internet cafés and ICTs
generally.
Fax, in contrast to radio, was not a particularly widespread or valued ICT in
any of the case studies, and seemed unlikely to become so, since it compared
unfavourably with alternatives such as e-mail for most purposes. It was not
used by many people in any of the case studies, and those who used it, did so
less than once a month. Uses were most often related to the formal workplace,
sending in job applications, or to interactions with formal institutions such as
banks, government offices and educational institutions. A few people in a
number of different places (Bhamshela, Lira and Kabale) also mentioned using
fax as a cheaper alternative to phone calls when maintaining contact with
family overseas or internationally.
Figure 5.2 Percentage of respondents who had used ICTs, Kabale District, 2003
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Phone shops
‘I would use a phone to fit into the community and development’.
Household survey respondent, Rubaya, Kabale
Phone use has increased dramatically across all communities included in this
research (see Figure 5.3), mainly because of the expansion of GSM cellular
networks. Public fixed wireless phones, offered through public phone booths
and franchises set up as part of operator licensing agreements, and through
privately owned phone shops, have closely followed the expansion of these
networks. While private cellular phone use has been much more widespread
than generally predicted, public access through fixed wireless is the most
common and most affordable type of use for most people.
Phone shops are more prevalent and tend to be more popular than phone
booths, which can often be out-of-service and require prepaid cards. Phone
shops also have attendants who can provide customer assistance. In many
phone shops, they will dial the number for the customer so that all the person
needs to do is speak into the receiver. Phone shop attendants in Lira reported
that not everyone had yet mastered this; some customers even tried to put the
handset on their heads.
Phone shops are used by all kinds of people, although most customers live
within 20 minutes of the service. Thus, the biggest obstacle to use is for those
living in rural areas where low population density, lack of electricity, and
sometimes lack of a GSM network prevent phone shops from operating.
Where a network is present, some rural people, especially those who travel to
town regularly, will have cellular phones and often sell air time to others.
Phone shops do not offer all the benefits of private cellular phone use. While
some phone shops, especially in residential areas, will receive incoming calls,
Figure 5.3 Percentage of population who had used a phone, 1996–2003
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many do not, and certainly it is not as convenient as directly calling some-
body. Many phone shops also do not offer the same level of privacy as a
personal phone.
The single largest use of the telephone, across all case studies, was social
communication – firstly with family members and secondly with friends. The
telephone was noted as an important communication tool for maintaining
ties locally, nationally and internationally. In Bhamshela, people reported
making calls specifically to request support and to announce deaths. Likewise,
people in Lira, who tended to use the phone less frequently, did so to request
support and to report emergencies. Those in Khayelitsha reported the highest
frequency of calls related to family (86 per cent), and used them to maintain
links with relatives in rural areas whom they would sometimes support eco-
nomically as well.
Business-related use was the second most prominent. It was reported in all
communities, although the proportion of phone users who made use of the
telephone for business ranged considerably, peaking at 52 per cent in Khaye-
litsha, but with only 12 per cent in Bhamshela. In Khayelitsha, people used
the phone most often in formal employment, and also for informing their
employer when they were sick. In Lira, Nabweru and Kabale, small businesses
employed the phone in co-ordinating trade and co-operation between them-
selves and businesses in other regions, especially Kampala. Cellular phones
also allowed people to receive calls from potential customers. For example,
some taxi drivers in Kabale and Khayelitsha carried them and could give out
their numbers to potential clients.
Other reasons for using the phone varied. Emergency use, especially related
to health, was particularly valued in Lira, but also in other places. In Lira,
almost one-quarter of respondents recalled using the phone to make inquiries
regarding school fees and educational programmes. People in Kabale also
mentioned this.
Provision of telephone services was an important source of employment
across all of the case studies, except perhaps in Bhamshela where there were
only three jobs at the two phone shops. In other communities, entrepreneurs
had found that the high level of demand for service and relatively low over-
heads could sustain many small businesses. The most profitable were those
with a Vodacom franchise, such as the one shown in Photo 5.1, since they got
preferential rates from Vodacom, thus guaranteeing a generous margin despite
heavy competition.
In both South Africa and Uganda, a number of innovative services providing
information through Short Message Service existed at the time of research. For
example, Foodnet and Gordon Bell (owner of Radio Lira) had come up with a
project to allow people to obtain commodity prices via SMS. The user would
‘SMS’ the name of the commodity (for example, ‘cassava’) to the service’s
number; in reply, he or she would receive a list of up-to-date market prices in
major trading centres across the country. However, during the course of the
research no one who was interviewed mentioned using such services.1 While
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this can be partially explained by the fact that many of these services were new
and people did not know about them, there did not seem to be any immediate
demand for information-driven services.
Internet cafés
Internet cafés were the main venue of Internet use in the cases surveyed. This
was because in most areas, especially in Uganda, relatively few work places had
Internet access, even if they had computers, and no one reported a home
Internet connection. In Bhamshela and Khayelitsha, where no Internet cafés
and few other public Internet sites existed, Internet use was also very low (see
Figure 5.4).
In Lira, where awareness and use were most limited, some of the first and
most dedicated Internet users were disc jockeys at local radio stations who
used the Internet as a source of music and international news. Several stations
had made agreements with local Internet cafés, where they gave free publicity
to the station in exchange for free access. Radio Lira had opened its own
Internet café, which it promoted on air. Voice of Kigezi FM in Kabale had done
the same thing. Journalists from Kampala-based national newspapers also used
the Lira Internet cafés to e-mail stories about the ongoing war in the north
back to the editors.
Across the Ugandan cases, e-mail was widely used to keep in touch with
Photo 5.1 Vodacom container in Bhamshela
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family and friends. These included many people living abroad. In Lira, for
example, 25 per cent of those surveyed had relatives and friends in other
countries. Some people also used chat and pen-pal sites to expand their social
networks internationally. E-mail was the most popular use of the Internet.
Other common uses were for searching for information related to scholar-
ships, conferences and educational programmes in other countries. Students
in high school or above sometimes used the Internet for researching topics
related to their course work. Entertainment was popular amongst younger
patrons, who commonly used the Internet to visit the web site of their
favourite football team or music group. Pornography sites were visited at
almost all Internet cafés. This was unfortunate in the sense that many porn
sites automatically download interfaces with shortcuts to their services, some-
times with pop-up porn advertisements. Most computers had no protection
against this, so they would often become littered with self-launching porno-
graphic pictures, creating a less-than-welcoming environment for any
subsequent user who might be offended by such images. Most cafés were
patronized mainly by young men, and the prevalence of pornography may
have reinforced this trend.
Internet use was not yet widespread amongst professionals in any of the
cases, with the possible exception of Kabale town. Those who did use it
included NGO workers, professors, teachers, civil servants and health profes-
sionals looking for information related to their work. In Kabale, some people
reportedly used the Internet to track financial investments in East African
and international markets. The presence of public Internet services was also
helpful to the tourism trade in this area, since tourists commonly sought out
these facilities. In Nabweru, a few centres planned to offer distance education
programmes, which would provide new educational opportunities for local
residents.
Figure 5.4 Percentage of respondents who had used the Internet, 1996–2003
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Communication centres
‘Those who aren’t learned don’t use our services – they have nothing to
produce from here. Most of our users are students; they photocopy past
papers for revision. We also have many working class [people]; they come to
produce small documents like letters’.
Attendant, communication centre, Nansana
Communication centres are more diverse and flexible than phone shops and
Internet cafés. They offer a range of services based on community demand,
their own capacity, and the particular constraints and opportunities of
the market. Thus, more than other type of centre, they varied with location.
Their managers were often influenced by competing centres, so they might
introduce a service they saw elsewhere or else be forced to stop a service if
competition grew too great.
In Lira, communication centres catered to the many NGOs in the area. Some
provided computer training and consultancy services to local NGOs; others
offered computer maintenance. In Kabale town and Nabweru, the centres
catered to other small businesses, institutions such as schools and government
offices, and individuals, particularly students. Organizations would use the
centres to produce and copy documents such as meeting minutes, reports,
examination papers, price lists and flyers. Individuals would use them to
photocopy identification papers and other important documents and for
creating CVs. Some communication centres in Kabale also allowed individuals
to do graphic design, edit video and copy CDs. People used these latter services
for both income-generating and personal purposes. Managers of many of
these centres in all three places expressed their interest in getting Internet
connectivity, which might also change the mix of services they chose to
offer. In Nabweru, two businesses were expecting to get distance education
services – one through a partnership with a British organization offering
accredited computer training, the other via a video feed of university lectures
from nearby Makerere University.
In Khayelitsha, there was only one stand-alone communication centre, a
Vodacom phone shop that also had other ICT-related services. Other centres
offering these types of services operated within businesses or NGOs. They were
used mainly for preparing CVs and funeral programmes and sometimes for
homework assignments.
Computer training
‘People want to have general computer knowledge because most job ads
today request it’.
Ruth Ninsiima, Computer Instructor, African
International Christian Ministry/Vocational
Training College Computer Centre
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Although many people expressed interest in learning to use computers, this
did not always translate into a spending priority. Most places offering
computer training had trouble attracting large numbers of students and so
combined that service with other ICT-related services. Computer training was
also offered at some private colleges and vocational institutes. As one service
provider in Lira observed, people would not take a course until they had a
definite and immediate reason to do so. People who took computer training
courses were usually young and had at least completed secondary school. They
took courses either because they were going on to post-secondary education or
else because they felt it would increase their immediate job prospects. Often,
they were people who had already had a small amount of previous exposure to
computers, or who had been advised by a relative or friend that computer
training would help them to find work. Women with secretarial training often
took computer courses to upgrade their skills, to help them to get a job, or to
improve their chances of promotion. At the Christian Ministry Vocational
College in Kabale, for example, almost all computer students were women
with secretarial training.
Most computer training courses offered by private centres were short-term
unaccredited courses designed to help people master a particular proprietary
software package such as Microsoft Word or PowerPoint, or to introduce them
to the general operating system. The experience and knowledge of instructors
varied greatly. Some had university degrees in computer studies while others
had taken only a few two-week courses themselves. Other than testimony
from previous students, most students did not have much background
knowledge that they could use in making an informed decision about what
courses were best.
Community service
Some communication centres were operated by people who considered the
centre not simply a profit-making venture, but also a service to the com-
munity. In this spirit, they sometimes offered additional services that do not
necessarily generate a profit. For example, Infornet in Lira had a plan to begin a
computer club for children. Forward Communications, also in Lira, was run by
a pastor who used the profits for a variety of charitable endeavours, mainly
in support of orphans. This had run into difficulties because increased com-
petition, especially in phone services, was reducing their profit margin. The
centre also offered computer classes that widows were encouraged to take so
as to gain saleable job skills. The fees for these classes were required in three
instalments, an arrangement intended to make the training more affordable
for prospective students. Some communication centres were also more willing
than other types of centre to experiment with different services and tech-
nologies (often as a survival strategy in a fast-moving market), or to continue
running a particular service even when it was not generating any profit, if
they saw a benefit to the community. For example, a number of businesses in
Khayelitsha reported running some services on a break-even basis.
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Services within an existing business
These services were accessed and used in a manner similar to the communica-
tion centres. The core business, though, tended to have some influence on the
types of customers who came to use the services. For example, ICT services in
hotels tended to attract the hotel’s out-of-town guests, as well as people living
and working in the area.
Services within a not-for-profit organization
‘I have been crying to be like those with access. I want to fit into the
community’.
Household survey respondent, Kabale
Within schools
World Links school-based telecentres are used primarily by students and
teachers, but are also open to the public. As the SBTs in Lira and Kabale were
located on the town outskirts, they attracted some nearby residents who might
not otherwise use the Internet. Uneducated people reportedly came only
infrequently. One reason was that the schools did not always make themselves
welcome to such people, who were regarded as potential thieves and vandals.
One school had a policy in place banning uneducated people from the school
grounds. However, the policy was waived for the telecentre which, under the
conditions of the World Links programme, had to be publicly accessible.
Otherwise, both schools had cheap and fast Internet connections before these
were available in town. Thus, they were the first public places in both locations
where people could go and use the Internet at a reasonable cost. Although
dial-up had been available in both places, it was expensive and of poor quality.
In Kabale, the telecentre targeted foreign tourists and also enjoyed patronage
from students and professors at a nearby university. Both SBTs had concerns
about how their long period offline might affect future relationships with their
customers, since in both cases new Internet cafés offering more competitive
services had opened up. Kabale’s SBT was virtually unused by the public in the
absence of the Internet connection. The Lira SBT had only a few members of
the general public as users, namely those enrolled in computer training classes.
A problem common to these schools was the limited number of computers
compared with the large student population. Students commonly reported
frustration because their computer classes were overcrowded. Smaller, weaker
students were sometimes forced off machines and these struggles frequently
led to equipment breakdowns. As a result, many students did not attend com-
puter class at all. Even those who did attend regularly – for example, the
seniors in Lango College’s computer club – reported that their skill levels were
limited and that they needed further instruction.
Not surprisingly, the internal organization of the school influenced the
success of these school telecentres or labs. Wizzy Digital Courier found that
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many schools in Khayelitsha actually had computers but were not using
them. Schools that were effectively using the computers often had an internal
champion – most effective when it was the principal or vice-principal, who
encouraged or required teachers to use computers in their own work. However,
there were also stories of internal politics limiting the control of resources. In
Bhamshela, one school kept computers in the principal’s home for safe-
keeping. In another SBT, a high-level school official was reportedly trying to
limit public use of the facilities because they competed with his own private
communication centre in town.
Within a library
There was only one example of a library-based public Internet service in this
research. Thus, it is hard to generalize. This centre, located in Khayelitsha,
had limited user support, low-quality technical service, and less than ten users
per day. The users tended to be well educated professionals or post-secondary
students who already had experience with computers. Although the user fee of
R10 per hour was subsidized by the library, it was still considered unaffordable
by most local residents.
Within a community centre
The Aleksan Kopano Community Resource Centre in Alexandra was the one
community centre in the study that provided ICT access. Its services included
computer training, direct access to the Internet, standard office applications
on computers, and photocopying. The centre also housed a community radio
station.
When the centre tried to introduce a fee for Internet access, people would
no longer come and use the service, even though the rate was subsidized. The
centre then offered access for free and demand grew. Up to 30 people a day
(the maximum the centre could accommodate) were using the services in
30-minute time slots. The library also contained some computers without any
Internet connection, but with commonly used applications such as word pro-
cessing. These were free but not used much. Most of the users were people
already able to use the Internet. According to staff, the applications were quite
broad. While entertainment was one use (but with a ban on pornography), it
was not the dominant one. Some people used the Internet to seek jobs, mainly
secretarial and computer-related work. High school students used it to look
for bursaries and to do research for assignments. Business people obtained
information on how to run a business and on budgeting and tendering, and
those wanting to open bottle stores used it to seek government gazettes.2 The
computer training was intended to increase the employability of its graduates,
and those attending the course were required to speak English, the language of
instruction. Those attending the course were young men and women, mostly
with a high school education.
Compared with private access centres, the community centre was able to
offer high-quality services in a community where a commercial business
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might have struggled. It was also able to subsidize some services, although
sustainability was always at issue and depended on strong management and
willing private sponsors. Because the centre offered many community services,
it also attracted many people.
Within NGOs
The types of services offered, as well as who accesses them and how, depend a
great deal upon the specific NGO and its location. Two examples highlight this
diversity.
The Khayelitsha Educational Resource Information Centre (KERIC) was an
NGO located in a community centre complex. Its services were similar to those
offered by nearby commercial centres: the centre allowed people to come and
use computers, usually to prepare CVs, or else to pay one of the staff to do so at
rates comparable to those charged by nearby businesses. Most users were job
seekers responding to advertisements they had seen, and they would use
KERIC to prepare CVs and submit them by fax or e-mail. Some students also
came to KERIC to type or photocopy homework assignments. The number of
users varied from day to day, but was often less than 10. The typical user profile
was similar to that of people using the equivalent commercial services. The
main difference was that only KERIC allowed people to use the computers
themselves.
RANET, the Ugandan programme for distributing climatic information,
operated out of 10 different World Vision field offices, although it was in the
process of opening new sites within other NGOs. These field offices were often
in remote areas and depended on their own source of electricity. They already
had a computer for administration, a building, staff, a power source and a
relationship with the community based on a cross-sectoral development
approach. Since there was only one computer, World Vision staff would down-
load information from the Worldspace Satellite’s African Learning Channel.
This included the Department of Meteorology’s seasonal forecasts and other
information supplied by various NGOs and research centres, including market
prices supplied by Foodnet and a large range of agricultural extension informa-
tion and health information. Farmers were sometimes allowed to access this
information directly, but because the computer was often required for other
purposes, it could not be dedicated for full public access. The information,
however, was intended to be public, and with this aim it was posted and dis-
tributed to extension agents, farmers’ groups and local radio stations. Some
World Vision offices had also chosen to share information packages other than
the climatic information (which was the explicit focus of the programme) with
radios and schools. There was no charge for any of the information or training
provided.
Two sites were visited in the course of this research. The Bukinda RANET site
in Kabale, as with about half of the sites, ran into some early difficulties with
equipment operation. In Bukinda, the person who had received training left
suddenly and the remaining staff did not know how to download from the
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Worldspace site. In about 2001, they sent packets of downloaded information,
including National Farm Radio Forum scripts, to about 14 schools in the area
and some farmers. The impact of this information was unclear, although
it seemed slight. The staff received acknowledgement from the principals,
nothing more. And when they stopped sending the packets, due to a computer
problem, no one reacted.
The project resumed full operation about three months before the research
visit. A large training effort through the Meteorology Department focused on
agricultural extension offices, representatives of farmers’ groups, and local
representatives of the World Vision ADP management committee. The 30
participants decided to form associations that would be responsible for dis-
seminating the climatic information to farmers within specific areas. The
method of dissemination was left up to the person or persons responsible for a
given area. In addition, they hoped the Voice of Kigezi radio station would
broadcast the climatic information without charge.
In a RANET site in Iylowa, Tororo district, the programme was running
smoothly and the farmers had had three seasons to test the climatic forecasts
and related strategies. The staff had disseminated the information mainly
through farmers’ groups, but had not yet managed to secure the co-operation
of local FM radio stations. The farmers were impressed by the results and
said that so far the seasonal predictions had been accurate and helpful.
While many farmers in the area traditionally depended on ‘forefather
knowledge’ and had derided the RANET forecasts, the last few years had
apparently proven RANET to be more accurate and reliable than the
traditional methods. However, there was also a project under way to docu-
ment the indigenous knowledge and consider ways to integrate the two
sources of information and practice. The farmer groups were themselves
involved in this initiative. Overall, the programme was useful and highly
valued by the farmers. Dissemination remained the major challenge and
limitation, and there was room to make greater use of the other kinds of
downloaded information. Market price information in particular was not
being disseminated.
Telecentres
‘Before the telecentre, there weren’t any computers. Schools got them in
about 2001. So people learned about computers at the telecentre’.
Telecentre staff, Bhamshela
Universal Service Agency telecentres in Bhamshela and Khayelitsha
At the time of research, both these telecentres had extremely low use rates.
Bhamshela was on the verge of closing, but was still offering computer classes
to six students. At its peak, it had offered phone and photocopying services
to many local residents, although other services, especially computers and
Internet access, had not been used very much. It was relatively well known in
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the community, although many people still knew it as ‘the place that used to
have phones’. Local residents were frequently interested in taking computer
classes, especially for increasing their employability, but most found the price
of courses unaffordable, resulting in a large stack of uncollected certificates
earned by students who had never paid their fees in full.
Khayelitsha Telecentre, shown in Photo 5.2, was located in a residential area
and did not appear to be as widely known. It had 10 or fewer users a day, and
many of these came to use the photocopier. It offered computer classes which
were attended mainly by people about to begin university who felt they
needed to learn computer basics. Perhaps because these clients were only a
small part of Khayelitsha’s population, demand for computer training had
fallen off and the classes had not been offered for about four months prior to
the research visit.
Nabweru Telecentre
Nabweru Telecentre was set up beside the subcounty government offices,
since these were intended to be an anchor user and the telecentre’s eventual
owner. By the time of the research, the subcounty had taken over ownership
although it was not playing an active role. The telecentre’s management was
struggling to maintain activities, with little support. The telecentre’s location
was problematic not only because it was off transport routes and away from
trading areas, but also because of its very proximity to the subcounty head-
quarters. People liked to avoid this government facility because it housed both
tax offices and jails – an ominous combination in the eyes of many. Perhaps
for this reason, the telecentre had an average of only 11 or 12 people per
Photo 5.2 Khayelitsha Telecentre
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day using its services (Etta, 2003). Subcounty staff were the telecentre’s main
patrons, using it mainly to drop off documents for typing or copying. The
telecentre staff also engaged in some agricultural outreach activities with
farmers and maintained a small library of mainly agricultural documents and
videos. Their capacity to engage effectively in outreach activities was limited
by lack of funds, since external funding had ended and paid services were
poorly used. They were also still engaged in a number of activities through
UNESCO, including an indigenous knowledge project and the installation of a
community radio station.
AHI telecentres in Rubaya and Kabale
The Kabale Telecentre described itself as a ‘business oriented’ not-for-profit
centre. At its height, it reportedly had about 100 users a day. But as com-
petition in town increased, its customer base dropped to between 10 and
20 users a day, plus four computer students. Most of these used phone and
photocopying services, while a few made use of typesetting facilities each day.
Computer students came mainly from two groups of people: secondary school
students on vacation and people already employed but wishing to improve
their job skills. People who used the regular services generally lived nearby.
Staff reflected that most people still did not use the services because they did
not know about the telecentre or understand its purpose and because resources
were not available for marketing or outreach activities. The centre had an
Internet connection that was cut off when competition increased. When it was
operational, staff reported that up to 15 farmers a week came in to access
commodity related information.
The Rubaya Telecentre had about four visitors per day on regular days, and
20 on market days, once a week. It also offered computer training and had four
students at the time of research. Some local schools used the telecentre to
typeset and photocopy examination papers, while others continued to use
stenciling as a cheaper method. The local NAADS office used the telecentre
to prepare all their documents, as did local churches and subcounty staff.
Community members used the telecentre’s telephone but also other services
for preparing wedding cards and other documents. Students and farmer
groups sometimes made use of the modest library facilities and photocopied
documents.
General observations
‘I want to get more knowledge in using e-mail. Through e-mail and the
Internet, I can get friendships outside the country. I also want to make
partnerships with other organizations outside and network so we can
build on our group. My training stopped because where I’m living there’s
no computer. I can’t yet continue because all the training is centralized in
Lira’.
CPAR CLC beneficiary, living in the country, outside Lira
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Telecentres provide many of the same services as commercial communication
centres. Sometimes they are located in remote areas where the market is not
yet providing such services, as in Bhamshela in South Africa and Rubaya in
Uganda. When they are in such areas, they can help extend the reach of the
market by creating and/or demonstrating local demand for telecom services,
but this depends in part on the availability of infrastructure. For example,
other phone, fax and photocopying services opened once the Bhamshela tele-
centre no longer offered them; but in Rubaya, poverty, low population
density and lack of electricity mitigated against the survival of ICT-related
businesses.
One challenge faced by all the telecentres was low overall usage. A particular
service might be in big demand, while others were not. Where commercial
centres existed, they were usually unable to compete for a variety of reasons.
For example, they may have been trying to subsidize non-commercial
activities, or perhaps they had dial-up Internet connectivity that was
unaffordable, or they were located in slightly out-of-the-way places. Because
decision-making was split between telecentre management and the body over-
seeing the project, it was often unwieldy, sometimes tightly tied to funding
conditions and stated project objectives, and less responsive to the local
market, which was itself often unpredictable. Because the telecentres were
generally expected to become self-financing primarily through user fees, they
faced a sort of identity crisis with regard to the types of services they offered.
And given that none of the centres reviewed in this research was making
enough money to cover costs, they often found themselves drawn to those
options that seemed most commercially viable.
Part of an integrated development strategy
‘Resources aren’t a problem – it’s co-ordination, especially in government.
There is competition between and even within government organizations’.
Karen Thorne, MediaWorks, South Africa
MPCC Programme
The Multipurpose Community Centres (MPCCs) being built by GCIS appeared
to be filling a large gap in government service delivery in many communities.
These were services that were required by many people, including pensioners,
unemployed people, self-employed people and students. In Bhamshela, the
MPCC was quite new and did not yet have a manager, but appeared to be well
used. It was too early to say how the MPCC would be used and whether all
services would work. It was also hard to say just how much of a role ICTs would
play in service delivery. GCIS planning documents sketched a vision where
staff at the different offices housed in the MPCC would play the role of infor-
mation intermediaries, helping to answer people’s questions and referring
them to different information links and sources, including ICT-related ones
such as phone numbers and Web pages (GCIS, 2001). Whether this would
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work in practice would depend greatly on the staff themselves, the types of
questions asked by community members, and having reasonably priced and
reliable ICT services either at the MPCC or nearby. In 2003, the high cost of
Internet access and lack of connectivity options other than dial-up meant that
most MPCCs did not have an Internet connection and were unlikely to get one
until something changed in the national telecom market.
NAADS Programme
The National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAADS) is a large 25-year pro-
gramme begun in 2001 by the government of Uganda to ‘increase farmer
access to information, knowledge and technology for profitable agricultural
production’ (NAADS, 2001). It is part of the government’s Plan to Modernize
Agriculture (PMA). The first seven-year phase costs an estimated US$108
million, funded primarily by outside donor agencies. By the end of this phase,
the programme is expected to have a presence in every district of the country.
NAADS replaces the old government extension system with a new decen-
tralized demand-driven extension system within the private sector. The pro-
gramme gives farmer groups resources with which they can choose to contract
extension operators to provide them with certain information and inputs with
the ultimate aim of commercializing farming in the country. Once they have
adopted practices and inputs that allow them to generate a profit, they should,
in theory, be able to pay for extension services themselves, thus rendering
those services sustainable.
An early criticism of NAADS from a variety of observers has been that,
despite the explicit aim to target poor subsistence farmers, those without
resources are unable to participate in or benefit from the programme (eg,
FOWODE/Oxfam, 2004).
From the perspective of universal access, NAADS provides interesting poten-
tial in rural areas, since creating demand for information is a major obstacle
faced by telecentres. If NAADS succeeds in creating a network of farmer groups
who have the capacity to demand information, rural telecentres may serve
an important intermediary role. In Rubaya, the AHI telecentre was already
collaborating with NAADS, and the staff there had helped it to identify and
expand the number of farmer groups in the area.
Radio and Internet
In South Africa and Uganda, as elsewhere in the world, radio is the most far-
reaching method of broadcasting information. The government of Uganda
found that in the mid-90s the state-run Radio Uganda was the main informa-
tion source for Uganda’s mainly rural population (Government of Uganda,
2002). In both countries, the liberalization of the airwaves is a relatively recent
phenomenon, starting in the early to mid-90s, the same period in which the
telecom sector began to be privatized.
In Uganda, private operators could apply for FM licenses. By 1998 there were
28 FM stations in the country and by September 2003 this had risen to 119.
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One reason for the quick spread of these stations was that station owners
were making a profit, mainly by signing up big advertisers and by receiving
sponsorship from government and other agencies to broadcast development-
related programmes. In Lira, three radio stations were located within the town
(Radio Lira, Radio Wa and Radio Rhino) and had all opened up within the past
three years. All three used the Internet to obtain material for programming.
Radio Rhino had an agreement with a local Internet café whereby they were
able to browse for free in exchange for promoting the café on air. The
same scenario was repeated in other towns across the country. In Kabale, the
largest radio station had also set up the only financially successful Internet
café. RANET was also pursuing relationships with stations in its areas of
operation to have climatic information broadcast so that it could reach a wide
audience. About six sites, some radio stations and some telecentres, were being
converted to ‘community multimedia centres’ under a new UNESCO initia-
tive. This set up community radio stations within telecentres (or conversely,
telecentres within radio stations) in an attempt to maximize the benefits of
such a symbiotic combination. At the time of research, the installation was in
progress.
In South Africa, radio was more tightly regulated and there were fewer
private stations. But the community radio sector was very strong. Ninety-six
community radio stations had been granted licenses by the end of 2003, and
over 100 (some still awaiting licensing hearings) were members of the not-
for-profit National Community Radio Forum (NCRF). The Forum lobbied on
behalf of community radio at the policy level, helped stations with pro-
gramming, especially around events such as national elections, and assisted
with capacity building, specifically the incorporation of new ICTs into
radio operations. A major focus was satellite communications for live-to-air
broadcasting. Its longer-term goal was to introduce two-way satellite connec-
tions so that stations could directly share programming with each other. It
was supporting stations through ‘hub’ stations in each province which shared
their equipment and expertise with neighbouring stations. Unlike Uganda,
there had been little direct interaction between community radio and tele-
centres, and what little there was reportedly did not have much success. The
MPCC programme had planned that its facilities would house both telecentres
and community radio, though it was unclear what relationship might develop
between the two.
The two countries have distinct experiences in terms of radio and its inter-
actions with new ICTs. However, both demonstrate that radio remains the
most popular way to receive information, since it is low-cost and widely
accessible, does not require literacy or special skills of its users, and is usually
available in local languages. Telephone and even Internet use (which is
dominated by e-mail) tend to be used for personal communication purposes
most of the time, rather than for seeking out new information. Combining
new ICTs with radio clearly increases the value of the information they can
provide by greatly increasing its reach.
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Analysis by livelihood
Survival
‘I want to know how to use a computer because people are growing heavier
with insecurity here. I don’t know how, but maybe it will help’.
Household survey respondent, Lira
People in survival situations usually do not have the resources to use ICTs
even when they are available. Depending upon the situation, some people
may have a reason and the capacity to make a phone call, usually to a family
member. People in Lira would sometimes go to the radio stations in times of
crisis, to find accurate up-to-date news and to try and track down family
members.
The greatest impact that ICTs may have on people in survival situations is
indirect. NGOs, government departments and aid agencies that serve popula-
tions in urgent need may better co-ordinate their efforts and get useful infor-
mation if they have access to telephones, computers and the Internet. Another
major indirect impact of ICTs on such people relates to the smoother flow of
information to broadcast media and the availability of more diverse and
timely information sources, especially in situations where a dominant group
may try to limit certain forms of information. In Lira, for example, radio
stations depended upon village reporters for news. Mobile phones, where the
network was available, could help these people to transmit information.
E-mail helped journalists from Kampala to submit stories quickly for publica-
tion. These uses of ICTs can help to build public awareness of emergency
situations. The conflict in northern Uganda is a good example. It was often not
treated as a major issue amongst people in the south. Nonetheless, and in
part because of good communications links between Lira and the rest of the
country, national daily papers often covered the situation, thus helping to
keep the issue fresh. These reports contrasted with the official government
news releases which tended to downplay the level of the conflict and
announce that the end was imminent. Sadly, whatever impact honest media
coverage may have had on national public opinion and government com-
mitment, it had not been sufficient to change the situation.
Another potential benefit of promoting ICTs is suggested by an anecdote
from Gordon Bell, owner of Radio Lira. He recalled an incident in which a
person had died of a treatable condition because a local doctor had refused to
give the cure – which itself was not expensive – because the patient could
not pay a hefty consultancy fee. To Bell, this demonstrated that information,
when limited, was held by the powerful at the expense of the weak. If people
had a resource like the Internet at hand and know how to use it, they could
look up basic medical information that might literally save a life.
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Subsistence and subsistence plus
‘I don’t need to learn how to use computers because I am always out working
in the field’.
Household survey respondent, Rubaya, Kabale
‘Climate patterns are changing – seasons and rainfall. So farmers need advice
about which crops to plant and when. If the information is too slow [in
reaching them], it is useless because it doesn’t influence the decision making
of the farmer’.
Milton Waiswa, RANET
For people in primarily subsistence lifestyles, the radio is a widely used
source of information. Those who use the telephone do so primarily to
maintain contact with family members in other parts of the country or other
countries. These contacts are often used to request money or help acquiring
needed items. Where the Internet is available, e-mail, and to a lesser degree,
chat, is also used for maintaining international contact with the Ugandan
Diaspora.
Although there are many situations in which information is useful to
specific livelihood strategies, whether related to agriculture, markets, health
or education, people in this category do not tend to actively seek out new
information. They are more likely to depend on traditional forms of
knowledge already embedded in their practices. As there are already plenty of
demands on the little money they have, their willingness to pay for informa-
tion services is usually very limited. For example, the potato farmer in Photo
5.3 has hired help in harvesting her crop, but says she cannot afford to use
ICTs and has no real reason to use them. Even when it is free, information is
not likely to be applied unless it actively builds on existing knowledge or
creates new social structures. For example, RANET Uganda provided farmers
with training about what to do in different climatic conditions. Where this
conflicted with traditional local knowledge, more traditionally minded people
watched to see how those who adopted the new practices faired.
On the one hand, then, telecentres have had a difficult time reaching
these people, even when they are physically accessible, because user fees for
services generally outstrip ability and willingness to pay. The exception is
phone services. On the other hand, these populations may benefit indirectly
from telecentres if the local institutions which serve them are able to operate
more efficiently as a result of being able to tap into locally available ICT
services.
Self-employment
‘I want to know more about repairing computers. There are a lot of benefits to
that kind of knowledge now. For example, most jobs at the NGOs require
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you to be computer literate. This knowledge could also help me to open
my own training school if I can get loans to buy computers. Then I’d be
self-employed’.
Participant in World Bank-sponsored Youth ICT
Programme, Lango College, Lira
Photo 5.3 Potato farmer in Rubaya
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For self-employed people, both phone shops and communication centres pro-
vide useful business support services. Phones can be used to contact suppliers,
clients and potential clients. However, personal cell phones are also very
popular and provide a useful feature that communication centres do not offer:
they make it possible for business contacts and clients to call at any time. For
example, some taxi drivers in South Africa and Uganda carried cellular phones,
as did some traditional healers and people working in many other types of
service and trading.
On the productive side, providing ICT access and value-added services is
an opportunity to make money that many entrepreneurs in Uganda, and
to a much lesser degree, in South Africa, are seizing. However, their early
experiences show that these ventures often have high risks and low profits.
Part of the reason for the low profits is that, even where demand exists for
phone and Internet services, the high rates charged by telecom operators, and
to a lesser extent ISPs, do not allow much room for mark-up. However, these
entrepreneurs are crucial players in the pursuit of universal access since it is
through their centres that the majority of users gain access to ICTs. They
also assist large telecom operators by helping to open up telecom services to a
larger segment of the market. Their risk and added value should be somehow
recognized and they should share in a greater proportion of the financial
benefits from telecom sector growth. This would also ensure that more money
circulates locally instead of being sucked out of the community (and often the
country) by the major operators. The positive example of how such a model
can work is the Vodacom phone shops.
Formal employment
‘I’m studying computers because it will help with job opportunities. After I’m
finished, I want to work at a computer till’.
Computer student, Bhamshela telecentre
Computer skills are strongly associated with formal education and formal
employment. If all people are to have the opportunity to learn computer-
related job skills, computer training should be available in schools. But
because many people already struggle to gain access to formal education,
especially at secondary and post-secondary levels, this creates the potential for
a greater social and economic divide within a country. Some schools do not
have the resources to acquire computers and many do not have electricity. In
any case, the presence of computers does not by itself guarantee any direct
benefits. Often there are few computers available, a lack of qualified teachers,
and problems associated with security, infrastructure and cost. Many schools
pay for computers through increased school fees, and sometimes through a
special computer lab fee. The poorest rural schools in Uganda, even if they
managed to get computers, would not be able to impose these fees on the
students as most families would not be able to pay. Short-term private classes
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are available in many areas, but the fees are often prohibitive and standards
vary widely. This is a major policy issue at the national level.
This research did not quantify the benefits of knowing about computers or
identify exactly what computer skills were in demand, how many skilled
people managed to find jobs, or where they found them.3 For most people in
the case communities, the other assets required to benefit from a computer-
skills strategy, plus the investment of time and money, were too great to even
consider. However, many young people were interested in gaining computer
skills to improve their future job prospects. Certainly, some people with
computer skills, mainly men, had chosen to start their own businesses or work
as consultants, either in Kampala or in smaller towns. Women tended to gain
skills for work in secretarial and office support positions.
Without advocacy for the less powerful local businesses, large international
companies are likely to take the lion’s share of profit in the ICT sector. Like-
wise, without equal access to quality education, the divide is likely to increase
between those who can afford well-equipped private schools and courses and
those who cannot. Both these issues require national-level intervention and
are arguably some of the greatest problems related to universal access.
Connections within the extended family are one of the greatest equalizing
forces in this otherwise highly-stratified scenario. Those able to go on to
higher education and formal employment often end up supporting members
of the extended family and even friends. In this respect, it is common for poor
families to support one member to pursue higher education, thus increasing
his or her job prospects.
Acquiring assets
‘Most women said they don’t need information, they need credit . . . we need
to move beyond the tangibles’.
Florence Kuteesa, CEEWA
‘I’d like to know about computers, just to have some knowledge about
it at first. We the women who have children to look after need some
of these services, such as computer knowledge, which may be a source of
income’.
Household survey respondent, Lira
The ability to use ICTs often depends on possession of other assets – money,
mobility to get to an access point, literacy or, in the case of Internet use, the
ability to understand English or another major world language. Access to, and
ownership of, ICTs are valued as assets in several respects:
• They are status symbols. Examples included owning a recent-model
cellular phone, being able to use a computer, and having an e-mail
address.
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• ICT-related skills, and especially computer skills, can improve one’s
chances of getting a good job.
• ICTs, especially telephone and e-mail, can be used to maintain contact
with family and friends across the country and the world.
• The Internet can help people create new international links with others.
Young people particularly value this attribute and sometimes see it as a
potential source of economic gain. For example, a boy in Lira reportedly
made contact with someone via the Internet who helped him pay his
school fees.
• For many people, mastering basic ICT skills boosts their own self-
confidence, since ICTs are popularly associated with the modern world. As
one woman in Bhamshela commented, if she and her family cannot use
computers, people will think they are uncivilized.
However, information per se is not highly valued, although many people
listen to the radio and value its benefits. A few organizations that have worked
with community groups commented that people did not view information
as a resource of major importance. CEEWA Uganda, for example, noted this in
work with women entrepreneurs, and AHI in its dealings with farmers in
Rubaya.
Maintaining and expanding family and social networks
‘These phones are important because they allow us to communicate with
our relatives’.
Phone shop user, Bhamshela, South Africa
As already noted, communication with family is the single largest use of the
telephone and, in the case of people with family members abroad, it is also a
major driver of e-mail use. Such communication is important because of the
remittance economy: people employed in cities often send rural relatives
money and other requested items, and sometimes host young relatives seeking
work in the city. ICTs help maintain these networks. Also, when people with
ICT skills use them to gain entry to the formal economy and better paying
jobs, they often end up sharing the economic benefits with rural family
members. This kind of use may act as an equalizing force within a system that
otherwise favours those with higher-level formal education and jobs in the
formal sector.
Impact and strategies for maximizing benefits
From a livelihoods perspective, what are the major positive impacts of ICT
access on development? Here are four key benefits, the first of which is the
most important:
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• ICTs support the remittance economy and help maintain contact between
geographically dispersed family members.
• They create more opportunities for interaction with other parts of the
world, and these may, in turn, lead to new economic opportunities.
• They support independent media coverage through e-mail and online
news.
• They create new opportunities for small business. However, some of these
ventures, especially those involving computers and the Internet, pose
high risks and generate only modest profits.
ICTs can also have a negative impact on livelihoods. Using them is expensive
and draws on scarce financial resources. Young people in particular may
spend a large proportion of their income on cellular phones and access time at
Internet cafés. While such expenditures may at times constitute a form of
investment, the returns are unlikely to equal output in economic terms.
Indeed, ICT usage is often motivated by a desire for higher social status or
entertainment. Most of the profit generated from using ICTs, whether through
access centres or private ownership, goes to big telecom operators, which are in
a much better position to lobby for their own interests than are small local
businesses. Finally, the growing demand for computer skills for certain types
of jobs and for university studies (more so in South Africa) creates higher
entry barriers to both post-secondary education and formal employment.
This, in turn, widens the chasm between poor and rich families, and especially
between rural and urban families.
Based on the experiences of the access centres reviewed in this research,
there are a variety of strategies that can be used by the centres themselves and
by policy makers to maximize the positive development potential of ICTs and
reduce some of the risks.
Access centres
A basic distinction can be made between phone and other ICT services, in
terms of accessibility. People appreciate the value of telephone services with-
out any great need for awareness building, special skills or education. Physical
availability and cost are the two factors determining whether and how often a
person uses the telephone. Access centres are cheaper than private ownership
although they do not of course offer all the same advantages: most will not
accept incoming calls and many also lack privacy.
For ICTs focused on information acquisition, development impact is
maximized where they are integrated into other activities and structures.
Access focused clearly on one application can build capacity and lead to
further exploration of the possibilities of both the technology and the
information available through it. RANET is an excellent example of this.
For computers and the Internet, there are multiple barriers to use. For many
populations, direct access is not feasible; mediated access is more likely to
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bring benefits. Most access centres have had only limited success in addressing
the barriers their potential customers face and only certain populations used
their services, particularly professionals and students. In many cases, those
using access centres had some exposure to computers in another setting such
as school or work.
User fees alone are not necessarily an insurmountable barrier to use; but
combined with other barriers, they create a major disincentive. For example,
most people within a 20-minute walk of phone service are willing and able to
pay. These rates are often high by international standards. South Africa, for
example, has some of the highest landline phone charges in the world. But
poor people value and use these lines – and they control costs by limiting
the length and frequency of calls.4 In the case of computer and Internet ser-
vices, three factors combine to minimize use: user fees, lack of knowledge
of potential applications, and inability to actually use the technologies.
Inexperienced people do not explore the potential of the services since there is
no immediate benefit in doing so. Using computers and the Internet in a way
that has tangible value takes some investment in terms of time; and when time
also involves money, this increases the cost of the investment. Youth are the
people most likely to use new ICTs at access centres without prior exposure.
They are motivated purely by curiosity. But for most adults trying to get by
on few resources, curiosity with a price tag is not worth indulging. This
implies that fee-based access to computers and the Internet is unlikely to
create widespread popular use, unless there are other places where people can
build proficiency in these technologies free of charge.
The effectiveness of any access centre depends on its internal capacity.
Dedicated, energetic leadership and management, along with the ability to
partner effectively, are particularly important characteristics. In addition, the
technology itself must be reliable, or at least the organization using it must be
resourceful – meaning that if the technology does fail, there should be an
alternative path forward while the problem is being addressed.
Access centres can also have a positive impact on development by increasing
local job opportunities, building staff capacity in ICTs and management, and
participating in other community development initiatives. These con-
tingent benefits should be explicitly recognized and targeted where possible.
Externally funded projects in particular need to maximize local input and
control from the beginning – both to build capacity and ensure local
relevance.
Policy makers
If one compares common patterns of ICT access and use with policy visions
and the great promise of ICTs, it is apparent that such potential cannot be
realized spontaneously through the market. One factor that limits the use of
ICTs as components of livelihood strategies is the common perception that
these technologies, especially computers, are for educated people only and
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primarily needed for enhancing job opportunities. Such a popular view limits
the spontaneous appropriation of ICTs where physical access is provided. This
underscores the earlier argument that ICT services need to be harmonized with
larger national development strategies, especially those for rural areas.
Another clear issue is affordability. Both end consumers and local access
centres, whether run by entrepreneurs or NGOs, struggle with the high cost
of equipment and telecom services. These costs can limit the spread of ICTs
and undermine their potential value. Affordability itself is a very elastic term,
since it is often difficult to place a clear value on an ICT service – it depends
on what it is used for. The International Telecommunication Union, for
example, suggests 3 per cent of income should be spent on ICT-related ser-
vices; but in Khayelitsha, based on people’s own reported spending estimates
and census figures, people were spending over 25 per cent of their incomes just
on phone services! What then, is an affordable rate?
Larger urban centres have better infrastructure, a wider range of services, and
greater demand. However, services tend to target the wealthier segments of
society, allowing for easier profits. This tendency is especially evident in areas
with high levels of inequality. In South Africa, most urban cybercafés cater to
the middle classes; but in the townships there are, with the exception of phone
shops, very few services.
Even small towns in Uganda can sustain some ICT services, aided greatly by
local Internet points-of-presence. Again, the usage patterns indicate that the
market tends to focus on a small segment of the population – professionals
and other well-educated people. In rural areas, however, there are few wealthy
people and very few ICT services. In these areas, the market generally cannot
sustain services, with the exception of some personal cellular phone services
that are often informally shared and resold.
These distinctions are sometimes blurred, especially by outside agencies, in
identifying areas and methods for supporting universal access. Small towns are
sometimes identified as ‘rural’ and the degree of existing economic activity is
not recognized. Provision of public access can be seen as a valuable end in
itself, whereas in practice it duplicates and competes with services already
available. Access initiatives in such locations may still be valuable given that
overall use and awareness are low, but they need to be much more purposive
and targeted if they are to reach a different segment of the population and
meet a felt need. For example, rural farmers may not know what ICTs can
do, but they may express a need for timely market information or weather
forecasts.
Co-ordination and communication across government sectors and levels are
important if ICT-related infrastructure development efforts are to be properly
linked with intended uses. Both Uganda and South Africa have engaged in
this to some degree, and their experiences indicate that the process of change
is lengthy and profound. In South Africa, the GCIS is facilitating a multi-
stakeholder process to design and deliver MPCCs, whereas in Uganda NAADS
is co-operating with existing telecentres and other ICT projects and can help to
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build effective demand for these services. This type of co-ordination can also
help to prioritize and identify appropriate technologies. For example, RANET
is using Worldspace data satellite receivers which allow its sites to receive a
large amount of data, but do not allow for uploading. While this is a more
limited technology than the Internet, it is much cheaper. Such co-ordination
can also help avoid duplication. For example, before GCIS began its co-
ordinating work, a number of government departments were implementing or
planning similar community centres without any clear links.
Multi-sectoral links also make it possible to constantly revisit the goal of
universal access in the context of current national and local development
priorities. Where universal service funds exist, it is possible to target access
services in ways that maximize their reach and developmental impact. For
example, World Vision wanted to step up their RANET sites into public access
sites with a dedicated computer. If they could propose such a venture and
obtain a one-time grant from the UCC to acquire the initial equipment, similar
agencies might follow suit.




South Africa and Uganda in the broader context
The conclusions, lessons, and suggestions in this final chapter are based
largely on the empirical evidence from the two countries covered by the study,
Uganda and South Africa. How widely applicable, then, are the lessons that
can be drawn?
South Africa and Uganda are two specific examples of a process that is
occurring, with different variations, across Africa and the world. Firstly,
national governments and international agencies have since the 1990s,
paid increasing attention to the importance of information and communica-
tion technologies, since these are drivers of the new emerging ‘knowledge
economy’. Secondly, 105 national governments made commitments to the
WTO to privatize and liberalize their telecommunication markets under the
GATS agreement beginning in 1997 (Bressie, Kende and Williams, 2004).
Uganda and South Africa were two such governments. Since these agreements
committed governments to similar conditions and processes of telecommuni-
cations reform, it is not surprising that some early results reveal similarities
across countries. This reform has also influenced the penetration of newer
telecom technologies such as the cellular phone. In this case, there were
generally multiple licensed private service providers early on, in contrast to
the situation for fixed-line telephone provision, which in most countries was
rooted in public monopolies. The Research ICT Africa network has produced
some interesting cross-Africa comparisons of telecom sectors in seven African
countries (South Africa, Uganda, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya and
Zambia). These comparisons show that, while different countries have taken
different routes to meet their commitments, common patterns exist. Most
countries encounter barriers to achieving ‘ideal’ liberalization. Weak
regulators and political lobbying by powerful private and state interests, for
example, are fairly common. However, those countries in which the telecom
sector has been more fully opened up generally appear to have better overall
access at lower prices. Uganda, although far from being in a state of perfect
competition, has gone further than most African countries in liberalizing its
markets. In contrast, Ethiopia still has a state-run monopoly and tele-
communication services are scarce, expensive and difficult to obtain (Adam,
2004). South Africa is in many ways a unique case, due to its higher GDP, much
stronger existing telecom infrastructure, and high levels of inequality.
In short, applying lessons from South Africa and Uganda requires an
understanding of the contexts in which the observations were made and in
which they are to be applied. Referring back to Figures 1.1 and 1.2, we can
reconsider Uganda and South Africa as two specific instances of a general
pattern occurring within Africa and beyond.
Examining key differences in ICT prevalence and use between South Africa
and Uganda also points to differences in causal factors. Some of these are
noted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, while other aspects, especially those related
to local culture, have not been fully captured and explored by this analysis.
This is true, for example, for the greater gender imbalance amongst ICT
users in Uganda than in South Africa. Table 6.1 shows some of these dif-
ferences in causal factors and resulting ICT accessibility, use or developmental
impact.
Table 6.1 Differences in ICT accessibility and use in South Africa and Uganda
Differences in causal factors Results (ICT accessibility, use, developmental
impact)
Policy intent
Greater national focus/activity by
government and NGOs in the
community media sector in South
Africa: community radio, posters,
newspapers.
A substantial role for community media within the
MPCC model in South Africa, with no equivalent in
Uganda.
Major focus in South Africa on
government service delivery, redressing
historical inequities.
Greater implementation focus in South Africa on
ICTs to deliver government services.
Implementation
More of a direct implementation
approach in South Africa, compared
with regulation/subsidy and focus on
market means by Uganda.
An underperforming telecentre programme in
South Africa which is too limited to reach most
people. In Uganda a wider variety of approaches
based more typically within the market, but with
large questions remaining about accessibility to
rural populations.
Larger direct donor involvement in
Uganda, and greater interaction
between donors and the Ugandan
government.
A wider range of telecentre models in Uganda
compared with the mostly homogenous Universal
Service Agency telecentre programme in South
Africa. Early donor experiments influenced
Ugandan policy makers’ decisions about how to
proceed on universal access.
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Similarities between South Africa and Uganda in ICT access and use can
equally be explained by corresponding similarities in policy intent, political
and economic situations, and external factors. As already mentioned, the
overall processes in each country were shaped by the WTO’s GATS trade
agreement. Both countries had relatively high costs of connectivity, related to
still limited markets with powerful telecom operators which could be difficult
to regulate. Equally, those managing access centres in both countries related
stories of unresponsive service and incorrect billing from landline providers.
In both countries, local political troubles had sometimes turned a subsidized
access centre into a source of conflict, and some observers had concluded this
was another argument for privately owned centres.
Differences in causal factors Results (ICT accessibility, use, developmental
impact)
Less effective regulation in South
Africa, and earlier competition
(especially in fixed line
telecommunications) in Uganda.
Fewer available technological options (eg, limited
availability/deployment of VSAT, wireless),
especially in rural areas (urban areas in the process
of getting ADSL) in South Africa.
National/local context
In South Africa, a strong history of
resistance to an oppressive state, with a
lingering sense of distrust and
disenfranchisement ten years after the
end of apartheid.
High rates of theft and vandalism, even in
‘community- owned’ projects.
Artificial, economically weak
settlements (ie, townships) in South
Africa versus functional towns in
Uganda.
Less overall economic activity within townships
makes beginning a viable computer-based
enterprise more difficult, although phone services
have ready demand. Ugandan towns, in contrast,
appear able to sustain a much wider variety of
services, including training, computer secretarial
and desktop publishing services, as well as
Internet cafés. Phone services, however, remain
most prevalent and appear most likely to generate
profit.
Different migration patterns: in Uganda
a greater international Diaspora; in
South Africa, almost exclusively
internal migration in the communities
studied.
Greater apparent demand for e-mail in Uganda and
high demand in both countries for telephones.
Varying local economic and cultural
factors.
Gender gap: fewer women amongst ICT users in
Uganda compared with South Africa.
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Lessons for policy makers
1. Market liberalization is more likely to lead to broader access than
telecommunication monopolies with some obligations – especially
where the regulator is weak.
Based on South Africa’s experience, a monopoly telecommunication market
results, not surprisingly, in high costs and a lack of response to consumer
needs. The argument often made for telecommunication monopolies – that
they are necessary for achieving universal access – does not bear up in the
experience of either South Africa or Uganda. In both countries, the relatively
more open and competitive cellular markets were responsible for the majority
of new telephone users. This increase was never a major part of the original
universal access strategies since the popularity of cellular services was not fore-
seen. Although this is generally a positive development, cellular phone use is
still much more expensive than landline phone use, and cellular networks are
not well-suited to large data transfers. While new technological developments
may change these limitations, some close observers have argued that public
investment in telecom infrastructure, including fibre optic cable, is necessary
to move a nation towards universal access and to maximize the potential
benefits of the information economy (Tusubira et al., 2003).
For Internet use too, the relatively more liberalized environment of Uganda
has facilitated universal access. Although South Africa has the largest propor-
tion of Internet users in Africa, it is also one of the most unequal countries in
the world and patterns of access reflect this. Rates of Internet use in Bhamshela
and Khayelitsha were lower than in many places in Uganda. In both places,
dial-up had proven a poor option for Internet connectivity because it was
expensive and of poor quality. Only in Uganda (and urban areas in South
Africa not covered by this research) had people been able to use alternative
methods of connectivity, including VSAT and wireless broadband.
2. Universal access and access centres need to be integrated into national
development strategies, especially in rural areas.
Both South Africa and Uganda demonstrate that, left to market forces, certain
populations are likely to be excluded from certain types of services and bene-
fits associated with ICTs. Moreover, the ability to benefit from ICTs depends
upon the provision of services that have traditionally been within the domain
of public services – especially electricity, roads and education. At the same
time, ICTs may play a complementary role in larger development strategies.
In South Africa, the Multipurpose Community Centre programme focuses on
creating structures for government service provision and community media
in traditionally disadvantaged areas. In Uganda, the National Agricultural
Advisory Service, which is integrated into the overarching national develop-
ment strategy, focuses on creating demand and linking it with the supply
of agricultural information. Both of these programmes can benefit from the
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presence of basic ICT infrastructure in rural and disadvantaged areas, and can
in turn act as ‘anchor clients’ in creating effective demand for these services,
thus contributing to their financial viability in poor areas.
In 2003, both South Africa’s MPCC programme and Uganda’s NAADS strat-
egy had been operating for a few years, but it was too early to determine what
the long-term viability and impact of these strategies would be. Both required
the creation of new organizational structures and new working relationships,
within government and between government and other stakeholders. This
was a time-consuming process that committed to a longer-term vision. Such
types of activities can be viewed as social investments in underdeveloped
communities. If carefully co-ordinated and adequately resourced, they will
create opportunities to ensure ICTs serve the public good.
Any attempt to integrate ICT access into development strategies will be
strongly affected by the larger market and regulatory environment. Uganda,
despite the fact that the national ICT policy had not yet been passed, seems
to have faired better than South Africa, which had, from the beginning,
an explicit policy and a special agency to focus on universal access. This
was in part because much of this policy, while ambitious, was not clearly
defined and planned out. Also, the South African regulator was generally
perceived to be weak, especially because of regular interference from the
Ministry of Communication. Any integrated ICT policy will be seriously
hobbled unless it includes clear definitions and action plans, and operates
in an environment where the national telecom sector is effectively
regulated.
South Africa has experimented with direct government intervention in
universal access service provision. As of 2003, these efforts had not been very
successful. This cannot be said to prove that direct government intervention is
always a bad idea – but rather that it is affected by larger market and infra-
structure issues. The Universal Service Agency might have been more effective
had it been set up as a branch of the regulator. As such, it would enjoy the same
independence and power vis-à-vis the operators as the regulator, and universal
access issues would always be framed within the larger context of the tele-
communication market.
Besides being highly dependent on the wider national market, access centres
operating through user fees are not adequate by themselves to build local
demand. This is because of the multiple barriers to access that many popula-
tions face. Low levels of education, illiteracy, low awareness, lack of access to
transportation, and lack of money all contribute to low levels of ICT use. They
are reinforced by a popular conception of ICTs, and especially computers and
the Internet, as the tools of the educated only. Most people are concerned with
gaining immediate productive assets. Knowledge of computers is usually seen
as a long-term investment for people who want to seek formal, professional
jobs opportunities. While this understanding reflects current reality, it also
overlooks the potential that these tools hold for other types of livelihood,
and especially the potential value of information in productive activities.
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Unfortunately, this perception is widespread and such uses are therefore
unlikely to be discovered spontaneously.
Because knowledge of computers is necessary in a growing proportion of
formal-sector jobs, public schools are also important potential equalizers
amongst the population. Creating a strategy aimed at giving all public school
students a fair chance to use computers and learn related skills is therefore
another important complement to universal access strategies. However, there
are huge obstacles to achieving this goal in both South Africa and Uganda
because many schools are under-resourced and have no electricity. Also, the
presence of computers in schools by no means ensures that all students will
receive effective instruction in their use or get the chance to apply them in
other areas of the curriculum.
3. Large telecom operators seem to profit disproportionately from the
telecom services offered through shared access centres, with little of the
profit staying in local communities. Regulation can improve this
situation by recognizing the value of the service provided by local
intermediaries between big operators and the public.
Large telecom operators have much greater political clout than the frag-
mented groups of consumers and small businesses further downstream. Access
centres in local communities are often small local businesses or not-for-profit
organizations that actually help generate profit for the large operators by
aggregating demand and creating use amongst people who would not be able
to use the services by other means such as private ownership. In South Africa
especially, the gap between rich and poor is one of the largest in the world, and
it is therefore tempting for the large operators to ignore poorer markets. Again,
it is the small entrepreneurs who often help to bridge this gap. Regulators
can do much more to explicitly recognize the valuable contributions of these
service providers both to the public and to the large operators. The latter do
business in monopoly or near-monopoly situations, whilst the former face
fierce local competition. For these reasons, regulators should seriously con-
sider requiring large operators to give preferential (‘wholesale’) rates to any
agent who either resells public access to telecom services or provides them free.
4. There is a clear practical distinction between phone and Internet
access: the former has much greater local market demand than
the latter.
The distinction between phone and Internet access may reflect a broader dis-
tinction between communication-related and information-related services,
where the former commonly enjoy greater demand than the latter (Odlyzko,
2004). In terms of policy, it implies that it is worth thinking of telephone
services as separate from, or at least as not necessarily connected with, the
Internet. This is especially true as long as GSM (Global System for Mobile
Communications) plays a major role in providing basic phone access, since the
same technology is not suited to large-scale data transfer as required by most
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Internet applications. However, where and when VoIP is legalized, or GSM-
related technologies become better suited for broadband data transmission,
this distinction might once again cease to be important in terms of physical
infrastructure. It will remain relevant, however, in terms of barriers to use.
Telephones are simple to use and do not require literacy or knowledge of a
major world language. Most computer-based applications, in contrast, require
literacy and some training and time for mastery. And they are vastly more
useful when the user has knowledge of a major world language. Because of
this, any strategy to provide universal access to computers will need to be
closely linked to public education and adult education programmes.
Lessons for those implementing access centres
1. Set a clear and simple initial goal that is based on a real local need
and on which the centre can build.
Early telecentres were often conceived as extremely ambitious projects,
offering a full range of services from virtual learning libraries to telehealth
applications. But in South Africa and Uganda, they were largely unable to
deliver on these high expectations. One of the biggest problems seems to be
with the expectations themselves. For example, local stakeholders, including
telecentre staff and community members, were often introduced to telecentres
with great tales of what they could bring. Whatever the centre did manage, it
almost always fell far short of these expectations. Local support for telecentres,
essential to their continued survival, often decreased over time and staff became
demoralized. Telecentres can reduce risk of big disappointment and lowered
credibility by starting with modest expectations that they can in fact fulfil.
This also allows local capacity to be built gradually. RANET, for example, began
by focusing on the delivery of seasonal forecasts. As many of its sites flourish,
it is natural for local stakeholders to experiment with other applications of
the informational resources available to them. Any intervention by outside
agencies also requires an honest assessment of risk and potential limitations.
2. Externally subsidized access strategies should be based on a full local
market assessment that takes into account both current conditions
and likely future developments.
Another hard-earned lesson from the early telecentres is that outside agents
often did not assess the local market. Rather, they tended to assume that ICT
access services were in short supply and that they should therefore go ahead
and set up a centre to meet a need. This assumption was often true when the
original centres were launched, but the local market often changed quickly –
and not always in response to the telecentre itself. It also links to the some-
times arbitrary distinction often made between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’. In the
implementation of funded telecommunication projects in Uganda, ‘rural’ was
sometimes used to refer to any place other than the capital city, Kampala.
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While Kampala is the largest, most important urban centre, Uganda also has
large towns. ‘Rural’ telecentres situated on the outskirts of these towns are still
competing with a small but active town market. In Uganda, many of the larger
towns have hosted some kind of access centre since about 1998 – the same
period in which the first telecentres began.
This implies that those implementing funded access centres should consider
how these are likely to support local efforts and meet local needs, rather than
usurping and undermining existing local efforts. Perhaps they are providing
a particular service that the market cannot, or they are providing access for a
particular segment of the community that market-based access centres cannot
reach. They should further consider how they might work with and perhaps
directly support local efforts, whether they are small businesses or NGOs.
Supporting existing efforts is likely to be more cost-effective and to have
greater development impact than unilaterally creating a new institution. It
may add value to the work of the existing organization. Many local entre-
preneurs also have an interest in their community that goes beyond a pure
profit motive. Supporting them will in turn support the local economy and
may create jobs.
3. Control for complexity and localize decision making as much as
possible. Funding needs to be flexible and responsive to local
market changes.
Local markets can change rapidly, especially with regard to ICTs. So access
centres need to be able to respond quickly and flexibly. This requires a lot of
locally based decision-making power, as well as capacity to make decisions.
Good management has long been recognized as a key to telecentre success (eg,
Fuchs, 1997). In both South Africa and Uganda, early experience also showed
that placing scarce resources, in the form of telecentres, in resource-poor
communities could lead to local political conflict, especially where the centre
was under the control of local government authorities. This is another reason
why entrepreneurial models sometimes seem to work better. For some of the
people involved in the early Ugandan telecentres, this was the single most
important lesson from their experiences. Certainly, a clear, simple decision-
making and accountability structure is important. Telecentres that rely on
boards filled with local politicians and funding decisions tied to a preplanned
budget or a centralized authority are likely to run into serious operational
difficulties, as these structures will not allow them to respond to community
needs.
4. It is generally not realistic to expect a centre to be profitable
immediately after start-up.
Financial viability over the short term is most likely where:
• there is already demonstrated need and willingness to pay;
• a centre is able to count on service of fair quality and reliability;
CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 125
• running costs are not high and profit margins are fair;
• the access centre is either very simple, or is an addition to an already
functioning organization;
• the access centre is in a highly visible place where people come regularly
to shop and do business.
User fees will often play a role in sustaining access. This may not be a bad
thing, insofar as willingness to pay is an indication of local relevance. How-
ever, the barriers that many people face in gaining access to ICTs and using
them, especially computers and the Internet, are multiple and cumulative.
User fees are an extra impediment for a large segment of the population. Thus,
for any particular centre, depending on its aims and intended reach, it is
important to consider the likely impact of user fees and the pricing structure
on the services offered. For telephone services, simple pay-as-you go access
offered at convenient hours has strong popular demand. Without a concerted
marketing effort, fee-based access to computers and the Internet are likely to
serve only a small segment of the population.
Lessons for those supporting access centres
1. Civil society organizations need to act as watchdogs and place
consumer issues related to telecommunications into public debate.
Building telecommunications infrastructure requires huge amounts of capital.
Because of this, national telecom services will never operate in an environ-
ment of ‘true competition’, where consumer choice amongst multiple
providers promotes efficiency and good practice by competitors. Thus,
governments create agencies to regulate the sector. The telecom operators,
though, are large and powerful, and the regulators often do not have sufficient
political might to manage them. Moreover, the government itself may have
stakes in the major operator, as well as the power to override the regulator’s
decisions. This happened in South Africa on a number of occasions. Such
behaviour can result in decisions that do not maximize public interest.
There is clearly a need for third parties which can serve as watchdogs:
groups that are not directly engaged in telecom services, not profiting from
them, and not directly tied to the government. While the regulator is supposed
to play this role, this is demonstrably often not the case, and an outside
agitator may help the regulator perform more effectively. In South Africa,
for example, the LINK Centre at the University of the Witswatersrand has
conducted public-domain research and provided expert commentary on
telecommunication regulatory and policy issues. It has done this, for example,
for the news media which has in some cases strongly criticized practices of
government, the regulator and major operators.
There is an ongoing critical need for third parties to take on this role
because of the large vested interests and amounts of money at stake. Major
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policy decisions are often made behind closed doors and the general public
is not usually in much of a position to scrutinize carefully everything
that happens. Yet the impacts of these decisions are felt all the way down
to access-related activities at the grassroots, which may find themselves
struggling simply because they cannot get basic phone service at an affordable
price.
2. Small businesses and not-for-profit groups providing various forms of
public ICT access often need support, especially in the form of capital,
equipment, practical technical skills, and business management and
marketing skills.
There are plenty of small enterprises struggling to make a success of providing
ICT access and related services. Although the capacity of these enterprises in
terms of capital, equipment, skills and knowledge varies considerably, most
are weak in at least one of the major areas. The idea of applying SMME support
services to access centres has a fairly successful history in Asia, mainly through
Grameen. In Africa, IDRC supported entrepreneurial start-ups in Senegal
and many of these thrived. In the areas covered by this study, however, there
was relatively little support activity although some NGOs were beginning to
think about it. In the summer of 2003, a project to replicate the success of
Bangladesh’s Grameen Village Phone Programme was just beginning in
northern Uganda, but was too young to be captured in this research.1 The
Vodacom phone shop franchise was another example of an activity fitting
this category, with great success. Other licensed national operators were
considering how they could emulate the model to meet their own licensing
obligations. Clearly, more could be done in this area, especially given the high
demand in both countries for productive, financially viable activities. Third
parties should help entrepreneurs assess both potential risks and benefits.
Market research especially was an area that was often weak, resulting in many
stillborn enterprises.
3. There have been many stand-alone pilot projects and innovative
activities, but the knowledge gained from these is fragmented and
poorly shared.
There are many examples of stand-alone initiatives – sometimes imple-
mented by local agencies, sometimes by outsiders – that have shown some
level of innovation but which were not covered by this research. Many of
them address common problems. For example, Wizzy Digital Courier has
developed an innovative solution to the high cost of Internet connections.
While they have focused on schools in South Africa, the same idea could be
applied to many other situations and places. Sharing these ideas and learning
together have proven to be a challenge. Perhaps this is because there has been
so much activity around ICTs for development in a reasonably short time
period. Many of those who have taken independent action have also expressed
some frustration with larger agencies and networks that they have found to
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be too bureaucratic and often ineffective. This has contributed to overall
fragmentation.
For third parties trying to find their own role, there is a rich bank of on-the-
ground experience in providing access to ICTs, often for a specific develop-
ment-related goal. A number of agents have worked at documenting and
publicizing these. For example, bridges.org is producing a number of ICT-for-
development case studies. At this stage within both South Africa and Uganda,
there is little reason for unilateral action. Interventions should be preceded by
a concerted effort to understand existing efforts and then designed to com-
plement those activities. The challenge is that the ICT scene is constantly
changing and documentation becomes quickly outdated.
4. Partnerships between national or regional not-for-profit organizations
and local access centres require careful attention to the capacity
requirements of partners, and may take time to develop as this
capacity grows.
Partnerships between access centres and other organizations were typically ad
hoc, sometimes transient, and more common among not-for-profit centres.
Such centres, however, often had difficulty maintaining partnerships due to
ongoing crises. Some regional structures put in place to support access centres
found that maintaining reliable communication with these centres could be
difficult; whereas the centres themselves sometimes found such organizations
hard to contact and unresponsive to their needs. For example, schools in the
Western Cape were unimpressed with the activities of Schoolnet South Africa.
So they began their own local network which they hoped to expand. Network-
ing seemed to be more effective where it was rooted in local activities and
partnerships expanded slowly, and where the participants had at least some
basic potential. External agencies looking to co-ordinate such networks were
sometimes far-reaching in their ambitions but had relatively few active
linkages to on-the-ground projects.
What are the main lessons for third-party organizations seeking local
partners? Firstly, in creating partnerships and networking opportunities, it is
best to start small, with concrete activities. These may need to include
capacity-building exercises. But if capacity building is not the intention – for
example, an access centre is to be used to disseminate information on
HIV/AIDS – then the capacity of the centre to effectively carry out such a task
should be assessed.
Secondly, not-for-profit organizations are often considered to be prime can-
didates for partnership, but depending upon the task, small local businesses
already providing ICT access or related services may also be valid partners.
Partnering with locally owned business has the potential benefit of supporting
the local economy while building on existing capacity. Sometimes small
businesses exhibit more local ownership than NGOs which may have been
opportunistically driven by external funding opportunities. Such businesses
also face great challenges in accessing investment capital and sufficient
128 TELECENTRES, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT
management, market research and technical capacity, and may be equally
valid targets for capacity-building efforts.
Research directions
The role of research
The issue of universal access is complex and subject to constant change as
new technologies become available and the market changes. For this reason,
ongoing research in this area is important. One role of research is to monitor
what is happening across countries and to analyse emerging risks and
opportunities. This can inform the process of policy revision.
As universal access is a public interest issue, there is a need for independent
research and publicly available results. The telecom sector especially has a
large body of private sector research often funded by and directed on behalf of
major operators. Public research is necessary to inform regulators, smaller
operators, consumers and consumer advocates, and to promote transparency.
Independent research can also play an important role in monitoring the
degree to which reality mirrors policy intent. For instance, in South Africa
where there had been a clear discrepancy between policy intent and outcomes,
independent research by organizations such as the LINK Centre at the
University of Witswatersrand and bridges.org, as well as media coverage of
the issue, put pressure on the government to revise its practices.
Much research has been done in this area at the project level and by
independent academics, including Master’s and doctoral students. While
there is a wealth of detail in various case studies, little of this information has
been analysed at a more general level. There is potentially much to be learned
through meta-analysis. Better channels for sharing and disseminating research
on universal access issues would also be useful. Some of the traditional
academic methods of disseminating knowledge do not fit well with ICT issues
because the information dates very quickly. For this reason, much master’s
and doctoral research remains unpublished.
The overall arena: actors and relationships
At the national level, ongoing independent research should monitor the
impact of universal access policy, with a specific focus on the costs and benefits
to various stakeholders. This type of monitoring requires clear definitions
of key terms such as ‘affordability’ so that progress (relative to the definition)
can be measured. Other potential areas of research are the effects of pricing
structures on consumer behaviour; the impact of specific universal access
policies, including the costs and benefits to various stakeholders; international
examples and the potential applicability of other policies (for example, those
from Latin America) to particular national contexts; and research into the issue
of public versus private infrastructure development.
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Start-up and sustainability
A key area that remains fuzzy and which is often overlooked is how to
determine appropriate strategies for different types of areas. While different
strategies are obviously necessary, implementing agencies are usually on their
own when it comes to identifying which type of situation they are dealing
with. It may be that the market can be left to itself to provide access centres. Or
perhaps conditions are such that a subsidy or intervention in setting up a
centre would help prime the market. Or it may be a situation where the cost
of setting up an access centre outweighs the potential benefits until other
conditions – for example, electricity, roads or the local economy – are
improved. Research that provides general guidelines and issues to watch out
for could help implementing agencies to avoid common errors.
Another area that could be better researched and documented is how best to
support entrepreneurs who provide universal access. Some initiatives have
already been well documented, including Vodacom’s experiences and the
Grameen phone programme in Asia. Some needs are already well understood,
such as the development of skills in business management, marketing and
basic technical maintenance. These particular skills are in high demand. As the
importance of entrepreneurs in providing access becomes ever more apparent,
these initial case studies and lessons need to be expanded and applied to
potential policy in support of entrepreneurial activity. Research can also
address the issue of how entrepreneurs make decisions about setting up a
business and what types of services to offer. Understanding this could help
those who support entrepreneurs to do so in a way that serves the public
interest, reduces the risk to entrepreneurs, and maximizes productive poten-
tial. For example, a number of entrepreneurs in Lira put great emphasis on
customer service and marketing. How could their counterparts in other places
be encouraged to adopt such practices and, if they did, would the change be
beneficial?
Reach and use
Many not-for-profit telecentres, especially those in or near towns with private
competitors, struggle to establish an identity and role for themselves. To
survive financially, they often end up competing directly with local businesses
on services and prices and targeting the same customers. Further research
could identify and document experiences that demonstrate the particular
niches such telecentres might fill, ways to extend their reach and development
impact, and strategies for survival. And perhaps it could identify when such
centres are no longer necessary, in the face of a changing market.
Research on how different people decide on the cost they are willing to pay
for a particular service has been rather limited. Largely anecdotal evidence in
Africa suggests that ITU guidelines of affordability at 3 per cent of income
spent on information and communication services have little connection
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with reality. In practice, people often pay a much larger proportion of their
income on such services, particularly phone use. A related theme is the issue
of how people, at the individual and household level, make decisions to
start using ICTs and to continue to use them. A special focus on people in
the ‘subsistence plus’ category could lead to greater insight as to when
and how to build demand in rural areas. This approach could also be used to
analyse differences as a function of languages spoken, sex, age and socio-
economic status.
Finally, one of the most important and potentially positive uses of ICTs
is to maintain urban-rural and domestic-Diaspora links. Specifically, how
much of an equalizing force do these links exert, given other factors like
unequal access to education? What are the likely longer-term trends? Ideally,
research could inform policies that favour these interactions and thus increase
benefits.
Appropriating technologies
Most telecommunications R&D occurs in the industrialized North, targeted
towards populations of the same. There is an ongoing need to focus research
attention on determining which technologies might be usefully applied to
universal access and national development in countries of the South. (GSM,
VSAT and wireless are good examples of technologies that have already been of
great value to the South.) Ideally, such research should be carried out in a way
that supports and strengthens domestic technological capacity, especially so
that domestic businesses can participate and gain.
Last words
Optimizing the benefits that new information and communication technolo-
gies present to all citizens of a nation is a goal that presents many challenges,
constant change and much to be learned. Access centres are an important
part of universal access strategies but are not sufficient by themselves. Other
conditions are equally crucial, especially effective national telecommunica-
tion operators regulated in the public interest. The services that access centres
can offer are not always the equivalent of private ownership of ICTs. Some-
times they cannot equal it; sometimes they accomplish more. For example,
private cellular phones allow people to receive calls anywhere (within
coverage) at any time. But the collaborative dimension of access centres can
sometimes help to spark larger community development processes.
One side of universal access that cannot be overlooked is the potential for
giving local people opportunities to provide ICT services and profit from
that entrepreneurship. When this factor is included, universal access becomes
a double-edged tool for community development. Otherwise, if the profit
generated from ICT services is sucked out of poor communities and these
services do not lead to local economic benefits, universal access is potentially
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a tool for further impoverishment. Universal access policy aims to maximize
benefits and understand and minimize risks to public interest. Early policy, for
example in South Africa, was sometimes overly optimistic in identifying
potential benefits. Experience now reminds us that positive development out-
comes do not spontaneously emerge from access, although the potential is
there.
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Notes
1 Introduction
1 Not all of the centres included in this study provide full public access, but they serve
at least a portion of the public. Schools fit within this understanding, but are
included insofar as they provide access to non-students, to maintain manageability
of the research.
2 This presumes the government is democratic and fairly represents the interests of its
people.
2 Access centres and South Africa’s universal access policy
1 This topic has been well monitored and analysed by various observers, especially
the LINK Centre at Wits University. As this overview is comparatively simplistic, the
reader is referred to the bibliography for a more detailed account.
2 Because these lines were unaffordable to many households, 2 million were soon
disconnected.
3 Uganda’s experience with shared access centres and universal
access policy
1 It is a ‘high risk’ proposition mainly because of dependency on third parties for
technical solutions and support, difficulty in securing skilled staff, and environ-
mental and climatic conditions. Also, the complexity of factors makes accurate
planning difficult. Most external funders require such planning, but provide only
short-term funding.
2 In Bukinda, RANET had not been operational long enough for farmers to test this,
but in Tororo they reported they had enjoyed benefits due to their ability to respond
to the RANET climatic forecasts over three seasons.
3 Bushnet’s service has a much broader reach, along the MTN cellular towers that
cover the country, although for small cybercafés it is relatively expensive.
4 Social status also carries economic value (although hard to quantify) in terms
of favours and privileges others may grant you in the expectation that you will
eventually reciprocate.
4 Start-up and scalability of access centres
1 This had been the ‘white school’ under apartheid, and was still wealthier and pre-
ferred by those with a choice, although mixed-race schooling had been introduced.
5 Local livelihoods, reach and development impact
1 The Foodnet project was still fairly new and use was growing – the project also
tracks information on use rates. They also printed the prices in newspapers and
announced them on the radio.
2 In South Africa, bottle stores sell alcoholic beverages.
3 The Youth Development Trust of South Africa released a report on the topic of
computer training, especially at private computer centres, and its links to the job
market (YDT, 2003).
4 This is not to suggest that the relatively high cost of telecommunications service in
Africa is at all a positive thing! It simply provides evidence by exception that user
fees per se are not the sole or even primary reason why computer-based ICTs have
much lower usage rates.
6 Conclusions, lessons and research directions
1 Entitled Village Phone, this project is an ongoing partnership between MTN Uganda
and the Grameen Technology Center.
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Appendix 1: Data Sources and Data
Collection Schedule
South Africa
Field research in South Africa took place over a six-and-a-half week period from Tuesday
April 22 until Thursday June 5, 2003 and included national level data collection, two
community case studies and visits to a number of additional projects. About a third of
this time was consumed by travel, logistical preparations, ongoing adjustment of the
research design, data analysis and processing and an impressive number of civic holi-
days. Data collection activities were concentrated in Johannesburg and surrounds, Cape
Town, Khayelitsha (on the Cape Flats) and Bhamshela, which is about an hour and a half
north-east of Durban.
Research Component Sub-component Data collection methods
Khayelitsha
Community Case Study
11 ICT access centres,
1 high school, 1 community
radio station, 1 computer
training school
Observation,
Interview with staff and/or
management,






General population Survey of 68 households in
3 different areas of Khayelitsha
Bhamshela Case Study Telecentre Observation
Interviews w/ manager and staff
person
Group interview w/ students






Interviews w/ management and/or
staff
Interview w/ board members
Half-day user exit surveys
Qalakale High school Visit
Interview w/ principal
General population Survey of 68 households in
3 different communities around
Bhamshela
Uganda
Field research in Uganda lasted seven-and-a-half weeks from Friday June 6 until
Wednesday July 30. The research benefited greatly from excellent and very enthusiastic
research assistants at each case study site. Very little data processing and analysis took
place during this time.





Observation, interviews w/ director,
director of computer school, youth
coordinator, head librarian, and
community radio station manager
Computer Clubhouse, Joburg Observation, interview w/ manager




Site visits to schools in Eshowe,
Ingwavuma




NCRF Meeting w/ ICT Policy Officer,
Communications Officer
Women’s Net Interview w/ several staff
Media Works Interview w/ director, community
services coordinator
Document review
Governmental agencies GCIS Interviews w/ staff
Document review
USA Interviews w/ head of research
department, KZN provincial rep
Document review
site visits to 2 USA telecentres
Other Vodacom Community
Services
Nicholas Pejout, Researcher Meeting
136 APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION SCHEDULE
Research
Component
Sub-component Data collection methods
















3 local radio stations Interview w/ staff
Site visits
Usage data from household survey
General population Survey of about 65 households in
Lira and surrounding villages
Kabale Case
Study
AHI Telecentres Document review,
Interviews w/ project coordinator
and w/ staff at Kabale and Rubaya
telecentres
RANET Bukinda Site Interview w/ manager,
Interview w/ a programme
participant









2 local radio stations Interviews w/ staff,
Usage data from household survey
General population Survey of 74 households in




Nabweru Telecentre Document review
Interview w/ assistant manager
Meeting w/ former board member
Interviews w/ users (all local gov’t
representatives)
Site visit/observation
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Research
Component
Sub-component Data collection methods
Nabweru Case
Study
9 ICT Access Centres




Access centre survey/staff interview
Site visits/observation
User exit surveys




Tororo RANET site Site visit,
Interview w/ coordinator,






Nakaseke telecentre Site visit,
Meeting w/ former manager, current





I-Net Meeting w/ Johnson Nkuuhe,
an I-Net founder,





CIAT/AHI Interview w/ AHI project
coordinator,
Document review
Schoolnet Interview w/ coordinator,
Document review
World Links Interview w/ coordinator,
Document review,
Site visits
Uganda Connects Interview w/ staff,
Document review
CEEWA Interview w/ staff,
Site visit,
Document review
Wougnet Interview w/ staff,
Document review
138 APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION SCHEDULE
Research
Component
Sub-component Data collection methods
NGOs and
associations
World Vision Meeting w/ staff,




UNCST Interview w/ staff,
Document review
NAADS Interview w/ staff,
Document review
Dept of Meteorology Interview w/ RANET project
coordinator,
Site visits (Tororo, Bukinda),
Document review
Dept of Local Government Interview w/ director,
Site visit to training,
Meeting w/ training consultant
UCC Interview w/ director, staff,
Document review
Other Bushnet (ISP) Interview w/ co-founder,
Interviews w/ clients & other key
informants
UgandaOnline (ISP) Interview w/ founder
UNESCO High Commission
for Uganda









Gordon Bell (Radio for
development)
Interview
Dick Kawooga (Researcher) Meeting
I-Net/APC Policy Workshop Attendance at four sessions
AfriNEC meeting Attendance
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